Dialogue with Tristan Vick on the Golden Rule

Posted on October 22, 2012 by Maryann Spikes
In this Euthyphro Dilemma thread I began a dialogue with Tristan Vick, which I continue in this Golden Rule thread, and bring to the top in the thread you are now reading.

Tristan replies:

With 1)God commands/reveals in accordance with his good nature, isn’t actually a proof for God’s good nature. It’s not even an induction. So it can’t simply be assumed, let alone assumed to answer how God, being an independent mind, would or could define “good” or by what accordance of his own Will or Dictates he can or cannot abide. 

So I still don’t think it avoids the problem of subjectivity.

With 2) we can know the Golden Rule through reason and intuition only if it corresponds in order to be known, I think William James answers this in his work. The good may be of pragmatic value, but it doesn’t require the good to be purposeful in and of itself. Sam Harris’ ‘Moral Landscape’ expands upon this. But you could look at the work of Thomas Hobbes as well.  

Basically, according to the goods which serve a practical good, these can be utilized in a way which help us achieve a greater good, but there may never be an ultimate good. There may only be general or generic versions, which we can only know by trial and error, so we come to recognize them, not by intuition, but by experience of the success of those which work and the failure of those which don’t. Therefore certain things which once seemed like a moral good, might in fact, change to prove outdated by today’s moral reasoning. 

As for this ‘universal hunger’ you speak of, this could also be explained from a Naturalistic and Evolutionary worldview. So the burden would be on you to explain why your version which relates to the properties of God supersedes these other explanations for the same “universal hunger’.
Anyway, just some food for thought.


I respond:

Tristan, 

You say, “1) ‘God commands/reveals in accordance with his good nature,’ isn’t actually a proof for God’s good nature. It’s not even an induction.” 

Many arguments are made with certain givens. The Euthyphro dilemma’s given is the Good. My argument is this: “If” the Good exists, or “granted” the Good exists, then God wills/commands according to it. 

You say, “So it can’t simply be assumed, let alone assumed to answer how God, being an independent mind, would or could define “good” or by what accordance of his own Will or Dictates he can or cannot abide. //So I still don’t think it avoids the problem of subjectivity.” 

You want it to answer how God, being an independent mind, would (or could) define the Good–or by what accordance (???) of his own Will or Dictates he can or cannot abide. This is worded so confusingly, but I think you mean that the resolution to the Euthyphro dilemma does not provide a definition of the Good. With that I agree–it only deals with ontology, not epistemology. See our discussion on that here, where I also answer the charge of subjectivity: http://www.ichthus77.blogspot.com/2012/10/dialogue-on-euthyphros-dilemma-with.html Note that my position is that God wills/commands in accordance with his nature–his commands do not define a new good–the definition of the Good never changes and corresponds to his nature. He cannot contradict his own nature–that would make him less than absolute/ultimate.

“With 2) we can know the Golden Rule through reason and intuition only if it corresponds in order to be known, I think William James answers this in his work. The good may be of pragmatic value, but it doesn’t require the good to be purposeful in and of itself. Sam Harris’ ‘Moral Landscape’ expands upon this. But you could look at the work of Thomas Hobbes as well.” 

I answer pragmatism, utilitarianism and Sam Harris elsewhere on this blog and my Sword and Sacrifice blog. Referring to people instead of arguments is not helpful to our dialogue… Can you answer this: If there is moral truth, to what does it correspond? 

You say, “…but there may never be an ultimate good.” Do you mean may in the sense of…”there is absolutely no possible way there could ever be an ultimate good”? Or do you mean it in the sense of “…it’s possible we may never discover an ultimate good”? (because it wouldn’t make sense to say that one may just pop into existence). Socrates, and anyone interested in getting at moral truth, is not concerned with the sort of “good” you are putting forth. 

You say, “As for this ‘universal hunger’ you speak of, this could also be explained from a Naturalistic and Evolutionary worldview. So the burden would be on you to explain why your version which relates to the properties of God supersedes these other explanations for the same “universal hunger’.” 

My version doesn’t supersede the other explanations: I believe the universal hunger was evolved (whether or not it was with God’s assistance, I am still researching), just like our hunger for food. Just as there must have been food enough for us to evolve a hunger for it: There must be “real” meaning in order for us to evolve a hunger for it. 

Sorry it took me so long to reply! Thanks for this discussion :)

Posted in Euthyphro Dilemma, Golden Rule | Leave a comment

Dialogue on Euthyphro’s Dilemma with Tristan Vick and Mike D

Posted on October 11, 2012 by Maryann Spikes
Unknown-2Update 10/16:  I’ve added my reply to the end of this post.  Thanks. :)

Backstory of this dialogue:  


1.  I posted the “Dear Euthyphro” meme on the Facebook page for Christian Apologetics Alliance.  The meme reads:

Dear Euthyphro, 

God IS the Good. 

Love, 

It’s the Golden Rule.


2.  Bud Uzorus was the first naysayer to reply.  He said, “Then good is arbitrary and entirely subjective.”  Not a premise in sight.  Merely a stand-alone, take-it-or-leave-it conclusion.  Anyone can do this in one second, leaving the other person having to do all the work.

3.  I call him on that, and he complains about it on his blog.  I reply to the comments that follow, including to Tristan Vick’s comment, which reads:  

Wow.  

He needs a class in philosophy. 

It’s funny that he says you “need to do your research” but doesn’t understand your point. It seems that he’s the one who needs to do his research. I’d have him start by actually reading Plato’s play Euthyphro, since it is clear by his own comments that he’s never read it.  

Instead of pointing out the point that Socrates made to Euthyphro, you should have just told him to read the play, and get back to you.


4.  Bud Uzorus replies that he got that same impression.  I reply to Tristan Vick, “I have taken a few philosophy courses and read the Dialogue with Euthyphro (1, 2, 3), and I understood ‘why’ Bud would (mistakenly) say what he said.  I addressed that in the dialogue that followed with Justin Schieber.” (links not in the original reply)

5.  Tristan Vick replies:

@Ichthus77 

*Edited* 

I’m sorry, that’s just not at all clear from the quote Bud was responding to. 

First off, the Golden rule was found in cultures which predate the Christian God. 

The Hindus had it. The Chinese had it. So what that has to do with Euthyphro is beyond me. 

Although I don’t know who Justin Schieber is, it would behoove you to at least remember the context of the debate between Socrates and Euthyphro, which was about blasphemy  and whether or not blaspheming something which may or may not exist could be considered a punishable crime. As you recall, Socrates is on trial because he said that you don’t need the gods to be good, because the gods aren’t good. At least that is the claim lobbied against Socrates. And if the gods exist, then whence good? Hence the dilemma. 

Bud’s point was to show you that if you make God the Good, as in your quote, you are making Goodness SUBJECTIVE.  

This is obvious. If God IS/MAKES/EMBODIES the Good, then whatever the MIND of God determines constitutes Good is what becomes the definition of Good. 

Plato was bringing this quandary to the people’s attention through Socrates dialog with Euthyphro, pointing out that this would be a HUGE mistake if they killed Socrates for a crime of blasphemy. Because, if there is a standard of goodness, as most people believe, then it likely does NOT stem from any God.
That’s the point Plato was making.  

Socrates can then turn this point around, using his oh so infamous Socratic method, to show that he does no injustice to deny that the gods are in any way good, because this in turn is not the same as denying Goodness. Therefore he did NOT blaspheme to say the Gods are not Good. It’s in the play.  

So I have no idea how Bud was mistaken by pointing out what is simply the MAIN point of the play. Which is why it seems to me you didn’t read it. Just saying.


6.  Tristan Vick also does a little research into what I have to say in my Dear Euthyphro meme blog post, follows one of the links in that blog post [God (is) the Golden Rule (ought) without offending Hume], and replies to it:

With 1)God commands/reveals in accordance with his good nature, isn’t actually a proof for God’s good nature. It’s not even an induction. So it can’t simply be assumed, let alone assumed to answer how God, being an independent mind, would or could define “good” or by what accordance of his own Will or Dictates he can or cannot abide. 

So I still don’t think it avoids the problem of subjectivity. 

With 2) we can know the Golden Rule through reason and intuition only if it corresponds in order to be known, I think William James answers this in his work. The good may be of pragmatic value, but it doesn’t require the good to be purposeful in and of itself. Sam Harris’ ‘Moral Landscape’ expands upon this. But you could look at the work of Thomas Hobbes as well.  

Basically, according to the goods which serve a practical good, these can be utilized in a way which help us achieve a greater good, but there may never be an ultimate good. There may only be general or generic versions, which we can only know by trial and error, so we come to recognize them, not by intuition, but by experience of the success of those which work and the failure of those which don’t. Therefore certain things which once seemed like a moral good, might in fact, change to prove outdated by today’s moral reasoning. 

As for this ‘universal hunger’ you speak of, this could also be explained from a Naturalistic and Evolutionary worldview. So the burden would be on you to explain why your version which relates to the properties of God supersedes these other explanations for the same “universal hunger’. 

Anyway, just some food for thought. 


7.  Mike D, on the same blog as Tristan Vick, challenged me (not one-liner Bud…) to a more in-depth discussion…I guess the one with Justin Schieber didn’t count?…:  

If someone cannot give you a concise summary of their arguments, then it’s a safe bet they don’t actually have any. 

Yeah, see, those concise exchanges are how you begin a more in-depth discussion. But instead of doing that, you purported to lecture Bud on “doing his homework” and gave him a link farm, which contained little if any content relevant to Bud’s objection. 

And, point of fact, Bud was right. If you ascribe goodness to God’s nature, it simply pushes the question back a step: are the qualities we associate with goodness – kindness, selflessness, compassion, etc… – good because they are part of God’s nature, or are they God’s nature because they are good? And the unavoidable implication of associating “good” with God’s nature is that, per William Lane Craig, God’s commands (our “oughts”) necessarily flow from his holy and loving nature. That part’s okay… it’s the parts where God commands genocide, the slaughter of children, the subjugation of women, death by torture (stoning) for victimless crimes (gathering wood on the wrong day of the week), or that God simply fails to denounce slavery at any point in the Bible whatsoever that you have a problem. Because now you, believing that only good things come from God, and that God’s commandments are necessarily good, have to rationalize extraordinary barbarism as holy and loving. 

Here’s the best part though, and why Bud was right: If you want to rationalize that barbarism by saying it was contextually justified at the time, then you are saying that there is nothing in principle wrong with those acts. An act can be either contextually wrong/right or objectively wrong/right – not both. So if you say that the genocide of Canaan was contextually justified, for example, then you’re tacitly admitting that you do not believe genocide (including the killing of children) to be intrinsically wrong. That makes the rightness or wrongness of any particular act arbitrary – for instead of any act being intrinsically objectively or absolutely right or wrong, it merely becomes right or wrong when God commands or forbids it.
So, which is it? Are moral acts objectively right or wrong unto themselves, or do they become right or wrong contextually when God commands them? You can’t have it both ways. 

See what I did there? That’s an attempt at a discussion. I’ll even give you another resource, one that only takes ten minutes to watch and is directly relevant to the conversation:  

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXO26pObTZA


***

So,  I will reply to all of the above, below:

***

The dialogue known as Euthyphro (http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/euthyfro.html) is recorded by Plato and took place between Euthyphro and Socrates, as Socrates was nearing the time of his trial and execution in 399 B.C..  The famous Euthyphro Dilemma at 10a is only part of this dialogue.  We need to distinguish between the dialogue (Euthyphro), which starts out asking for the definition of the Good (a matter of epistemology), and the dilemma posed by Socrates inside the dialogue.  The Euthyphro Dilemma is ultimately about the being, reality, correspondence, or truth, of the Good (a matter of ontology).  The original question about the definition of the Good was merely a foot-in-the-door question meant to lead into a dialogue that is Socrates’ final attempt at asserting essentialism(only as mid-wife) (http://philosophycourse.info/lecsite/lec-socmidwife.html), as opposed to voluntarism.  

Essentialism is the view that the Good exists to be discovered, whereas voluntarism is the view that the Good is willed or commanded into being.  The latter view, critiqued in this dialogue, is susceptible to the objection that it makes the Good an arbitrary fiction, whereas the former view, implied by Socrates, is the one held by those who view the Good as objective, unchanging, universal truth.  The Euthyphro dialogue and dilemma ultimately give birth to essentialism, grounded neither in the will, nor in the nature of the in-fighting gods Euthyphro believed in—the very sort of implication leading to Socrates’ indictment for blasphemy and being a “maker of gods” (3b) in the first place.  Some suggest the truth of the Good is grounded in the particular instances of the good (or, that there is no objective Good).  I submit that Socrates would apply Euthyphro’s dilemma to that “particulars” assumption, as well, and was the first to hint at a moral argument for God’s existence (Socrates refers to him as “the god” throughout the Apology)—if we take the Good as granted and follow wherever his beloved inquiry, or divine sign, leads (3b, 14c).
 
[Note:  My translation of Euthyphro appears in the softcover book, Plato:  Five Dialogues:  Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo.  It was translated by G.M.A. Grube and published by Hackett in 1981.  Richard Hogan and Donald J. Zeyl correct and improve the translations in this edition.]
 
Epistemology is the initial concern of the dialogue, Euthyphro.
 

Initially, Euthyphro gets going as Socrates requests that Euthyphro provide him with the universal definition of the Good.  In my discussion with Justin Schrieber (https://www.facebook.com/ChristianApologeticsAlliance/posts/417291828331731), I acknowledge that attempts to define the Good, to explain how we know the Good is good, concern the epistemology, or justification, of our understanding of what “Good” objectively means (if it hasobjective meaning).  This is the issue of “WHY is the Good good—how do we KNOW it is good?”

Euthyphro never provides a definition that is to Socrates’ satisfaction.  Socrates finds fault with every example—some of the examples provided for Euthyphro by Socrates to “help” him along, while actually playing with the poor lad.  All the examples can be boiled down to three:

 
·      To prosecute the wrong-doer; justice (too particular, only part of piety)
·      (To give) Whatever is dear to the gods (gods disagree on what is dear)
·      Whatever is dear to ‘all’ the gods (Euthyphro dilemma; applies to all 3)
 

In my “Dear Euthyphro meme” (https://ichthus77.com/2012/09/29/dear-euthyphro-meme), I suggest the correct definition of the Good is Love (not the sort that is from a lack, as discussed between Diotima and Socrates in the Symposium), correctly understood as the Golden Rule, corresponding to God’s nature (1 John 1:5, 4:8; Galatians 5:22-23; Matthew 7:12; John 1:45, 5:39; Matthew 5:17; 2:37, 39, 40), and I talk somewhat about its justification in the thread to which Tristan Vick replies (http://ichthus77.blogspot.com/2011/04/god-is-golden-rule-ought-without.html) but moreso in my neglected work in progress (http://ichthus77.blogspot.com/p/sword-and-sacrifice-philosophy-toc.html).  This is what Tristan really wants to go into a bit more, but we’ll get there soon enough.

More than a mere definition, Socrates is interested in getting at the “form” of the Good.  Socrates starts out asking a popular, benign question (What do we mean by “good”? 5c-d) as a means of being able to get into a more controversial conversation—the sort for which he was executed.  But by “form” (5d, 6d) G.M.A. Grube takes Socrates to mean universal “characteristics immanent in the particulars and without separate existence”—but this seems like a leap of eisogesis…adding meaning into what Socrates was saying, rather than going with the bare minimum of what can be taken as the plain, intended meaning (exegesis). Grube’s translation has Socrates asking Euthyphro:

 

“What kind of thing do you say that godliness and ungodliness are, both as regards to murder and other things; or is the pious not the same and alike in every action, and the impious the opposite of all that is pious and like itself, and everything that is to be impious presents us with one form or appearance in so far as it is impious?” (5c-d) and, later, “Bear in mind then that I did not bid you tell me one or two of the many pious actions but that form itself that makes all pious actions pious, for you agreed that all impious actions are impious and all pious actions pious through one form, or don’t you remember?”  (6d) (emphasis added)

[Tangent:  Granted the quote is an example of rhetoric, but Socrates is mistaken if he believes that good and evil are opposites, for evil is the privation of good (http://ichthus77.blogspot.com/2008/01/on-non-duality-of-good-and-evil.html) (http://ichthus77.blogspot.com/2011/11/answering-stephen-laws-evil-god.html).  Although he states that good and evil are made so through one form, it is more likely he means there is one form for the Good, and one form for the Evil—but I would be delighted to learn that he actually means that evil’s privation is impossible without the more/most ultimate form of the Good.  Anyway.]

Socrates hasn’t stated anywhere in the Euthyphrothat the good is merely or only existent in the particulars.  He does not explicitly state or imply, “The pious is the same and alike in every action, and it stops there, in particular actions—there is definitely no always-pious being which is reflected in all pious particulars.”  And why would he think that the form of the Good is best reflected in pious actions, when later such emphasis is placed on virtue, on ‘being’ pious?  With that in mind, wouldn’t he believe the form of the Good is best reflected in a being that is always pious—the Virtuoso?  The problem is, he acknowledged, that there was no always good god to be found among the Greek hierarchy (so he was receiving the “divine sign” from Whom?).  Perhaps this is why he was indicted with blasphemy and as a “maker of gods”?

So, as hinted at earlier, while Socrates’ questions start out with epistemology, asking for a definition of the Good…they lead into ontology, or questions regarding what gives the Good its being.  This is where he amps things up, from the general dialogue, to the particular dilemma found within it.

 
Ontology is the concern of the Euthyphro Dilemma—and arguably the ultimate concern of the entire dialogue.
 

As the dialogue progresses, Socrates’ rhetoric runs into the topic of the Good’s “ontology”.  Getting at the Good’s ontology involves asking questions like, “What being does the Good describe?  To what does the Good correspond?  What makes the Good something that is real?  How does the Good get its being?”  That is the sort of question asked in the dilemma posed by Socrates to Euthyphro:

“Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?”  (10a) The dilemma is more recently stated this way, with the horns of the dilemma swapping places:  “Is something good because God wills (or commands) it, or does He will (or command) it because it is good?”  So, the dialogue starts out about epistemology, whereas the dilemma in particular addresses the faulty ontology of a failed attempt at definition.  Euthyphro and strict Divine Command Theory proponents espouse divine voluntarism.  Socrates challenges them both, without ever making an assertion, as when Jesus asked, “The baptism of John, where was it from? From heavenor from men?” (Matthew 21, Mark 11) and the implied question, “Which of you is without sin?” (John 8), and many other questions (http://ichthus77.blogspot.com/2011/10/questions-jesus-asked.html).

Socrates is challenging Euthyphro’s definition of the Good (that it is whatever is loved by the gods), by challenging its ontology—and pointing out that even if the ontology worked (which it doesn’t), a definition of the Good is still lacking.  As Hume’s is-ought distinction and Plato’s justified-true requirement point out:  ontology and epistemology cannot pass for each other.

Socrates is stating that telling me what makes the Good real does not tell me what makes it good—and even your explanation for what makes it real is lacking.  1) The gods disagree on what is dear to them, so that, if it is true that they will the good, then something is both good and not good at the same time, and contradictions cannot be true.  2) Even if the gods agreed, the god-beloved is of a nature to be loved ‘because’ it is loved, whereas the good is loved ‘because’ it is of a nature to be loved, so the god-beloved does not define the good–they are not the same.  Just as no satisfactory definition for Good is found in the dialogue, there is no resolution to this dilemma found in it, either, though Grube suggests (a grand non sequitor) that one horn is favored:  that the gods love what is good because it is right, and so there is something more ultimate than the gods.  That conclusion neither defines the Good (the initial issue of the dialogue) nor gets at what makes the Good real (the issue of the dilemma).  The most we can conclude from this dilemma is that Socrates found fault in the position of those who think the Good is good “because” God loves, wills, or commands it.  He explicitly states no actual resolution—the divine sign (spurring on his thoughts about the form of the Good) held him back from it. Through Socrates, the always-good being speaks only what the listener should have been able to hear, but didn’t:  “My dear Euthyphro, I did not make this up.”

In reality, the dilemma Socrates sets up is a false one meant to stir up cognitive dissonance—a stone in your shoe.  There is a third option for which Socrates’ dilemma (or, dialectic…) was the midwife:  There is an always pious god who wills in accordance with his pious nature, and there are no in-fighting gods.  Socrates says, “I find it hard to accept things like that being said about the gods, and it is likely to be the reason why I shall be told I do wrong” (6a-b) and he says this referring to Euthyphro’s rationalizing his father-condemning behavior with, “Zeus is the best and most just of the gods…he bound his father because he unjustly swallowed his sons, and…in turn castrated his father for similar reasons.” (ibid)  Socrates doubts the myths, but he does not doubt the divine sign.

Socrates’ always-pious god, the source of the divine sign, loves, wills and commands in accordance with his goodness, as the true Virtuoso.  He does not invent (arbitrarily or otherwise) the Good (as opposed to strict Divine Command Theory, or divine voluntarism, or Euthyphro), nor is the Good something more absolute than “the gods” (what Grube suggests is the view from which Plato never departed—but all this dialogue suggests is essentialism, or anti-voluntarism, as opposed to ruling out ‘divine’ essentialism…except with reference to the in-fighting Greek hierarchy of gods).  Rather, the Virtuoso’s nature is the being described by the definition of the Good; it is that being to which the definition of the Good corresponds (is true), and to which all particular instances of good are true.  Some have tried to apply Euthyphro’s dilemma to this and say, “Is God’s nature good because of the way God happens to be, or is it good because it matches up to some external standard of goodness?” http://www.reasonablefaith.org/euthyphro-dilemma#ixzz29ToIzvbh  See above, my comments on the Golden Rule describing and corresponding to God’s nature (iow, being made objectively, unchangingly true by God’s nature).

Abstractions do not exist in order for particulars to be true to them. But if there is no existent “form…that makes all pious actions pious” and we are left with only the particulars, then:  the fleeting particulars make themselves pious.  Grube is reasoning in a circle when he assumes Socrates thinks forms are “characteristics immanent in the particulars without separate existence”.  Socrates would put it to Grube this way:  “Are pious particulars pious because the form of the pious is immanent in them, or is the form of the pious, pious, because it is immanent in the pious particulars?”  It can’t be both.  It’s like the watch passing between John and Richard in the TV series, Lost—a closed causal loop.  And in case I just need to be more clear—The pious particulars are truly pious because their goodness corresponds to God’s, which is described by the justified Golden Rule.  The pious particulars get their goodness from God, like we get our being from God.  The pious particulars, like ourselves, are contingent on God’s necessary being—they and we “have” being from him who “is” being.  God is no mere abstraction indistinguishable from a temporary pattern among fleeting particulars—how can anyone think that’s what Socrates was after?!

This is where I believe Socrates’ rhetoric, spurred on by the divine sign, was nudging his dialogue partners, though ultimately it nudged them to execute him. I submit it is Socrates’ own Virtuoso who would later take on flesh and engage his disciples in the “Socratic” method and be martyred, so as to demonstrate true piety in switching perspectives with us (Golden Rule) on the cross.  Socrates, like Jesus, was a gadfly, putting stones under the feet of all who would entertain his dialogue.  Like Jesus, he was an apologist, though constrained to serve as midwife (http://philosophycourse.info/lecsite/lec-socmidwife.html)—and few have been birthed “again” into his ideas. Socrates, like Jesus, “drank the cup” for threatening the idols of the powers that be, and for challenging them to think about what REALLY matters, which is no mere abstraction.  “Gentlemen of the jury, I am grateful and I am your friend, but I will obey the god rather than you, and as long as I draw breath and am able, I shall not cease to practice philosophy, to exhort you and in my usual way to point out to any one of you whom I happen to meet:  ‘Good Sir, you are an Athenian, a citizen of the greatest city with the greatest reputation for both wisdom and power; are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, reputation and honors as possible, while you do not care for nor give thought to wisdom or truth, or the best possible state of your soul?’ Then, if one of you disputes this and says he does not care, I shall not let him go at once or leave him, but I shall question him, examine him and test him, and if I do not think he has attained the goodness that he says he has, I shall reproach him because he attaches little importance to the most important things and greater importance to inferior things.  I shall treat in this way anyone I happen to meet, young and old, citizen and stranger, and more so the citizens because you are more kindred to me.  Be sure that this is what the god orders me to do, and I think there is no greater blessing for the city than my service to the god.” (Apology, 29c-30a)  Euthyphro was deaf to the dilemma, but do you have ears to hear?

 

“As it is, the lover of inquiry must follow his beloved wherever it may lead him.” –Socrates, Euthyphro, 14c.

***

Now for some dialogue with Tristan and Mike.

Tristan Vick, you say (#5 above), “If God IS/MAKES/EMBODIES the Good, then whatever the MIND of God determines constitutes Good is what becomes the definition of Good.”

The view of divine essentialism is that God is the Good.  God has always existed, so the Good has always existed.  God did not create himself, therefore God does not create the Good.  Whatever God wills or commands, he wills or commands in accordance with his nature—he does not make a new good.  There are truths about minds that are not dependent on minds understanding them in order to be true.  That the Golden Rule is how every mind ought to be, is true for every mind, but only fully descriptive of God’s.

But we will talk more about the Golden Rule in this thread:  http://ichthus77.blogspot.com/2011/04/god-is-golden-rule-ought-without.html, where I will answer all the objections in #6.  You are right in the comments below, where you say it is a different discussion.

Mike D (#7 above), you ask, “are the qualities we associate with goodness – kindness, selflessness, compassion, etc… – good because they are part of God’s nature, or are they God’s nature because they are good?” 

They are “justified” as good through good reasoning (follow Tristan and I to the Golden Rule discussion http://ichthus77.blogspot.com/2011/04/god-is-golden-rule-ought-without.html, if you like)—they are “true” if they correspond to an always-good being which they describe.  Hume’s is-ought and Plato’s justified-true require both, separately.

 

You say you are fine with the logic behind God commanding from his good nature (so I’m not understanding why you asked the question I just answered?), but that “it’s the parts where God commands genocide, the slaughter of children, the subjugation of women, death by torture (stoning) for victimless crimes (gathering wood on the wrong day of the week), or that God simply fails to denounce slavery at any point in the Bible whatsoever that you have a problem. Because now you, believing that only good things come from God, and that God’s commandments are necessarily good, have to rationalize extraordinary barbarism as holy and loving.” 

Those are very honest things to be worried about, if your interpretation of the Bible is correct.  Each one of them has been addressed elsewhere in many books, blogs, podcasts, debates, and so on, and I would like to stick to the Euthyphro dilemma in this thread.  But, I will grant, that if you are right in your interpretation—then the Good corresponds to nothing (does not exist).  Or, what other always-good candidate do you know?  But, if there is no good, then there can be no evil, which depends on the good (because it messes it up).  Your charges acknowledge the good, but they do not offer a replacement for God, to which the good may instead correspond.  Perhaps the answer is not replacing, but correctly understanding.  I like this collection of quotes I took from Tim Keller’s “The Reason for God” —

“…how to deal with a Scripture text that appeared objectionable or offensive to them. … slow down and try out several different perspectives on the issues that trouble them. …the passage that bothers them might not teach what it appears to them to be teaching. Many of the texts people find offensive can be cleared up with a decent commentary that puts the issue into historical context. … To reject the Bible as regressive is to assume that you have now arrived at the ultimate historic moment, from which all that is regressive and progressive can be discerned. … To stay away from Christianity because part of the Bible’s teaching is offensive to you assumes that if there is a God he wouldn’t have any views that upset you. … Only if your God can say things that outrage you and make you struggle (as in a real friendship or marriage!) will you know that you have gotten hold of a real God and not a figment of your imagination. So an authoritative Bible is not the enemy of a personal relationship with God. It is the precondition for it,” (109-114). 

For the record, I do not think judgment conflicts with God being good.  Imagine if he let us get worse and worse, and never intervened?  How would that be good?  But that only ‘barely’ addresses what you’ve said.  It would take me much more time than I have to give you a good reply.  Fortunately, many others have done work on this, and I hope you will give them a fair shot.

Removing this next quote from the above context and universalizing it, you say, “An act can be either contextually wrong/right or objectively wrong/right – not both.  Are moral acts objectively right or wrong unto themselves, or do they become right or wrong contextually when God commands them?” 

You agreed earlier that it makes logical sense (despite Old Testament qualms) to say that God commands in accordance with his good nature.  Pair that with contextual absolutism, a discussion in itself: http://ichthus77.blogspot.com/2011/07/my-first-wikipedia-article-graded.htmland you’ll have where I stand on that.

I apologize to both of you for taking so long to answer.  I wanted to give you a good reply.

Now I will work on our Golden Rule discussion, Tristan :)

Part of my contribution in this dialogue is cross-posted at the Christian Apologetics Alliance group blog.

Posted in Euthyphro Dilemma | 7 Comments

How to add a PayPal donate button on a WordPress site

Posted on October 8, 2012 by Maryann Spikes

My friend over at RazorSwift asked me how to add a donate button on a WordPress site. One of our mutual friends referred him to me, thinking I would know. So, of course…I tinkered around until I figured it out!  Now all my sites have one (feel free to support my work), and I thought I’d pass on this little secret to help my readers out.

Part One:  Creating the Donate Button on PayPal

1.  First, sign in to PayPal.  Follow this tab trail:  Products and Services >> Get Paid >> Fundraise >> Accept Credit Cards >> Create a Donate Button Now.  Do your thang, and remember to save your button.

2.  Once saved, you can find information about your buttons later by following this tab trail:  Profile >> My Selling Tools >> PayPal Buttons.

3.  Click on Action for the donate button you created, then select View Code from the drop-down.  If PayPal ever gives you an error message, just click Refresh.

4.  Find the line of code that looks like this:  <input type=”hidden” name=”hosted_button_id” value=”ABCDE1AB12345“>

5.  The part in your line of code that corresponds to the bold characters in the line above–you need to copy and paste that into what WordPress likes to call the Link URL:

https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=_s-xclick&hosted_button_id=ABCDE1AB12345

Part Two:  Adding the PayPal Donate Button to Your WordPress Site


Now, sign into your WordPress site and go to your Dashboard >> Appearance >> Widgets.  Drag the Image widget to where you want it to appear on your page.

1.  Insert this address into the Image URL field:  https://www.paypalobjects.com/en_US/i/btn/btn_donate_SM.gif

You can also add the Image URL of a button you find or design.  That’s a different tutorial.  We’re going for easy here.

2.  Next, insert the Link URL you found earlier, this being only an example:

https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=_s-xclick&hosted_button_id=ABCDE1AB12345 (You would need to change the information in bold to correspond with the information you found earlier when you viewed your button’s code.  Start over and follow directions if you’re like “Whaaat?!”)

3.  Fill out the rest of the information as you prefer and click Save.  Go to your website and test out the button by clicking on it.

And…you’re welcome!  See the Donate button to the right, if you’re really grateful.  ;0)

Any questions?

Posted in Freelancing Tips and Tricks | 26 Comments

Dear Euthyphro meme

Posted on September 29, 2012 by Maryann Spikes

Posted in Divine Essentialism, Euthyphro Dilemma | Leave a comment

Resolving Euthyphro’s Dilemma October 16, 2012

The Humean-Platonic tripartite (Ought-Is-Belief) theory of moral knowledge May 10, 2012

Answering Jerry Coyne and Jason Thibodeau on the Euthyphro Dilemma October 29, 2011

God (is) the Golden Rule (ought) without offending Hume April 10, 2011

Natural law, divine command and Euthyphro’s dilemma resolved March 27, 2011

Hume’s is-ought, Plato’s true-justified, Euthyphro’s dilemma and Gettier’s problem Feb 23, 2011

Norris, Gettier, Euthyphro, Hume and Plato: Is knowledge justified true belief? January 5, 2011

Good 101: Is there a solution to the Euthyphro dilemma? December 24, 2009

If there is an ad inserted into this post, I have nothing to do with it and do not benefit from it, except for having a WordPress site.

Posted on September 29, 2012 by Maryann Spikes | 1 Comment

From Potato Famine to Coffin Ship

Posted on September 13, 2012 by Maryann Spikes

This is the first chapter, From Potato Famine to Coffin Ship, of my mom’s book on Nellie Cashman, Toughnut Angel:  The Tale of a Real Life Adventuress of the Old West. Nellie came over here from Ireland on what they called coffin ships, the conditions of which were so wretched, a lot of people died during the voyage–many families held funerals for them before they left. Then she made and gave away fortunes as a miner in the Old West, always helping her predominantly male miners with food and lodging.  Those fortunes helped build hospitals.  She was truly an amazingly strong and great woman. This book will make you laugh and cry–the whole world should know Nellie. This first chapter was just published in Irish American Cultural Institute’s Newsletter Issue No. 912 (available via email) –h/t Jane Baker Continue reading →

Posted in Reviews and Interviews | Leave a comment

The day I converted from atheism is approaching…

Posted on September 11, 2012 by Maryann Spikes

64450_287287424737812_1314788024_nI spruced up the old testimony for Brian Auten’s Former Atheist Project on Apologetics 315, just in time for my approaching born-again birthday.  If you’re a former atheist, Brian would love to hear your story–and so would I :)  Mine begins here…

Before I became an atheist, I had grown up in church, a preacher’s kid who prayed to receive Christ when I was four. I never matured beyond the Sunday school understanding of avoiding the punishment of hell and gaining the reward of heaven.  There were lots of questions my parents did their best to answer, but many questions lingered after I got married and moved away from home.

When we bought a computer, I used it to witness in chat rooms and message boards, even met a few times in person with one of the people to whom I was witnessing.  In the process I discovered people have a lot of doubts about Christianity, and I added those doubts to my own.

I remember the night when the scales tipped and my doubts outweighed my faith – I had a nightmare that I rode in the passenger seat of a car speeding through a hilly stretch of road and could not make the driver slow down. I woke up terrified as the car launched off a cliff into the blackness of night.  The grounding of my faith gave way to an abyss of nothing.  It didn’t kill me, but it didn’t make me stronger, either.  The abyss provides no ground for meaningful strength.

I lived as a lost, prodigal sheep for about five years.  Emotionally I abandoned my family, paying as little attention to them as I could get away with, and invested all my spare time in online philosophy message boards. I did a lot of selfish things I rationalized were okay at the time, as long as no one knew.  Now I regret those things.  They caused pain and left scars.  I learned that nothing genuinely good needs to be hidden.  Really, I knew that, but I ignored what I knew, and God gave me over to delusional thinking.  I remember with sadness even the happy memories during that time, because they are all colored with the full reality of what I hid.

By the time He brought me back to Himself, I no longer thought about God.  I didn’t think a God existed to think about.  I felt apathetic about life. I taught my kids that believing in God was like believing in the Easter Bunny, Santa Claus, and the Tooth Fairy. My still-believing husband and I butted heads over my stand.

The nagging question of why something exists instead of nothing needled me. It bothered me because I couldn’t answer it, not because I thought an answer exists.

Finally I tired of lying to my husband and stopped doing things I had to hide, hoping my marriage would improve.  I became a zombie.  I merely existed, and would’ve continued that way if God had not intervened. I wished I could believe like my husband believed, to make our marriage go more smoothly, but I couldn’t.  I couldn’t believe something for which I felt there was no evidence.

It all became real on September 22, 2005, when God smacked me upside the head. I am leaving out details no atheist would believe unless they experienced them, but He influenced me to tell my husband everything I had ever done.  It felt like I threw my whole marriage and our parenting up in the air and trusted God to catch it and help it all land safely on the ground.

It turned out my husband had broken down and prayed two days before that I would find God and our lives would get straightened out. He already knew I wasn’t completely present in our marriage, and when I told him the truth, he wanted to leave, but God put it on his heart to stay.

Besides guiding me to tell my husband the truth that day, God helped me quit smoking and let go of other addictions. Life wasn’t all sunshine and roses—things got much worse before they got better, but God was on our side and carried us through the storm of insanity. I refer to it sometimes as the fiery whirlwind. God broke me, sifted me and refined me.

He made His saving love real to me by offering me His hand and giving me the choice to be saved out of the mud when I still wallowed in it.  The transformation God brought about in my life helped me and my husband go from the nightmarish brink of divorce, to best friends in love all over again, united in our faith.  He helped me gradually restore the intimacy mothers are supposed to share with our children.

After Jesus made himself real to me, I decided I wanted to actually look into the evidence, rather than chant the mantra still heard from atheists today, that “there is no evidence”.  I’ve been involved in apologetics ever since.  Now I teach my sons about arguments for God’s existence and evidence of Jesus’ resurrection.

“For You had cast me into the deep… But You have brought up my life from the pit, O Lord my God.” –Jonah 2:3, 6

Posted in Tim McGrew | 12 Comments

JC Lamont’s "Prophecy of the Heir" on the problem of judgment

Posted on August 29, 2012 by Maryann Spikes

Over the summer I read JC Lamont‘s Prophecy of the Heir, and not included in my review and author interview is mention that my absolute favorite thing about this book is how Lamont unapologetically, yet with the prowess of an apologist, answers the problem of the harshness of judgment. 

 In the review, I do mention that Michael’s loyalty to the Prince is challenged mainly by his doubts surrounding why Elohim would bring judgment upon humans (the mud race), or at least not save them from the consequences of their choices.  The relationship between Michael and the Prince is forged in the crucible of this conflict.  Most of my favorite POTH quotes surround how Lamont handles this delicate issue.  So, below, I want to provide some background to those relevant favorites.


 “One cannot pardon those who do not wish to be pardoned.” –The Prince, p.45
It is after Lucifer has led the rebellion in Shamayim, and the Prince is explaining to Michael that all who followed Lucifer are no longer the same, but have become Shaityrim.  Michael is mourning the loss of his friends, including his best friend, and his mentor.  He asks the Prince, “Is there no chance of pardon?”

“I will pardon any who wish to be pardoned.” –The King, p.83
Michael has asked the Prince, “If you care for them, …why do you not intervene?”  The Prince warns him “an intervention would be devastating,” and Michael replies that “the condition of Mortal-earth is devastating.”  Later, the Prince discusses the condition with the King, whose words are taken nearly straight from the Bible.  When the Prince hears these words, his grip tightens on his Father’s hand, and the King responds with, “I will pardon any who wish to be pardoned.”  The Prince whispers, “I know.”

“Has he not offered them both pardon and life?  It is they who have rejected him, not he who has rejected them.” –Mauriel, p.85

The above circumstances send Michael storming in to confront the Prince.  Michael argues, “Annihilation is not what I meant by intervention.”  The Prince reminds him of his warning that intervention would be devastating, and Michael is ready to defect.  Michael withdraws to solitude for a century as Noach constructs the ship that will save his family and many animals. He is surveying Gaia one last time for any other souls that can be saved from the coming destruction, finding no one.  Mauriel engages him about the source of his despair.  “‘If Elohim does not intervene,’ she said, gazing at the Gaia, ‘how many more will be born and live in darkness, to the end of their days, only to die in their treason?'”  In the middle of their back-and-forth, she says the quote beginning this paragraph, and when Michael responds, “And soon they will be dead,” she replies, “‘Ay, a breath sooner than anticipated.  But Michael…They are already dead.'”

 “If I destroy all who commit treason, I am a dictator.  If I prevent them from committing treason, I am a manipulator who withholds from them the right to choose.  And if I do nothing, in the hopes that they turn from treason and seek truth, I am accused of allowing suffering and not being of love.  So pray tell…what course of action could I take that would please you?” –The Prince, p.324
Shaitan has incited Daeved to authorize the census rather than trust King Elyon.  The Destroyer is carrying out the resulting plague and Michael has orders not to protect them.  Gavriel tries to reason with Michael about why King Elyon would do this, but Michael’s despair turns to rage, and he flies on his pegasus back to Shamayim to confront the Prince, demanding to know why the Prince does not stop Shaitan’s influence.  The quote provided is the Prince’s reply.

 My favorite moment in the whole story happens next.  I will quote it in its entirety:

Michael averted his eyes, and the Prince strode back to the pergola. 

Though Michael’s rage subsided, one thought remained.  Is this all just a game? 

The Prince snatched up his parchment and threw it at him. “Ay, Michael,” he said.  “It’s naught but a game!” 

Michael caught the scroll in surprise.  He hesitated, then unraveled it and read.  

***

Elyon, Elyon, my king, my lord   

Deliver me from this sword 

***

Why have you forsaken me 

In your eyes, forsaken me 

In your thoughts, in your heart, 

In your wrath, forsaken me  

***

In their hatred, dark and fierce, 

They mock, scorn and abase 

My hands and feet, they pierce 

My bones, they wrench from place   

***

You lay me in the dust 

Desert me as death calls 

Yet in you, will I trust 

Into your hands, my spirit falls  

***

He strode back across the garden, but when he reached the vines, the Prince called out to him. 

“Do not let your love for mortals kill you–that is not your path.”

Posted in JC Lamont's Prophecy of the Heir, Problem of Evil & Hell | Leave a comment

JC Lamont interview and Prophecy of the Heir review

Posted on August 29, 2012 by Maryann Spikes

I recently had the pleasure of reading and reviewing JC Lamont’s debut work of literary apologetics, Prophecy of the Heir, as well as interviewing its author, JC Lamont:

Book review: JC Lamont’s Prophecy of the Heir August 27, 2012
Shorter reviews on Amazon.com and BarnesandNoble.com.

Prophecy of the Heir author interview: JC Lamont August 27, 2012

In our interview, she fields all the many questions that popped into my head as I read her LOTR-inspired book of the new “angels and demons” genre.  I laughed, I cried–and even at one point got sick to my stomach.  More important, this book make me think.

JC Lamont’s “Prophecy of the Heir” on the problem of judgment

Posted in Apologetics, Reviews and Interviews | Leave a comment

Groothuis’ "Christian Apologetics" ch.12: The Design Argument

Posted on August 26, 2012 by Maryann Spikes
Resuming our discussion of Groothuis’ Christian Apologetics:


“[Dembski’s] method of detecting intelligent causes is already accepted in several areas of science, namely, archaeology, forensic science, intellectual property law, insurance claims investigation, cryptography, random number generation and the search for extra terrestrial intelligence (SETI).  Intelligent design (ID) simply employs these methods of detecting or falsifying design and applies them to the natural sciences as well.” p. 244

Dembski’s design filter: contingency, complexity, specificity:

1.  contingency: not explicable on the basis of natural law (automatic processes-though they can act upon it)

2.  complexity: less probably that it came about by chance

3. specificity:  the first two being the bull’s-eye…are specified before, not after, the arrow is shot.
“…the design inference is not based on ignorance of the natural world but on knowledge about it, especially given recent discoveries in physics (fine-tuning) and biology (the nature of the cell and DNA).  Those who reject all design explanations in principle have committed the logical fallacy of begging the question in favor of naturalism; if so, their naturalistic theories become unfalsifiable and impervious to counter-evidence–traits that are hardly theoretical virtues in the philosophy of science.” p. 247

 “Even if we were to write a ‘0’ on each separate proton and on each separate neutron in the entire universe–and we could throw in all the other particles as well for good measure–we would fall short of writing down the figure needed.  [This is] the precision needed to set the universe on its course.” p. 250

 Sir Martin Rees’ “six numbers“–via Lemley, quoted from page 251:

 1.  The strength of the force that binds atomic nuclei together and determines how all atoms on earth are made.

 2.  The strength of the forces that hold atoms together divided by the force of gravity between them.

 3.  The density of material in the universe–including galaxies, diffuse gas and dark matter.

 4.  The strength of a previously unsuspected force, a kind of cosmic anti-gravity, that controls expansion of the universe.

 5.  The amplitude of complex irregularities or ripples in the expanding universe that seed the growth of such structures as planets and galaxies.

 6.  The three spatial dimensions in our universe–“Life could not exist if it were two or four,” contends Rees.

 “If each of the six numbers Rees has identified were dependent on the others–in the same sense that, say, the number of arms and fingers in a family depends on the number of family members–the fact that they allow for the existence of life would seem less of a shock.  ‘At the moment, however, says Rees, ‘we cannot predict any of them from the value of the others.’  So unless theoreticians discover some unifying theory, each number compounds the unlikeliness of each of the other numbers.'” p. 251 (but see more-fundamental-law objection below)

 Regarding the expansion rate of the universe:  “…the likelihood of this constant occurring by chance is that of randomly hurling a dart from outer space and hitting a bull’s-eye on earth that is less than the size of one atom.” p. 253

 Fine-tuning data is the result of either 1) design, 2) chance, 3) natural law/necessity, or 4) combo of 2 and 3.  Question:  Why not some combo of 1, 2, and/or 3?

 Regarding the Weak Anthropic Principle (or “the truism objection”)–I will phrase it this way:  Sure, there is fine-tuning, but no God is needed to explain it, because if the natural laws necessary for our existence had not manifested, we would not be here to observe anything.  We are, so they did.  No God needed.

 The problem with that, is it does not explain the fine-tuning or provide an explanation for the overwhelming improbability of the appearance of necessary conditions.

 Inscrutable odds objection:  can only calculate probabilities for things in the world, not the world as a whole.  Wrong, because 1) there are far more possible human-life-prohibiting universes than possible human-life-friendly universes, 2) the uniqueness of our universe doesn’t rule out the consideration of probabilities, 3) we rationally consider probabilities for singular events in other situations.

 Not chance, so mulitiverse:  The thing I am impressed with in this chapter is that most honest scientists don’t deny fine-tuning or try to argue it just happened by chance–hence, the multiverse theory (which is not merely a theory meant to deal with the improbability of fine-tuning, but is a theory some invoke for that purpose–because the more chances/universes you have, the greater your odds).   But… “…in order to ‘abolish one unobservable God,’ various multiverse theories require ‘an infinite number of unobservable substitutes.'” p. 261 –see earlier chapter on the problem of an actual infinite.  Multiverse theory 1) appears to be flagrantly ad hoc, 2) lacks experimental evidence, 3) is exceedingly complex.

 The more-fundamental-law objection says such a law would explain everything and a Designer would not be required. However, such a “superlaw” could have been otherwise, is not logically necessary, would itself be highly improbable and specified for life to exist, and so would not explain away the design hypothesis.

 Pantheism fails to explain design, because 1) the knower is not the known, 2) the universe is not a necessary being, 3) designing is done by a person, and 4) no rational argument can explain the presumably ineffable.

 In sum:  The universe is not logically necessary and requires an explanation of its origins.  Further, the “six numbers” are either the result of 1) chance, 2) necessity, 3) combo of first two, or 4) design.  The probability of the first three is way, way, way, way, waaaaaaaaaaaay, way too low.  Therefore, 4.  Therefore, there is a Designer.

 Questions for Dr. Groothuis, sent via email:

 1.  Is that bone field on 261 a reference to the Higgs field?  Is the recent Higgs Boson discovery a step towards a unified theory for the “six numbers”?  Will it result in a rewrite of this chapter?

 2.  On page 251 you say a unifying theory would make the life-friendliness of the “six numbers” less of a shock.  But of the more-fundamental-law objection, you say, on 263, the superlaw would still be improbable and specified for life.  Are you talking about two different things?

 For those curious about the Higgs discovery, here is a great article from John Lennox in the Christian Post:  http://global.christianpost.com/news/the-god-particle-not-the-god-of-the-gaps-but-the-whole-show-80307

 Update 8/28:  Had apologetics meeting last night, and have 2 more questions:

 3.  Isn’t the arrow already shot, so that the fine-tuning is drawing the bull’s eye after the fact?  I know that must be wrong, because scientists don’t deny fine-tuning, but…?

 4.  Is this argument saying the same thing as the anthropic principle (which uses the language “necessary” instead of “impossible”)–If it were naturally impossible that we be here, we wouldn’t be.  We’re here, therefore it is naturally possible.  Therefore, no supernatural explanation is needed.

 Will email the new two questions to Dr. Groothuis, but I’m pretty sure he’s too busy to give a complete answer.  So–anyone reading this, who knows their stuff–please reply.

(discussion index)

Posted in Apologetics, Groothuis' 'Christian Apologetics', Reviews and Interviews | Leave a comment