Category Archives: Epistemology

New Philosophers’ Carnival is…

here.  It features my book discussion of Christopher Norris’ Epistemology.

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Norris’ Epistemology book discussion.

Christopher Norris The following has all been moved from here. Norris’ Epistemology; starting point, updates  Norris’ “Epistemology” Intro. I Norris’ “Epistemology” Intro. II Norris’ “Epistemology” Intro. III Norris’ “Epistemology” Intro. IV Norris’ “Epistemology” Ch1.I Norris’ Epistemology Ch1.II-III Norris’ Epistemology Ch2.I Norris’ “Epistemology” … Continue reading →

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Questions regarding first chapter of Craig’s "Reasonable Faith"

I want to start by saying I’m a huge fan of William Lane Craig and recently met him at a fairly local Reasonable Faith conference. I had almost finished reading On Guard when the conference began and have since completed … Continue reading →

Posted in Gettier Problem, Justified True Belief, William Lane Craig | 11 Comments

God (is) the Golden Rule (ought) without offending Hume

Would very much appreciate some feedback on this.  I have tried to put all of it in my own words without referring to influential sources.  Clearly some of it needs more reasons (like the GR’s presence in every major culture/religion, how … Continue reading →

Posted in Divine Essentialism, Euthyphro Dilemma, Gettier Problem, Golden Rule, Is-Ought Fallacy, Justified True Belief | 3 Comments

Open letter to William Lane Craig regarding April 7 debate with Sam Harris

[ Reposting from Friday. ] I know you are a seasoned apologist but wondered if you will be using Hume’s is-ought fallacy, and Harris’ appreciation of correspondence theory, to question Harris on what his real ought corresponds to in reality, … Continue reading →

Posted in Divine Essentialism, Euthyphro Dilemma, Golden Rule, Justified True Belief, Sam Harris, William Lane Craig | Leave a comment

Natural law, divine command and Euthyphro’s dilemma resolved

…using Hume’s is-ought distinction’s mirror concept, the ought-is distinction***. Euthyphro’s dilemma:  “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious?  Or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?”  This can be reworded to read “Is … Continue reading →

Posted in Divine Essentialism, Euthyphro Dilemma, Is-Ought Fallacy, Justified True Belief, Natural Law and Divine Command | Leave a comment

Philosophers’ Carnival #122

Welcome to the 122nd fortnightly edition of Philosophers’ Carnival!  Without too much ado [ besides a plug for the Carnival’s new FB page ] I present to you a philosophers’ blog carnival that is (this round) predominantly about mostly Philosophy of Religion and mostly Ethics…with a smidge … Continue reading →

Posted in Carnival, Divine Essentialism, Euthyphro Dilemma, Faith, Golden Rule | 6 Comments

Hume’s is-ought, Plato’s true-justified, Euthyphro’s dilemma and Gettier’s problem

Hume‘s is-ought (fact-value) distinction is the same as Plato‘s true-justified distinction.  When is/true/fact and ought/justified/value are not kept distinct, the Euthyphro dilemma as applied to epistemology ensues:  Are we justified in believing (ought we believe) merely because our belief is true (can truth justify … Continue reading →

Posted in Apisticism, Divine Essentialism, Euthyphro Dilemma, Gettier Problem, Is-Ought Fallacy, Justified True Belief | Leave a comment

Atheism and agnosticism (really, apisticism) as belief

First I will grant that agnosticism (a better word for this being ‘apisticism’) is neutral in order to make the claim that atheism is a belief because it lacks the neutrality of apisticism. Then I will challenge the neutrality of … Continue reading →

Posted in Apisticism, Faith | 6 Comments

Answering Gettier

[ work in progress ] [ completed 1/15/11 ] Plato’s justified-true-belief definition of knowledge, maintained by critical realists, besides requiring that a belief be justified by evidence and true by correspondence, says 1) whether or not a belief is true … Continue reading →

Posted in Gettier Problem, Is-Ought Fallacy, Justified True Belief, Norris' Epistemology, Reviews and Interviews | 8 Comments