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Category Archives: Epistemology
Norris, Gettier, Euthyphro, Hume and Plato: Is knowledge justified true belief?
[ Section on Gettier revised 1/7/11 ][ Mention of Euthyphro dilemma as applied to epistemology revised 2/23/11 ] When deciding whether knowledge is justified, true belief (Plato), a question arises: Is the truth of a belief 1) external to the … Continue reading
Replacing Agnosticism with Apisticism
This article argues we replace the word “agnosticism” (lack of knowing) with the word “apisticism” (lack of believing) on every belief scale. The current debate between Myers and Coyne on the falsifiability of atheism is complicated by a misunderstanding of faith/belief as … Continue reading
Is-ought fallacy and knowledge as justified, true belief
The is-ought fallacy (Hume) is a real fallacy, and is why knowledge is justified, true belief (Plato). In order to be knowledge, a belief must both be justified by the evidence, and true by correspondence. If we consider justified a belief … Continue reading
Posted in Is-Ought Fallacy, Justified True Belief
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The New, New Theism
Edited the fourth option on my scale 2/17/11. THE NEW, NEW THEISM (a bit of satire)followed by three versions of Dawkins’ belief scale, the final version being mine The theism of the New, New Theism is not a belief, but a … Continue reading
Posted in Apisticism, Faith, Golden Rule, Richard Dawkins
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Norris’ "Epistemology" Postscript, II
Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy” Concluding Scientific-Realist Postscript – Section II.After restating some things said in section I, Norris states that he has tried to represent opposing positions fairly, without caricature. The issue has been … Continue reading
Norris’ "Epistemology" Postscript, I
Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy” Concluding Scientific-Realist Postscript – Section I. First-off, I can’t help thinking of Kierkegaard’s “Concluding Unscientific Postscript” when reading the title of this chapter, but Norris never overtly names him.Norris basically … Continue reading
Norris’ "Epistemology" Ch5, VI
Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy” Chapter 5: Making for Truth: Some Problems with Virtue-Based Epistemology – Section VI.Grand finale for this chapter. One more chapter after this, with only two sections in it. Marie McGinn … Continue reading
Norris’ "Epistemology" Ch5, V
Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy” Chapter 5: Making for Truth: Some Problems with Virtue-Based Epistemology – Section V.Ok, so, apparently “foundationalist” means coherentist, and “anti-foundationalist” means pragmatist. Sosa claims they are a dead-end dispute to … Continue reading
Norris’ "Epistemology" Ch5, IV
Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy” Chapter 5: Making for Truth: Some Problems with Virtue-Based Epistemology – Section IV.Virtue-based epistemology “has partly grown out of, and partly emerged as a reaction against, the kinds of reliabilist … Continue reading
Norris’ "Epistemology" Ch5, III
Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy” Chapter 5: Making for Truth: Some Problems with Virtue-Based Epistemology – Section III.Can a virtue-based epistemology, unlike McDowell’s efforts, “(1) make good the normativity-deficit, and (2) avoid all the usual … Continue reading
