Ichthus77

The first premise below is okay, because the idea of a perfect being is conceivable (not contradictory).

Anselm’s first ontological argument:
1.  God is the greatest possible being.
2.  Actual existence is better than possible (mental) existence.
3.  Because 1 & 2, therefore God, as the greatest possible being, does not merely have possible (mental) existence, but also actual.

Question:  What if the greatest actual being is not the greatest possible being?

The third premise below is okay because there is nothing contradictory about a maximally great being.

Anselm’s second ontological argument:

1.  God is maximally great–a Perfect Being.
2.  –that is either impossible or (if possible/actual) necessary (can’t be contingent).
3.  It’s not impossible.
4.  Therefore, it’s necessary.
5.  Therefore, God exists.

Kant’s criticism that existence is not necessary to the idea of God (or that existence cannot function as a predicate for the subject of God) fails, because God is a possibly existing thing whose existence is a legitimate question (not all conclude he does exist).

Question:  What if the greatest actual being is not a maximally great/perfect being?

Question:  Is being “necessary” the same as being “logically necessary”?  If so, then even if the ontological argument fails, it does not rule out God’s being logically necessary, as there are other arguments that can stand in for that (cosmological, moral, etc.).

Interlude:  The paradox of the stone fails because it is logically impossible to make a stone he can’t lift–power is about logical possibles being actualized.

Plantinga’s ontological argument:

1.  It is possible a maximally great being exists (it isn’t contradictory).
2.  A maximally great being exists in some possible world.
3.  So, a maximally great being exists in every possible world.
4.  Therefore, a maximally great being exists in the actual world.

Question:  What if it’s possible a maximally great being does NOT exist (in some, therefore any, possible world)…?

The “perfect island” parody/argument fails because there are no maximal or necessary islands.

Cool:  These scriptures point to God’s necessity:  Acts 17:24-25; John 5:26.

(discussion index)

One thing I found helpful in this chapter of Groothuis’ Christian Apologetics was the distinction between general revelation and natural theology.  Not all general revelation is ‘natural’–“God may have revealed himself in a way not susceptible to argumentation.  If so, this general revelation would be more a matter of intuition than intellection,” (p. 174).  I think the moral hunger common to every human fits in this category.

I appreciated that general revelation in the Bible was referenced.  Romans 1:19-20:  “What may be known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them.  For since the creation of the world, God’s invisible qualities–his eternal power and divine nature–have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been are, so that people are without excuse.”  Romans 2:14-15:  “(Indeed, when Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature things required by the law, <sup class="crossreference" style="font-weight: bold; line-height: normal; vertical-align: top;" value="(A)”>they are a law for themselves, even though they do not have the law. ¹⁵ They show that the requirements of the law are written on their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts sometimes accusing them and at other times even defending them.)”



The “biblical authority” argument against natural theology fails because an authoritative text is not made less authoritative (is not undermined) by corroborating and confirming its authority (defending its credentials)–rather, these things establish the authority of a text, which is not dependent on such arguments, but is made more credible to (say) skeptics.


The “noetic effects of sin” argument against natural theology fails because “Reason itself cannot be fallen and remain reason,” and “Sound reasoning is the norm for [those] willing to follow truth wherever it leads.”


The “direct knowledge of God” argument against natural theology fails because there is more than one way to know something–theistic arguments can supplement immediate knowledge.


The “proofs lead to pride” argument against natural theology fails because theistic arguments can influence a person to begin to wonder about his or her status before God, to seem small in comparison to the metaphysical grandeur of God, and to investigate the claims and credentials of Christian theism.


The “natural theology in competition with special revelation” argument fails because “the Bible itself claims that God is revealed in nature and conscience” and “a sound apologetic method attempts to verify the Christian worldview through various means, not merely by natural theology.”


The “religious irrelevance” argument against natural theology fails because, rather than ending in deism, it is a “prelude to other evidences and arguments pertaining to” the creeds of Christianity.


The “complexity of proofs” argument fails because many reason these arguments on their own without ever first learning the arguments, and many master them–so it must not be too complex for them.  The argument does not apply across the board and so does not eliminate natural theology altogether.


The “rational weakness” argument fails because it poisons the well rather than giving actual counter-arguments.  “In the end, the proof of the theistic proofs lies in the proving, that is, in their validity and soundness, and not in theoretical musings about what they can or cannot or should and should not do.  We must simply discover whether the arguments, singly and taken together, make belief in God more credible than otherwise.”


(discussion index)

p. 158:  “Pascal does not mention hell overtly in his famous argument.”

p. 161:  “First, prudential matters do not determine beliefs; they merely prime the pump for investigation and consideration.  One must consider the credibility of any religious claim in addition to its prudential promises.”

Question:  “Yet this does not mean that we could not choose to cease believing in Christianity,” (p. 163)–how does that relate to ‘perseverance of the saints’?  This use of the world belief implies not mere intellectual assent (the sort “even the demons” give), but actual faith.

(discussion index)