Category Archives: Epistemology

Philosophers’ Carnival #122

Posted on March 14, 2011 by Maryann Spikes

Welcome to the 122nd fortnightly edition of Philosophers’ Carnival!  Without too much ado [ besides a plug for the Carnival’s new FB page ] I present to you a philosophers’ blog carnival that is (this round) predominantly about mostly Philosophy of Religion and mostly Ethics…with a smidge … Continue reading →

Posted in Carnival, Divine Essentialism, Euthyphro Dilemma, Faith, Golden Rule | 6 Comments

Hume’s is-ought, Plato’s true-justified, Euthyphro’s dilemma and Gettier’s problem

Posted on February 23, 2011 by Maryann Spikes

Hume‘s is-ought (fact-value) distinction is the same as Plato‘s true-justified distinction.  When is/true/fact and ought/justified/value are not kept distinct, the Euthyphro dilemma as applied to epistemology ensues:  Are we justified in believing (ought we believe) merely because our belief is true (can truth justify … Continue reading →

Posted in Apisticism, Divine Essentialism, Euthyphro Dilemma, Gettier Problem, Is-Ought Fallacy, Justified True Belief | Leave a comment

Atheism and agnosticism (really, apisticism) as belief

Posted on February 16, 2011 by Maryann Spikes

First I will grant that agnosticism (a better word for this being ‘apisticism’) is neutral in order to make the claim that atheism is a belief because it lacks the neutrality of apisticism. Then I will challenge the neutrality of … Continue reading →

Posted in Apisticism, Faith | 6 Comments

Answering Gettier

Posted on January 9, 2011 by Maryann Spikes

[ work in progress ] [ completed 1/15/11 ] Plato’s justified-true-belief definition of knowledge, maintained by critical realists, besides requiring that a belief be justified by evidence and true by correspondence, says 1) whether or not a belief is true … Continue reading →

Posted in Gettier Problem, Is-Ought Fallacy, Justified True Belief, Norris' Epistemology, Reviews and Interviews | 8 Comments

Norris, Gettier, Euthyphro, Hume and Plato: Is knowledge justified true belief?

Posted on January 5, 2011 by Maryann Spikes

[ Section on Gettier revised 1/7/11 ][ Mention of Euthyphro dilemma as applied to epistemology revised 2/23/11 ] When deciding whether knowledge is justified, true belief (Plato), a question arises: Is the truth of a belief 1) external to the … Continue reading →

Posted in Divine Essentialism, Euthyphro Dilemma, Gettier Problem, Is-Ought Fallacy, Justified True Belief, Norris' Epistemology, Reviews and Interviews | 3 Comments

Replacing Agnosticism with Apisticism

Posted on November 21, 2010 by Maryann Spikes

This article argues we replace the word “agnosticism” (lack of knowing) with the word “apisticism” (lack of believing) on every belief scale.  The current debate between Myers and Coyne on the falsifiability of atheism is complicated by a misunderstanding of faith/belief as … Continue reading →

Posted in Apisticism, Faith, Gettier Problem, Is-Ought Fallacy, Justified True Belief | Leave a comment

Is-ought fallacy and knowledge as justified, true belief

Posted on November 12, 2010 by Maryann Spikes

The is-ought fallacy (Hume) is a real fallacy, and is why knowledge is justified, true belief (Plato). In order to be knowledge, a belief must both be justified by the evidence, and true by correspondence. If we consider justified a belief … Continue reading →

Posted in Is-Ought Fallacy, Justified True Belief | Leave a comment

The New, New Theism

Posted on October 10, 2010 by Maryann Spikes

Edited the fourth option on my scale 2/17/11. THE NEW, NEW THEISM (a bit of satire)followed by three versions of Dawkins’ belief scale, the final version being mine The theism of the New, New Theism is not a belief, but a … Continue reading →

Posted in Apisticism, Faith, Golden Rule, Richard Dawkins | 5 Comments

Norris’ "Epistemology" Postscript, II

Posted on July 1, 2010 by Maryann Spikes

Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy” Concluding Scientific-Realist Postscript – Section II.After restating some things said in section I, Norris states that he has tried to represent opposing positions fairly, without caricature. The issue has been … Continue reading →

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Norris’ "Epistemology" Postscript, I

Posted on June 30, 2010 by Maryann Spikes

Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy” Concluding Scientific-Realist Postscript – Section I. First-off, I can’t help thinking of Kierkegaard’s “Concluding Unscientific Postscript” when reading the title of this chapter, but Norris never overtly names him.Norris basically … Continue reading →

Posted in Norris' Epistemology, Reviews and Interviews | Leave a comment