Ichthus77

Wilkins and the EAAN — a reply by Dr. Alvin Plantinga

Posted on February 24, 2012 by Maryann Spikes

The January 30 Philosophers’ Carnival featured Classical Global Skepticism and the EAAN by Jim S. at Agent Intellect. January 31, John Wilkins at Evolving Thoughts responded with Plantinga’s EAAN. I volunteered to host the next carnival, inviting submissions with an emphasis on dialogue, being sure to email Professor Plantinga regarding these developments. I said I would be happy to host his reply on my blog, knowing he does not have a blog of his own. He answered that he would reply to Wilkins in roughly a week. I was hoping to have his reply posted in time to include it in the February 20 carnival I just hosted, but I received his reply today and am honored to post it below. I will submit it to the next carnival, which will be hosted at critique my thinking (you can submit articles to that carnival using the form on this page).

The rest of this post is written by Dr. Plantinga.

***

Wilkins and the EAAN

John Wilkins represents my evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN) as follows:

P1. If evolution is true, then we have modified monkey brains.

P2. Modified monkey brains are not evolved to find out the truth.

P3. Evolutionary naturalism (the view that everything about humans, including their cognitive capacities, evolved) is the output of modified monkey brains.

C1. Therefore evolutionary theory is unreliable and should be rejected.

C2. Therefore evolutionary naturalism should be rejected.

P1 – P3, I take it, are supposed to be premises of my argument, and C.1 and C.2 its conclusions. Wilkins then objects to this argument. I agree with him: this argument is objectionable. I am happy to say, however, that it is not even remotely recognizable as my argument.

I have no objection to P1 to P3 (taking ‘naturalism’ the way Wilkins take it); neither, however is a premise of my argument. While I have no objection to P1 and P3, I do reject P2 (and of course it is not a premise of my argument). I’m inclined to think that in fact our brains have evolved from something like monkey brains, but it certainly doesn’t follow that they haven’t been evolved to find out the truth. Like other Christians, I believe that God has created us, and created us in his image. That means that he has created us in such a way that we too can have at least some knowledge: of the world around us, of ourselves; and also of God himself. So if, as seems likely, we have come to be by virtue of an evolutionary process then God has created us by way of such a process—an evolutionary process has been guided and orchestrated by God. But then P2 is false.

Thus the first main problem with Wilkins’ reconstruction of my argument is that none of the premises he ascribes to me is in fact a premise of my argument. And the second main problem is that in attempting to state my argument, he uses the term ‘naturalism’ in a way completely different from the way I use it. In my argument I take naturalism to be the claim that there is no such person as God or anything like God—no angels, demons, or anything else supernatural. Naturalism is therefore stronger than atheism; you can’t be a naturalist without being an atheist, but you can be an atheist without rising to the full heights (or descending to the murky depths) of naturalism. Wilkins, however, takes naturalism to be something entirely different: “the view that everything about humans, including their cognitive capacities, evolved”. I reject and argue against naturalism taken my way; it is naturalism taken my way that I argue against. On the other hand, I have no objection to naturalism taken Wilkins’ way: since I have no objection to the view that we have come to be by an evolutionary process (one guided or orchestrated by God), I also have no objection to the view that everything about us, including our cognitive capacities, has evolved.

This second problem—his using ‘naturalism’ in a way completely different from its use in EAAN—leads to the third major problem. This problem is that neither of the conclusions he ascribes to my argument is in fact a conclusion of the argument. According to Wilkins’ C1, “evolutionary theory is unreliable and should be rejected”; according to his C2 “evolutionary naturalism should be rejected”. Neither of these is a conclusion of my argument; furthermore, I don’t believe either one. It is not a conclusion of my argument that evolutionary theory is unreliable and should be rejected; as I say, I have no objection to current evolutionary theory. It is also no conclusion of my argument that evolutionary naturalism (naturalism taken Wilkins’ way) should be rejected. Taken his way, ‘evolutionary naturalism’ is just the view that everything about humans, including their cognitive capacities, has evolved; I don’t argue against that thought and have no objection to it.

So I’m sorry to say Wilkins gets my argument really wrong; none of the premises he ascribes to me is in fact a premise of the argument; and neither of the conclusions he ascribes to me is in fact a conclusion of my argument. Furthermore I don’t believe either of the conclusions he ascribes to me.

If Wilkins has the argument wrong, how is it supposed to go? First, the conclusion is that you can’t sensibly accept both current evolutionary theory and naturalism as I defined it; the view that there is no such person as God or anything like God. That’s the conclusion: I am certainly not arguing that evolution is false or can’t sensibly be accepted. What I am arguing is that the conjunction of naturalism with current evolutionary theory is self-referentially inconsistent; it shoots itself in the foot, you can’t rationally believe it. That is because if you believe that conjunction, then you get a defeater for that conjunction—a reason to reject it, to refrain from believing it.

The argument has at least two forms, one with a stronger conclusion and one with a weaker. The stronger conclusion is that a person who accepts (believes) N&E has a defeater for all of his beliefs, of whatever kind. The weaker argument has the conclusion that one who accepts N&E has a defeater for any philosophical or metaphysical beliefs he has—beliefs such as that Plato was right (or wrong) about the forms, or that there is (or isn’t) such a thing as objective right and wrong, or that there is no such person as God, or (Darwin’s example) that “the Universe is not the result of chance”—or naturalism itself. These beliefs are of such a sort that it doesn’t seem to matter, for fitness, for survival and reproduction, whether you hold the belief. (After all, it is only the occasional member of the Young Atheist Society whose reproductive prospects are likely to be enhanced by his accepting naturalism.) Since Wilkins takes Darwin to be offering an argument of this weaker sort, I’ll confine myself to the argument with the weaker conclusion.

The argument goes as follows. First, I’ll use ‘N’ to abbreviate ‘naturalism’, ‘R’ to abbreviate ‘our cognitive faculties are reliable with respect to metaphysical beliefs’ and ‘E’ to abbreviate ‘we and our faculties have come to be by way of the processes appealed to in contemporary evolutionary theory’). Then we can state the argument as follows:

P1 P(R/N&E) is low

i.e., the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable when it comes to metaphysical beliefs given the conjunction of naturalism with evolution is low.

P2 One who sees that P1 is true and accepts N&E has an undefeated defeater for R.

P3 One who has an undefeated defeater for R has an undefeated defeater for any of her metaphysical beliefs.

P4 N&E is a metaphysical belief.

Therefore

C One who sees that P1 is true and accepts N&E has an undefeated defeater for N&E and hence can’t rationally accept N&E.

So if she accepts E, she can’t rationally accept N. We can therefore speak of an evolutionary argument against naturalism: if you see that P1 is true, you can’t rationally accept both evolution and naturalism. Evolution is often thought of as a pillar in the temple of naturalism; that’s a whopping error: you can’t sensibly accept both evolution and naturalism.

A couple of comments on the argument. First, P1 is conditional (and a fourth problem with Wilkins’ presentation of my argument is that he seems to have overlooked its conditional character); the claim is on the assumption of naturalism and evolution, the probability of our cognitive faculties being reliable is low. The claim is not that in fact our cognitive faculties aren’t reliable, or that the probability of R just on evolution is low; the claim is that this probability is low given naturalism and evolution.

Second, according to P2, one who accepts N&E and sees that P1 is true has an undefeated defeater for R. For the argument for thinking this defeater is undefeated, see chapter 10 of my Where the Conflict Really Lies.

Third, the conclusion of the argument is that (if you see that P1 is true) you can’t sensibly accept both evolution and naturalism. It doesn’t follow, of course, that you should accept theism, belief in God: you could just be agnostic about theism and naturalism. But it does follow that if you believe in evolution, then for you theism is much more sensible than naturalism.

How strong is this argument? It’s clearly valid; so what about the premises? Perhaps P1 is the premise most needing defense; but surely P1 has a lot to be said for it. According to Wilkins, “what Darwin is arguing is that evolution gives us no confidence in metaphysical conclusions . . . .”[1] Of course the probability of R on evolution alone (without the addition of naturalism) may not be particularly low; the probability of R on E and T (where T is the proposition that God has created us by a process of evolution) will presumably be high. But Darwin was probably assuming something like naturalism as a background condition; his thought, I suggest, is that P(R/N&E) is low. And if that was his thought, he seems to be right. It makes sense to think that natural selection would mold cognitive faculties in the direction of greater reliability when it comes to beliefs relevant to survival and reproduction; but natural selection presumably doesn’t give a rip about beliefs which, like metaphysical beliefs (naturalism, for example), seem not to matter to fitness.

As far as I can see, therefore, the argument is very strong. P1 is true; once you see that, then if you accept N&E you have a defeater for R; if you have a defeater for R, you have a defeater for all your metaphysical beliefs, including N&E itself; but then you can’t sensibly accept both evolution and naturalism. Since there is powerful evidence for evolution, therefore, you should give up naturalism.

[1] In this connection, note that Wilkins construes my argument as for the conclusion that one can’t sensibly accept supernaturalism: “Plantinga’s EAAN is actually an EAAS (supernaturalism)”. In a way, that’s true: if you accept N&E, then you have a defeater for R and hence for supernaturalistic beliefs such as theism. Of course you’d have to be pretty benighted in the first place if you accepted evolution, naturalism, and also supernaturalism.

Posted in Carnival | 3 Comments

Philosophers’ Carnival #138

Posted on February 20, 2012 by Maryann Spikes

Welcome again to Philosophers’ Carnival, “which aims to showcase the best philosophical posts from a wide range of weblogs. We invite submissions from bloggers and readers, and collate the submitted posts into one big round-up (or ‘carnival’) every three weeks, offering a brief summary of each entry, and a link to the complete post.” This is carnival #138.

We begin with…

Ethics

Social Morality’s random walk through time posted at Morality’s Random Walk by Mark Sloan. Game theory is intrinsic to reality, therefore morality based on game theory is intrinsic to reality, using a very broad definition of altruism that Ayn Rand could get along with. Very cool picture of galaxies. In walks Joshua Harwood:

Philosophical Amputations: 2: Loaded Language and Reification posted at A Yangist’s Musings by Joshua Harwood. In the tradition of David Hume, who cautioned against the reification of deriving oughts from ises (a favorite topic of your hostess), Harwood takes apart what at first blush might appear to be a well-formed question but turns out to be full of assumptions which cannot simply be considered ‘given’ in authentic philosophical discourse. “They’re drawing elaborate maps of assumed territories that they don’t prove exist.” Reminds one of Sam Harris’ “The Moral Landscape” (the topic of Philosophers’ Carnival CXV).

The Origins of Property: A Parable with Morals posted at and by Tomkow. We’re talking about ownership. In the tradition of John Rawls, who suggested the distributive-justice thought experiment that we imagine how a society would form if it were just starting out (I touch upon distributive justice in my work-in-progress), Tomkow employs parable (or fable) to tease out his (somewhat disjointed) conclusion (moral) that justice is all about permission, property is all about permission (though, somehow people are excluded from giving permission to be owned), but property does not have to be just (moral). Yep, it’s all in there, and I found it an enjoyable read. Relevant to this is:

The Separateness of Persons: Commensurability without Fungibility posted at Philosophy, et cetera by our founder Richard Yetter Chappell. Richard corrects the error in assuming consequentialists feel that because the value of persons is commensurable (“ones that can be compared and traded off against each other”) they are fungible (the loss of one is cancelled out by the gain of another). Rather, “a fitting consequentialist agent would desire each good (separately), …will have distinct intrinsic desires for each person’s welfare, … They will be pulled in both directions, torn by the distinct importance of the two lives (only one of which can be saved), and whichever one they do save, they will still see something regrettable about the loss of the other.” Moving away from consequentialism:

You Kant Be Serious posted at and by Vroomfondil. If you can wade through the politically-charged vitriol, this is a nice addition to the carnival. V points out that ‘intended’ consequences matter over actual consequences, then s/he juggles the implications of favoring duty over inclination and makes them comically collide in an inclination to duty. It is something I actually wonder about Kant’s valuing a virtuous disposition despite his emphasis on duty. But ask yourself, V—who is physically stronger—the scrawny person who lifts 100 pounds because they tried really hard, or the ‘built’ person who lifts it effortlessly because they trained really hard? Same consequences. Same intentions. The obvious answer is the muscularly virtuous one—the scrawny one would readily admit s/he is not as strong as the built one, which is evidenced in how much effort went in to the endeavor. The same is true regarding moral strength. That isn’t to say that morally weak people are not doing something morally excellent and worthy of praise when they go against all inclination and do the right thing. It is only to say that having an inclination to do the right thing does not necessarily cancel out the rightness of the thing one is doing. Guess I’ll count that as my submission to this carnival. Somewhat related to this is:

The Concept-Deployment Asymmetry Objection posted at The Space of Reasons by Avery Archer. “Believing that ϕ is good requires that one deploy the concept of the good because it entails apprehending that ϕ is good. By contrast, desiring that ϕ does not require that one deploy the concept of the good because it entails apprehending ϕ as good, but does not entail apprehending that ϕ is good. This, I claim, represents a fundamental asymmetry between desiring to ϕ and believing that ϕ is good. Consequently, the Desire-as-Belief Thesis, which holds that the two are equivalent, must be false.”

Shifting into Metaphysics, Etc.

“Modal Ontological Arguments” and meta-modality posted at Critical Rationalism by Tony Lloyd. Lloyd replied to my relevant blogpost (the content of which is owed to William Lane Craig), “I reckon that standard Modal Logic can’t express ‘it is possible that a maximally great being exists’ and, so, I extend it” (in his submission). This statement from his submission shows that his submission is not in reply to my blogpost, as it indicates he never read my blogpost, which answers him: “That there is a fault can be shown by running the argument for other entities we are quite sure do not exist but will accept that they could possibly exist; such as The Golden Mountain, the Flying Spaghetti Monster or the Decent Pint of Mass Produced Lager.” However, that is not the ‘meat’ of his argument, which reminds me of an argument by Richard M. Gale (I’ll let you digest that!). He ends his submission with reference to an Evil God Modal Ontological Argument—my thoughts on the Evil God here. Jason Streitfeld also replied to the aforementioned relevant blogpost, replacing premise one with “It is possible that a maximally great being does not exist,” and this is the second time I’ve edited this section of the carnival: much discussion in the comments section! :0) Jason brings us our next submission:

Stanley on Ryle: A Criticism posted at Specter of Reason by Jason Streitfeld. This is the third in a series of posts in which Jason responds to Jason Stanley’s chapter on Ryle in his recent book, “Know How” (Oxford University Press, 2011). The other posts in the series, since they all fall within the appropriate time frame: 1. Jason Stanley’s “Know How” 2. An Objection to Stanley’s Accusation That Ryle Appeals to Verificationism 4. Ryle and Behaviorism 5. Stanley’s Great Error

Factive Verbs and Protagonist Projection posted at Experimental Philosophy by Wesley Buckwalter. This post delivers the results of a philosophy experiment conducted “to see if the linguistic evidence collected so far is better explained by (i) the folk tendency to adopt the perspective of the putative ‘knower’ when attributing or (ii) an underlying folk concept which really does allow for knowledge of false things. …it looks like people may be engaging in projective readings, rather than actually attributing knowledge to subjects with false beliefs.” Interesting experiment.

Group Consciousness: Is the US a Candidate? posted at critique my thinking by Nick. This one reminds me of this submission on the extended mind hypothesis (written by Chris Norris and hosted on my blog) from the last carnival I hosted. In fact I believe Nick is just calling Eric to clarify whether his understanding of group consciousness includes extended mind (it sounds to me like Eric is extending ‘extended mind’ from inanimate objects to other people, then labeling it group consciousness) and if so “point to salient evidence of inanimate objects hosting consciousness. // Because if the network of stuff between conscious persons does host consciousness, then the panpsychists might be on to something. Also, it would imply the possibility of mereological composition of consciousness-hosting parts—that is, the ability to consider any set of objects and conscious persons a conscious entity. For example, [Your next-door neighbors] + [television] + [The People’s republic of China] = [a single conscious entity]. This too seems bizarre. // And if the intermediaries fail to be feasible hosts of consciousness, then all we have are sophisticated and patterned interactions between conscious members of a group. That might instantiate something like ‘culture’, but it is a far cry from group consciousness.” Read Eric’s recent blog posts on that here and here.

*News Flash*
By the way, did you know there is an on-line consciousness conference going on until March 2^nd? Check it out! It is the fourth year for this conference hosted at Consciousness Online.

That’s it for this carnival. I was hoping to receive a submission from Professor Alvin Plantinga answering John Wilkins at Evolving Thoughts, who was replying to a submission to the last carnival. Professor Plantinga is a busy man though, and I will host his reply on my blog when he gets the time for it (update: here) and will submit it to the next carnival. Thanks to those who contributed and to those who are just stopping by to check things out! :)

Be sure and submit to the next carnival using the form here (not the blogcarnival widget or email), and do consider hosting (guidelines found here). The next carnival will be at critique my thinking. See you then!

Posted in Carnival, Golden Rule, Is-Ought Fallacy, Ontological Argument, Stephen Law's evil god argument, William Lane Craig | 31 Comments

Who Wrote the Gospels? by Timothy McGrew

Posted on February 10, 2012 by Maryann Spikes

Lecture notes and accompanying chart can be downloaded here. You can click on each blue checkmark to see the evidence.

Posted in Apologetics Toolbox, Tim McGrew | 3 Comments

Call for submissions to February 20’s Philosophers’ Carnival

Posted on February 6, 2012 by Maryann Spikes

On February 20, Ichthus77 will be showcasing philosophy blog posts for Philosophers’ Carnival. I will display whatever is submitted, within reason, but am hopeful to receive responses to posts featured in past carnivals, or even just responses to posts featured on other philosophy (or related) blogs. The emphasis here is on dialogue. For example, I am already seeing some dialogue about Plantinga’s EAAN, mentioned in a post submitted to the last carnival. More of this, please! :)

Posted in Carnival | Leave a comment

Genuine faith is never blind

Posted on February 5, 2012 by Maryann Spikes

I grew up believing that reason can only take you so far–after that, faith takes over. In one sense this belief is true: Intellectual faith/belief, if it isn’t blind, comes ‘after’ good evidence. However, in the sense that faith persists independent of reason or even in spite of evidence to the contrary (the sense preferred by New Atheists) this belief is false.

One cannot trust God and his promises unless one already knows (with good evidence) God and his promises exist–and simply knowing does not equate to trusting. Compare this to having faith in the faithfulness of one’s spouse. Whether or not they exist or have made promises of faithfulness is not a matter of faith. Trusting them and their promises is where faith comes in.

Some doubt, like Thomas did, even though he was daily in the presence of the miraculous before Jesus was crucified. Some all out reject Jesus and everything (they think) he is about, as did most of the Pharisees in Jesus’ day, who would rather claim his signs were demonic than change their worldview. So even in the presence of overwhelming evidence, faith can be lacking. Genuine, biblical faith is more than just knowing, it is more than mere intellectual assent. It is trust, and is never blind.

Posted in Apisticism, Faith | 3 Comments

WLC makes plain the Ontological Argument

Posted on January 23, 2012 by Maryann Spikes

The ontological argument finally clicked for me. Thankyou Dr. Craig!

Begin forwarded message:

From: William Lane Craig <info@reasonablefaith.org>
Subject: Question of the Week – Misunderstanding the Ontological Argument

———–

Question:

Good Day from Nepal. We badly need apologetics in Nepal so please keep in your prayers. I work in translating apologetic material in the language of Nepal where secularism and Hinduism are quite strong. Thank you for your work Dr. Craig. My question is on the ontological argument and I do not fully understand it. Can you help clarify? I recently asked a philosopher here and was told the following exchange:

My question to the professor:

…question concerning the reading packet in our resouces on Descartes and the Ontological argument. Most non-philosophers seem to think the argument is not credible while most philosophers do not it seems – could you help me by offering your own insights to its merit? For example – Alvin Plantiga seems to have developed the folowing:

The version below comes from Alvin Plantinga, one of America’s premier philosophers. It’s formulated in terms of possible worlds semantics. For those who are unfamiliar with the terminology of possible worlds, let me explain that by “a possible world” one doesn’t mean a planet or even a universe, but rather a complete description of reality, or a way reality might be. To say that God exists in some possible world is just to say that there is a possible description of reality which includes the statement “God exists” as part of that description.

Now in his version of the argument, Plantinga conceives of God as a being which is “maximally excellent” in every possible world. Plantinga takes maximal excellence to include such properties as omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection. A being which has maximal excellence in every possible world would have what Plantinga calls “maximal greatness.” So Plantinga argues:

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Premises (2)-(5) of this argument are relatively uncontroversial. Most philosophers would agree that if God’s existence is even possible, then He must exist. The principal issue to be settled with respect to Plantinga’s ontological argument is what warrant exists for thinking the key premiss “It’s possible that a maximally great being exists” to be true.

The idea of a maximally great being is intuitively a coherent idea, and so it seems plausible that such a being could exist. In order for the ontological argument to fail, the concept of a maximally great being must be incoherent, like the concept of a married bachelor. But the concept of a maximally great being doesn’t seem even remotely incoherent. This provides some prima facie warrant for thinking that it is possible that a maximally great being exists.

Would you agree that premises 2-5 are relatively non-controversial? In other words if premise 1 is “true” then would you say all 5 premises must therefore be logical true? Any thoughts/comments would be greatly appreciated.

Professor Messick:

Number 2 is not uncontroversial.

Just because it is possible for something to exist doesn’t mean that it does or must exist. Essentially no. 2 is stating “If it is possible, then somewhere it must be.” Not only is that not practical, it doesn’t even follow logically. Possible things do not automatically translate into actual things. I’d also dispute item no. 3, on the grounds that an example in one possible world doesn’t translate automatically into every possible possible world — were that the case, then all possible worlds would have to be identical, and full of mutually exclusive elements. Unless, that is, there is something special about the “maximally excellent” being that makes it unique and unlike other things, in which case, logic falters again.

This goes back to Anselm for the greatest formulation, and back even further than that. It has always been problematic.

I recall a professor of mine saying once that every philosopher sooner or later comes to the conclusion that the proof is right, but we don’t know how, and later comes to the conclusion that the proof is wrong, but we don’t know why.

Would you say he is mostly correct Dr. Craig? There are a lot of apologist who struggle with the ontological argument so any help would be greatly appreciated.

Kamal
Nepal

Dr. Craig responds:

Kamal, receiving a letter from a Christian brother in a place as far-flung and as hostile to Christian belief as Nepal made my day! So even though your professor’s objections are based on pretty elementary misunderstandings, I wanted to share your letter with others.

I’m afraid that your professor is mostly incorrect in what he says, Kamal. Your prof errs in thinking that the ontological argument goes back earlier than Anselm and in thinking that Anselm’s version is the best version of the argument. As Plantinga (as well as Leibniz) has explained, Anselm’s version needs reformulation; moreover, Plantinga’s version is not susceptible to your prof’s objections.

For example, his objection to (2) is based upon an apparent unfamiliarity with possible worlds semantics. To say that some entity exists in a possible world is just to say that such an entity possibly exists. It isn’t meant that the entity actually exists somewhere. Look again at my explanation: “To say that God exists in some possible world is just to say that there is a possible description of reality which includes the statement ‘God exists’ as part of that description.” Only if that description is true will the entity, in this case God, actually exist. So (2) is definitionally true.

Again, (3) is virtually definitionally true. A maximally great being is one that has, among other properties, necessary existence. So if it exists in one world, it exists in all of them! In that sense, such a being is different than contingent beings, which exist in only some possible worlds. A unicorn, for example, exists in some possible world, but not in all of them, for its existence is possible but not necessary. So your prof is right that there is something special, not about a maximally excellent being (which, you’ll recall, is defined to be a being which is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good), but about a maximally great being, which is defined as a being which has maximal excellence in every possible world. If such a being exists in any world, that is to say, if it is possible that such a being exists, then it exists in every possible world, including the actual world.

Logic doesn’t falter here. It all hangs on whether you think that (1) is true. (2)-(5) are true whether or not (1) is true. But if all the premisses are true, the conclusion logically follows.

There is a lesson to be learned in this. Students rightly have respect for their professors. We should learn from them in humility. But the fact is that many professors, both in the Anglophone world and especially outside the Anglophone world, are nearly clueless when it comes to Philosophy of Religion. I have been mortified by the simplistic and misconceived refutations of theism and theistic arguments that students often share with me from their Intro to Philosophy classes. You are well-advised to be quite critical about what your professors say about this subject, especially if they do not evince familiarity with the philosophical literature and are not interacting with other philosophers in the field who do not share their positions.

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Posted in Apologetics Toolbox, Ontological Argument, William Lane Craig | 4 Comments

Groothuis’ "Christian Apologetics" ch.1: Introduction: Hope, Despair and Knowing Reality

Posted on January 14, 2012 by Maryann Spikes

At my church we just started a book discussion of Douglas Groothuis’ “Christian Apologetics”. Wanted to share my favorite quote from chapter one, page 16:

“In one sense, we are alone. No one else will live our life or die our death. Each self is unique, responsible and indissoluble. Yet our fate is bound up with our world and our fellow travelers, each of whom has a particular way of coping with—or avoiding—these insistent immensities. We are alone—together.”

(discussion index)

Posted in Apologetics, Groothuis' 'Christian Apologetics', Reviews and Interviews | Leave a comment

Check out a few new tags…

Posted on January 13, 2012 by Maryann Spikes

Poetry and Fiction

Groothuis’ “Christian Apologetics” (buy book)

Divine Essentialism

Posted in Apologetics, Divine Essentialism, Groothuis' 'Christian Apologetics', Poetry and Fiction, Reviews and Interviews | Leave a comment

Christian Carnival

Posted on January 11, 2012 by Maryann Spikes

Welcome to the January 11, 2012 edition of christian carnival ii. We have so many great submissions this week, and I’ve also gleaned from the recent offerings of fellow members of Christian Apologetics Alliance.

problem of pain, suffering, evil

It was interesting to find a few submissions on this topic so I decided to make a category out of it for this edition. I also added a few I gleaned from recent Christian Apologetics Alliance offerings.

Richard presents “Don’t You Want To Be Healed?” posted at Mission Blog.

Rodney Olsen presents Losing Everything posted at The Journey – Life : Faith : Family.

Sarah presents Suffering and Death posted at This is what Sed said.

From Christian Apologetics Alliance members:

Christiana Szymanski blogged Quote of the Week: Ravi Zacharias On The Problem of Evil posted at In Defense of the Christian Faith.

Wintery Knight blogged Why does God allow his creatures to suffer? posted at Wintery Knight.

other apologetics from The Alliance

Brian Auten blogged 10 Pitfalls of the Foolish Apologist posted at Apologetics 315.

Mikel Del Rosario blogged William Jessup University Student – Understanding Apologetics was a Turning Point in My Life posted at Apologetics Guy.

Stephen Bedard blogged Religion as a Quest for Afterlife posted at Hope’s Reason.

Cory Tucholski blogged Contradiction Tuesday: Jesus in the Pecking Order posted at Josiah Concept Ministries.

Blake Anderson blogged The Flying Spaghetti Monster, Expanding Atheist Clubs, Bad Religion, & A Washington D.C. Rally posted at Ratio Christi.

Rob Lundberg blogged Sunday Morning Quote posted at The Real Issue.

Glenn Peoples blogged “God of the Living” – William Tyndale and the Resurrection posted at Say Hello to My Little Friend.

Greg West blogged J.P. Moreland: The Prophets Appealed to Evidence posted at The Poached Egg.

Melissa Travis blogged Book Review: John Lennox’s Seven Days That Divide the World posted at Hard-Core Christianity.

other ‘than’ apologetics from The Alliance

Tom Gilson blogged Sherlock Holmes vs. Hugo (and Why Hugo Should Win) posted at Evangel | A First Things Blog.

Austin Gravley blogged The Spirit, Isaiah 6, and God’s Timely Calling posted at Another Ascending Lark.

Holly Ordway blogged A Sonnet for The Kilns posted at Hieropraxis.

devotionals

Annette presents Psalm 108 posted at Fish and Cans.

Josh presents Easter Bible Verses – 20 Awesome Scripture Quotes posted at What Christians Want To Know, saying, “Check out these inspiring Bible verses about Easter and
the resurrection of Jesus Christ.”

Justin Raby presents Day 5: Not So Pink posted at Bible in a Month.

Jim Klingenberger presents Unions posted at Xulonjam’s Blog, saying, “Not sure how to categorize this. It came out of a couple of interactions, one on a secular board and another on a Christian board. I am defending Unions from the charges which are popular these days, particularly the idea that Unions are anti-Christian.” By the way, we’re talking ‘labor’ unions here.

Zowada presents what are you passionate about? posted at Zowada Blog, saying, “Our words reflect our passions.” Matt, you are a very insightful 16-year-old!…assuming you are still 16.

For the Tim Tebow fans, Rebecca LuElla Miller presents Platforms And Purpose posted at A Christian Worldview of Fiction, saying, “The topic is actually Christian living, not really a devotional, but none of the other categories fit. Here’s a key excerpt: “The size of the platform does not dictate the value of the ministry or reduce the importance of the purpose God has given to each. “”

Ridge Burns presents Telling God the Whole Story posted at Ridge’s Blog.

Chris Price presents Study on American Religion and the Community posted at American Church History.

That concludes this edition. Submit your blog article to the next edition of christian carnival ii using our carnival submission form.

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