Ichthus77

(quotes omitted) …the theistic view is that these qualities are good because (Maryann: rather than exist as, or exist if) they are found in God’s nature. The alternative (that God is good because his nature matches the Good) is just Platonism all over again, which we’ve already rejected (see my three-pronged critique of Platonism).

(3)

and 

The theory that I have defended is a form of Divine Command Theory. According to this view our moral duties are constituted by the commands of an essentially just and loving God. It seems to me that this theory does derive an “ought” from an “is,” and justifiably so—though not in the way you imagine. The theory does, as you say, ground moral values in God’s unchanging nature. God is the paradigm of goodness. But that is not to say that “because God is a certain way we ought to behave in certain ways.” No, our moral obligations and prohibitions arise as a result of God’s commands to us. God’s nature serves to establish values—goodness and badness—while God’s commands establish moral duties—what we ought or ought not to do. Grounding moral values in God no more derives an “ought” from an “is” than does Plato’s grounding values in the form of the Good (indeed, one of my critiques of moral platonism is precisely its failure to provide any basis for moral duty). The theist and Plato just have a different ontological ultimate.

(4)

It is unclear here whether or not Dr. Craig thinks the is-ought fallacy is a real fallacy. He seems to when he dismisses the idea that “because God is a certain way we ought to behave in certain ways” (ibid). But he seems not to when he asserts “our moral obligations and prohibitions arise as a result of God’s commands to us” (ibid). It is a tangent, but he also unnecessarily distinguishes between moral obligations and moral values. Anyway, to say “because this is God’s command, we ought to behave according to it” commits the is-ought fallacy.

There has been some discourse with Dr. Craig on this matter via Facebook (5), and via email with Dr. Weikart. Dr. Weikart’s most recent reply just restates his misunderstanding: 

You are denying the is-ought distinction, because (Maryann: according to me, Maryann) moral goodness (ought) is integrally connected to God’s being (is).

(via email)

Grounded in, yes. Justified by, no.




Reference List

1. Ichthus77. (2011). Where I am at with Hume’s is-ought distinction. Retrieved from http://ichthus77.blogspot.com/2011/07/where-i-am-at-with-humes-is-ought.html

2. Ichthus77. (2011). Answering Gettier. Retrieved from http://ichthus77.blogspot.com/2011/01/answering-gettier.html

3. Reasonable Faith. (2012). Moral Argument for God. Retrieved from http://www.reasonablefaith.org/moral-argument-for-god#ixzz23vssuCM3

4. Reasonable Faith. (2012). Does Theistic Ethics Derive an “Ought” from an “Is”? Retrieved from http://www.reasonablefaith.org/does-theistic-ethics-derive-an-ought-from-an-is#ixzz23vtucp00

5. Ichthus77. (2012). Is-ought discussion with WLC. Retrieved from http://www.ichthus77.blogspot.com/2012/01/is-ought-discussion-with-wlc.html