Ichthus77

Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy”

Chapter 2: Realism, Reference and Possible Worlds – Section I.

I gotta say it straight out-Professor Norris’ style is not accessible to the undergrad. This is not a fun type of learning-it becomes fun when I finally figure it out-but it would’ve been way funner, and from the start, if it had been written at my reading level. Here’s what I “could” grasp (or think I did grasp, anyway) from the first section–

This section was mostly about Saul Kripke‘s reference-fixing (naming), in comparison with Frege and Russell’s descriptivist theory (emphasis on Frege). There’s background involving “problems bequeathed by Kant’s great attempt-in the Critique of Pure Reason-to delimit the sphere of cognitive understanding (where sensuous intuitions must be ‘brought under’ adequate concepts) from that of metaphysics where reason has a license to raise such speculative issues but only on condition that it not lay claim to any kind of determinate knowledge.” Whatever THAT means. There is talk of “redrawing the Kantian line” … of taking “full stock of the ‘linguistic turn'” -whatever that means-of Kripke and Putnam (apparently a guy named Hilary-sorry, man) putting the case “for a strong causal-realist and objectivist approach to epistemological issues”. Causal-realism is defined in section II. Here’s what comes up in section I–

So basically the two theories compared are descriptivism (Frege) and naming (Kripke). You’ve got the name of something (gold), and then you’ve got a description of something (formerly: “yellow, ductile metal that dissolves in weak nitric acid”; now: “metallic element with atomic number 79”). The name, and the description, are called “referents“.

Descriptivism (Frege) says that names do not always refer to the same thing if we attach conflicting descriptions to the same name, and that descriptions are more important (the “former” description of “gold” is not the same “gold” as the “now” description of “gold”-it’s like they should be given different names…but consider the underlying reasoning of that). It gets weirder. “Strong descriptivists or paradigm-relativists like Thomas Kuhn [conclude] that shifts in the range of identifying criteria from one theory or classificatory system to the next can at times be so drastic as to break the referential chain of transmission.” This is called “radical ‘incommensurability’ between paradigms”. This ‘desperate position’ is adopted because of Frege’s “sense determines reference” and an idea Frege rejected: “the sense of any given term can only be specified in relation to the entire language, discourse or received body of knowledge within which it plays a role.” So, according to this position, the two things don’t just need different names now-they inhabit different worlds (harkens back to Quine’s “web of belief”). There is therefore no accounting for scientific progress, since you’re stuck in the world-web of your preferred description.

Naming (Kripke) would say that descriptions of a thing may change and so do not always refer to what they are describing-which has a name which stays the same and refers to what is being described even if the description changes (the two descriptions of gold are describing one thing named “gold”). Kripke is saying (1) the reference of the name “gold” (to that thing to which the name “gold” refers) is “necessarily” fixed at its conception (in the mind) and (2) is preserved throughout “every shift in its associated range of descriptive criteria”. If that word “necessarily” trips you up-that is explained next:

The explanation of “necessarily” has to do with modal logic – “the branch of logic having to do with possibility and necessity”. Kripke “makes a case for the existence of a posteriori necessary truths…which are neither analytic, i.e., true-by-definition, nor a priori, that is to say, self-evident to reason, but which nonetheless hold necessarily in any world where their referents exist or once existed.” Did that clear it up for you? Me, neither. Not even when Norris used examples. [See link in reply below on a priori / a posteriori, the water example.] Anyway, somehow that means thatnames are “truth-tracking”-they stick even when descriptions change (“sensitive to future discovery”)-name-reference transcends the ‘paradigm-shift’. This is called reference-fixing.

The rest of the section I couldn’t quite make out, unless the example I’m about to provide (not provided by Norris) explains it well: when it comes to language translation, different languages all have different names (at least one per language) for the same thing (assuming they all have a name for that thing), so all those names refer to that one thing. How else do we know all the names refer to that one thing, but that the names all have similar descriptions? Somehow, according to some philosophers, the Kripkean approach “allows-indeed requires-some additional descriptivist component.”

And I wanted to re-paste what I wrote in section IV of the Introduction:
“I think a descriptivist account says that features are not essential, that they fail to refer, that imputed properties before discovery (about some object), and imputed properties after discovery (about that object), will not be referring to the same object (if so-then how do you know what object you made a discovery about?).”
[Side-question, prob’ly stupid: Does all this discussion about referents assume all names (or even descriptions, for the descriptivist) refer to something that actually exists? For example-what about names like “unicorn” (or descriptions of them)? Probably it would only count as referring to an idea (based on lack of evidence for their corresponding to reality)?]

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A helpful reply from Professor Norris to my side-question, which also explains Frege’s “sense determines reference” which I didn’t really get until now:

Yes, the normal assumption is that the objects or events referred to (described, specified, picked out, etc.) really do or did once exist – as per Frege’s distinction between ‘sense’ and ‘reference’, where ‘sense’ is the range of properties or attributes that people have in mind when they talk about something and ‘reference’ is what the description picks out when and if it ‘goes through’ in the normal way. So allusions to fictive characters and events (or to imaginary objects like unicorns) have sense but not reference.

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_turn There’s other turns, too.

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I thank Professor Norris for the above explanation, as it was absolutely essential that I understand Frege’s “sense determines essence” in order to go forward.This is cool: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_priori_and_a_posteriori#Relation_to_the_necessary.2Fcontingent
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiotics … think it might have something to do with this. Fascinating.

Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy”

Chapter 1: Staying for an Answer: Truth, Knowledge, and the Rumsfeld Creed –
Sections II-III.

These sections deal with Michael Dummett and what has come to be called Dummettian anti-realism. The Verification Principle gets a new twist with Dummett’s three arguments: acquisition, manifestation, and recognition, but also TIME (knowledge of the past; history) and backwards causality of answered prayer is brought up-so this is going to be a fascinating discussion (which will hopefully not get too off-track) even if I’m only talking to myself. Also discussed are ‘testimony’ and Mill’s defense of the validity of induction. Norris brings Rumsfeld’s comments back up again, but I think we can look at this topic w/o referring to them.

II

Disputed class: hypotheses, conjectures, speculative statements, unproven theorems, etc. … “statements for which we lack any means of formal proof (in mathematics or logic) or empirical verification (in history or the natural sciences).”

Realists: statements in the “disputed class” can and do possess objective truth-value “just so long as the sentence in question is well-formed and truth-apt.” Statements can be “truth bearers” (if they “refer”) and the portions of reality to which the statements refer are “truth-makers” (they make the statements true). This means reality is a truth-maker even if no statement is made (truth is knowledge-independent, verification-transcendent, epistemically unconstrained). Reminds me of Russell-I like Russell. “A well-formed statement…will have its truth-value fixed by the way things once stood in reality quite aside from our lack of certainty.”

Anti-realists: Dummett: “truth” should be replaced with “warranted assertibility” and “restricted to just those statements for which we possess some bona fide means of proof or verification.” The word “truth” keeps being used, though. Again, the anti-realist position is that we shouldn’t be able to say “this is true” (or false) if we cannot also say “this is verified” (or falsified). “Statements [in the disputed class] cannot have a truth-value since it is strictly inconceivable that truth should exceed the limits of assertoric warrant.” He has three arguments to support this:

1. Acquisition-argument. I’m just gonna quote: “we could not possibly acquire a working knowledge of language except via a grasp of the truth-conditions (more precisely: the conditions for warranted assertibility) which apply to the various sentences endorsed by members of our speech community.”

2. Manifestation-argument. “such knowledge must be manifestable in our own speech-behavior and thereby exhibit that working grasp-our understanding of the relevant conditions-in a way that enables other people to correctly interpret our meanings and beliefs.”

3. Recognition-argument. “no sentence can legitimately count as true or false unless we are able to recognize those same conditions and hence interpret as falling within the scope of our best available knowledge concerning what would qualify as adequate grounds for asserting or denying its validity.”

So (per Dummett) when we “assert the existence of objective truth-values for statements belonging to the ‘disputed class’…[it] would amount to the self-refuting claim that we know something to be the case despite our not having acquired the capacity torecognize the conditions under which such a statement is warranted or to manifest our knowledge of those same conditions in a manner acceptable to others in possession of the relevant standards and criteria.”

Norris notes Dummett’s three arguments amount “to a more sophisticated, logico-semantic version of the Verification Principle.” The chief problem with the Verification Principle was that “it met neither of its own criteria for meaningful statements, i.e., that such statements should be either empirically verifiable or self-evidently valid in virtue of their logical form.” So Dummett attempts to shift the debate by raising it “as a topic within the philosophy of language and one that has to do with our warrant (or lack of it) for adopting a realist view of some particular area of discourse. … For the Dummettian anti-realist…there is no making sense of such claims [in the disputed class] since they involve the appeal to an order of verification-transcendent truth which ex hypothesi exceeds the furthest bounds of epistemic warrant.”

Where this gets really interesting is that Dummett claims that any gaps in knowledge must also be gaps in reality. “…there cannot be a past fact no evidence of which exists to be discovered, because it is the existence of such evidence that would make it a fact, if it were one.” “Equally strange-from any but a hard-line anti-realist viewpoint-is the claim that our evidence (or lack of it) is ‘constitutive’ not only of our state of knowledge with respect to those events at any given time but also of their very reality, i.e., their having actually occurred or not. In which case, quite simply, the historical past must be thought of as a highly selectively backward projection from whatever we are currently able to find out and hence as including lacunae-‘gaps in reality’, as Dummett says-corresponding to our areas of ignorance.”

III.
So, one example Norris uses of Dummett thinking we can bring about the past by a change in our present knowledge, is retroactively granted prayer request. To Norris, this is Dummett agreeing that “wishing (praying) makes it so”. I used to use this example (not Dummett’s-didn’t know about Dummett) when I would think about time and God’s sovereignty over it. I think differently about it now, because, unlike Dummett, I think everything in the past, present, and future is fixed/complete from God’s perspective (according to Einstein’s relativity, they ‘are’ fixed)-all affirmatively answered prayers were answered (in our past, present, future) before it all began (from His perspective). So the guy’s prayer about what already happened-isn’t “retroactively” granted (nothing changes in the past from God’s perspective-the past, present, and future are fixed/complete)-but “eternally” granted (from beyond time). And this is not a case of the guy changing the past with his knowledge, because nothing changes, and even if it does, it isn’t his “knowing it” that changes it (he does not know how it turns out when he is praying about it), but God Himself that changes it (if that were possible, and it isn’t-it’s all fixed). So “praying makes it so” is not equivalent to “wishing makes it so”.

At any rate, when you’re talking about knowledge that makes the past real, you bring up the time travel paradox of the closed causal loop. Now that I’ve said that, I’m wondering if it has anything to do with causal realism. If you (the reader) don’t know what a closed causal loop is, here’s an example based off the TV series LOST (I won’t get the details exactly correct, so it is only “based off” of it-it isn’t the exact situation). In 2007 Richard gives John a compass and tells John “The next time you see me, give this back.” John goes back in time and meets Richard again sometime in the 1950s, and gives Richard the compass, saying, “The next time you see me, give this back.” Richard gives it back to John in 2007-the event we started with. So–who is the original owner of the compass? Who even manufactured it? Applying that to Dummett’s reverse-causality powers of knowledge: If I make the past real with my knowledge-what made my knowledge happen? Shiver me timbers!

On to math. “Dummett’s intuitionist conception of truth in mathematics…whatever we are able to prove or ascertain by the best formal methods at our present or perhaps (on his more liberal account) our rationally optimized or future-best disposal. However, this leaves it a mystery how mathematical discoveries could ever have occurred unless through the proven capacity of thought to find out truths that went against currently accepted standards of proof or verification. What counts as epistemic, probative or assertoric warrant in such matters is always and in principle subject to disconfirmation by that which lies beyond our present-best powers of proof or epistemic warrant.”

Skepticism’s false dilemma: either truths that cannot be known (verified) (leading to “the skeptical impasse-the unbridgeable gulf between truth and knowledge”), or a redefinition of truth putting it in the bounds of knowability. This is a version of anti-realism’s false dilemma, which results from confusing ontological with epistemological issues. [not sure how the two differ]

There are viable realist alternatives (paragraphs are numbered for convenience, not to denote different alternatives):

1. Gödelian realism-

From discussion w/ hughw (thankyou) in Philosophy Chat Forum‘s chatroom:
Godel’s incompleteness theorem is simply that each system has its own axioms that cannot be challenged from within that system– since that system is based upon those axioms

Strictly speaking, it holds that for any mathematical, logical or other such formal system beyond a certain (fairly basic) level of complexity – e.g., first-order logic or basic arithmetic, there will always be one or more axioms within the system that cannot be proved using the logical resources of the system itself. But of course Goedel claims (and is generally agreed) to have formally proved this unprovability-theorem, which is a bit of a puzzle (to say the least). Hence the claim of some – Goedel himself, along with people like Penrose – that this demonstrates that human knowers have access to truths or ways of knowing (or proving) certain things that go beyond anything provable by purely formal means, such as the procedures instantiated by digital computers. This is what is usually meant by ‘Goedelian realism’, and – as Goedel was happy to accept – it amounts to a form of platonism about mathematics & the formal sciences.

2. “You can’t prove there are no WMDs” is like “You can’t prove there is no God”. “…although it is the case…that absence of proof is not proof of absence, still we are entitled (on probabilistic but nonetheless rational grounds) to draw a negative conclusion [when] non-existence can justifiably be maintained as a matter of inference to the best, most rational, or least credibility-stretching explanation.” “…it is a necessary presupposition…that there are truths which may or may not be discovered in the course of diligent enquiry and, moreover, that their standing is in no way affected by the extent of our knowledge, ignorance or uncertainty about them. Such is the starting-point or default assumption of any dispute-outside the realms of metaphysics or philosophy of language–…Beyond that, it is a matter of rationally weighing the evidence and attempting to reach an informed estimate which takes in as much of that evidence as possible, along with due allowance for the motivating interests of those whose judgements (or overt professions of belief) may always be subject in varying degrees to the pressure of ideological commitment or political self-interest.”

3. Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Thomas Reid (commonsense realism): “…testimony of various sorts plays a large and philosophically underestimated role in a great many aspects of human knowledge and experience.” … “can and should place trust in its various sources and means of transmission just so long as they stand up well to critical and methodological scrutiny.”

4. “…wide range of reliably knowledge-conducive procedures which no doubt fall short of absolute, indubitable truth yet which nonetheless offer sufficient grounds for rejecting the kind of anti-realist ‘solution’ currently on offer.” The skeptical/anti-realist false-dilemma is “another version of the fallacy that John Stuart Mill detected in Humean and other skeptical arguments against the validity of induction, that is to say, the mistake of imposing inappropriate (deductive) standards of truth on modes of reasoning-such as inference to the best explanation-that involved much wider, more practically accountable, sources of knowledge and evidence.”

Chapter two “shall unpack some of the arguments and concepts that philosophers have lately developed by way of providing those additional resources.” Nice segue.

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Dummett, nor his arguments, nor the term ‘disputed class’, nor anti-realism, are mentioned in my “Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian Perspective” (Geisler/Feinberg)–at least not in the index. In the chapter “How Do We Perceive the External World?” — Dualism (Representative Perception, Phenomenalism) and Idealism (weak, strong) are mentioned as alternatives to Realism (extreme/primitive, common-sense). Skepticism is also discussed. I’ve heard Norris say “representative perception” I think…but, if I did, I failed to mention it in my threads. Too bad his book has no subject index.

Mill is mentioned as relating to induction, but not directly as ‘the’ dude who defended induction against skepticism (instead, Frederick Will and Antony Flew are mentioned, as being only two of a group of philosophers…love this sentence: “The skeptic, then…is unhappy simply because induction is not deduction!”)–oddly his thoughts on logical and mathematical knowledge are also mentioned in such a way as to cast an interesting light on this discussion–“John Stuart Mill made it quite clear that he was not sure of the truth of the laws of logic. He wrote that the laws of logic are empirical generalizations, and, as such, are open to correction. He argued that just because we cannot conceive of another set of logical laws, it does not follow that another set of logical laws is impossible.” Reminds me of this from my Intro/SectionII thread on Quine: “So there is no ‘crucial experiment’ which can decide one of rival theories or hypotheses. In short, we can always make excuses for the results…even revise ‘laws’ of logic.”

Go here for some more info. on the Verification Principle: http://ichthus.yuku.com/topic/82. It’s a paragraph in one of my replies.

Geisler/Feinberg discuss a lot of stuff I wonder if Norris will discuss.

I’m not going to post induction stuff yet ’cause I just have this weird feeling I should save it for later.

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Strictly speaking, it holds that for any mathematical, logical or other such formal system beyond a certain (fairly basic) level of complexity – e.g., first-order logic or basic arithmetic, there will always be one or more axioms within the system that cannot be proved using the logical resources of the system itself. But of course Goedel claims (and is generally agreed) to have formally proved this unprovability-theorem, which is a bit of a puzzle (to say the least). Hence the claim of some – Goedel himself, along with people like Penrose – that this demonstrates that human knowers have access to truths or ways of knowing (or proving) certain things that go beyond anything provable by purely formal means, such as the procedures instantiated by digital computers. This is what is usually meant by ‘Goedelian realism’, and – as Goedel was happy to accept – it amounts to a form of platonism about mathematics & the formal sciences.

Also–one should wiki Dummett.

Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy”

Chapter 1: Staying for an Answer: Truth, Knowledge, and the Rumsfeld Creed –
Section I.

This section is pretty interesting and examines this quote from former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, spoken during a press conference on February 12, 2003 (section written December 23, 2004): “Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns-the ones we don’t know we know.” I vaguely remember hearing that press conference, can hear Rumsfeld’s manner of speaking, but I don’t remember what the context is surrounding that statement. Norris makes reference many times to the questionable existence of the WMDs that sold the invasion of Iraq to the U.S. public and the world. Norris’ language makes it obvious he thinks poorly of Rumsfeld’s creed-that it did not reflect a realist position, rather that Rumsfeld weaseled out of answering a question straightforwardly, of admitting there might not have been the WMDs that justified the invasion (and so no longer any justification), of the implication that the ‘evidence’ of them was perhaps a misinformation campaign, by masking “it is impossible to know (if there were or were not WMDs)” (iow, “you will never be able to know if there was/is no justification for the invasion of Iraq”) (blatant skepticism) in seemingly realist language.

Norris brings this example to examine, because it clearly shows how the central issues of epistemological debate “can often have a close bearing on the conduct…of our moral and political lives as persons whose considered judgement in matters such as the supposed justification for invading Iraq must always involve the attempt to sift truth from falsehood, or knowledge from ignorance.”

known knowns – things that we know we know

Most people would accept this, perhaps with caveats, because we all have experienced the reality of coming to find out that what we “thought” we knew-wasn’t the way things really are (we didn’t “actually” know it-we only “thought” we knew it). Observation-based beliefs and supposedly a priori truths (“thought to obtain as a matter of jointly intuitive and logical necessity quite apart from any such putative evidence for or against”) can later be proved either false, or “only true relative to a certain (e.g., Euclidean) frame of reference.” … “Hence the wide-spread debate as to whether there exist any statements that can rightly be considered ‘synthetic a priori’ in Kant’s sense of the term, i.e., statements which are self-evident to reason yet which also articulate an item of knowledge concerning the physical world or our experience of it. Some would even extend this doubt to a priori truth-claims of whatever sort, or whittle them down to a point of purely logical (and trivial) self-confirmation where only one candidate survives, namely the sentence ‘Not every statement is both true and false’. …extreme forms of skepticism.”

Rumsfeld’s “known knowns” isn’t clear enough. We need to make clear the (“cardinal”) distinction between (if we don’t, we cannot make sense of scientific progress, and the WMD discussion would be pointless)…

1. Know: “believe without question to the best of our knowledge or powers of rational comprehension” – “first-person [I: internalist], ‘psychological’ state of mind (‘I simply know this or that to be the case’)” Knowledge about WMDs “has its truth-value fixed…by the strength of conviction (genuine or otherwise) expressed by partisans of either view.” William James. “‘Truth’ can appear only under this or that currently accepted or preferred description.” (descriptivist?) “Truth-values cannot (or should not) be thought of as exceeding the bounds of warranted assertibility.” “Justification is principally a matter of ‘what works’ in the sense of promoting our best psychological, social and ethico-political interests.” “truth just is whatever has gained credence”
2. Know: “correctly and justifiably believe on the best, most reliable or truth-conducive grounds” – “properly applies only to that subset of beliefs which meet the twofold requirement of truth and epistemic or justificatory warrant.” Knowledge about WMDs “has its truth-value fixed by the fact of their existence or non-existence.” Bertrand Russell. “Truth must be conceived (in realist terms) as always potentially transcending the limits of present-best, communally warranted, or socially desirable belief.” “[I: pragmatic justification] ‘works’ only in so far as it encourages an attitude of placid and unthinking acquiescence in taken-for-granted (hence reassuring) habits of thought and belief.” “wishing cannot make it so”

This of course perks up my ears because it is relevant to my paper-where I talk about living as if we “know” there is moral truth, when we are offended when others violate our expectations, etcetera. Will keep it in mind.

known unknowns – things we do not know

At face value, says Norris, a realist, a defender of objective-truth values, would accept this. It seems to say “truth cannot ever in principle be reduced to the limits of present-best belief or officially authorized opinion.” The WMDs exist or they don’t-we know that we don’t know whether or not they exist. Norris thinks Rumsfeld actually means we will never be able to know (even when the search is concluded without finding WMDs, even if there is evidence of a misinformation campaign)-which is a skeptical, not a realist, position.

unknown unknowns – things we don’t know we don’t know

At this point I am reminded of the Venn diagram of self-knowledge. There are things we know about ourselves that others don’t know, there are things others know about us, that we don’t know about ourselves, there are things that others know about us that we also know, and there are things about ourselves that we don’t know and nobody else knows, either. The things we or others don’t know could either be known unknowns, or unknown unknowns. They are known unknowns if we can conceive of the question, but don’t know the answer. They are unknown unknowns if the question has never even occurred to us. Norris thinks Rumsfeld is not saying “There are perhaps objective answers that we haven’t even asked questions about,” – he thinks Rumsfeld is saying “you can’t prove a negative, so remain epistemically humble” so as to avoid “accusations of fraudulence, mendacity, faked ‘evidence’ and so forth”.

Brutal! Still no WMDs, though. Iraq is without a dictator, the U.S. is turning things over to the Iraqi people–steps in the right direction, methinks, unless it leaves Iraq vulnerable, of course, and a worse power than Hussein gains control over them.

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I am discussing my poll with RaspK over at Dawkins’ forum, and it occurred to me that without minds, there is no morality, so without an eternal mind, there is no moral truth, so–moral truth is not independent of minds (and, yet, it is). That sounds like anti-realism (except not). Ack?
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Professor Norris’ position:

Well, there is no ‘eternal mind’ (or nothing we can make any sense of under that name), so we’ll have to make do with human minds (collectively) as the source of whatever ethical truths we can come up with. Those truths will have to do with human (and I think non-human animal or other sentient) life-forms, and had better be based on some version of the consequentialist argument, i.e., maximizing welfare/flourishing and minimizing pain/misery. You can be a realist about those things without going platonist about moral values or landing yourself with all the classic problems about our (somehow, inexplicably) having epistemic/intuitive access to recognition-transcendent, hence inherently unknowable truths. Anyway that’s my best shot at an answer.

I was thinkin’ about it and–of course we can’t expect (moral) truth to “transcend” an omniscient mind. Sort of parallel to the idea that only an omniscient mind is capable of certainty, and all other knowledge is varying degrees of faith. But would you call that sort of truth (which does not transcend divine mind) mind-dependent? I don’t really think so…it sounds an awful lot like divine voluntarism. God does not create good/truth–He “is” good/truth. He creates what passes away–but all things eternal are what He is. But I will keep Professor Norris’ thoughts in mind.

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On the other hand, some of us know certainty is impossible for all but the omniscient and are satisfied with certitude. Also, if we know that we are attracted to some beliefs because we need a “feeling” of certitude, and if we value “truth” rather than that “feeling”–we can stop ourselves from believing on the basis of “feeling”. I think that feeling is maybe the initial spark that attracts us to the truth (route reconnaissance, as they say in the military)–and that reason can take the wheel from there. The underlying feeling can either be one of fear (to avoid existential nightmare) or curiosity (to go where no man has gone before)–or both. The “Why?!” is in us like webs are in spiders and nests are in birds.

I’ve been so busy and haven’t had time to progress through the book, but did review some epistemology/truth stuff out of Geisler and Feinberg’s “Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian Perspective” while waiting for jury selection to start yesterday (had jury duty). Hope to get back into this soon, but right now life is just zippin’ past.

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To me, (based on his reply about moral truth), Professor Norris sounds ontologically realist, epistemologically anti-realist–but I’ll wait until I make up my mind about that.

Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy”

Introduction, section IV.

So, to recap, Norris is going to make the case for realism as ontological commitment and as an “accounting for the growth of scientific knowledge by way of inference to the best (most rational) explanation.” He is going to present opposing views as well, like response-dependence. Though it cannot provide objectivity while meeting the challenges of the anti-realist or sceptic, Norris is going to “emphasize the range, ingenuity and resourcefulness of various arguments advanced in this vein, especially by Crispin Wright.” Response-dependence was touched on in section I of the Introduction, and will be discussed in chapter 4.

Internalist theories of knowledge – “first-person oriented modes of epistemological enquiry.” Externalist – (semantic: “meanings just ain’t in the head!” “advanced on modal-logical grounds by…Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke” Kripke/Putnam and the causal theory of reference-fixing was mentioned in section II of the Introduction. “Likewise highly promising are the kinds of naturalized epistemology-chiefly that developed by Alvin Goldman-which seek to conjoin a causal account of knowledge-acquisition with an adequately normative, reason-based rather than reductively physicalist (e.g., Quinean) approach.”

Chapter 2 will concentrate on the debates between realism and anti-realism, starting with “Kripke’s arguments for the existence of a posteriori necessary truths, or those that have to be discovered through some process of scientific enquiry but which nonetheless hold as a matter of necessity in any world physically congruent with our own.” Norris backs it up with Putnam’s “Twin-Earth” thought experiments, making the case for modal realism-the reference-fixing touched on in section II of the Introduction-“conserving fixity of reference across large (even radical) episodes of scientific theory-change.” The explanation given is mildly confusing. I’m not sure how you can consider a reference (like subatomic structure, or molecular constitution) fixed that was inconceivable to (could not be referred to by) previous knowers, but I’m betting I’ll find out. This is in opposition to a ‘descriptivist’ account, but I’m not exactly sure what that means, either. I think a descriptivist account says that features are not essential, that they fail to refer, that imputed properties before discovery (about some object), and imputed properties after discovery (about that object), will not be referring to the same object (if so-then how do you know what object you made a discovery about?).

Norris addresses concepts as they come up in the natural process of thinking through questions “that bear directly on matters of ethical and social (as well as more ‘narrowly’ epistemological) concern.” “Thus the book proceeds mainly through a series of interlinked debates-realism versus anti-realism, alethic versus epistemic conceptions of truth, externalism versus internalism, objectivist versus response-dispositional or otherwise specified middle-ground positions.”

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I’m confused right now as to why realism isn’t synonymous to, say, alethicism, externalism and objectivism; anti-realism to, say, epistemicism, internalism and response-dependence…but I’m pretty sure it’ll all be fleshed out as I read on.

Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy”

Introduction, section III.

This section discusses the Anglophone (or “analytic“-maybe Frege?, maybe Quine?) versus “continental” (mainland-European–the only example I recognized was Husserl) traditions. Husserl is grouped with Frege, Duhem with Quine, Kuhn with Bachelard. “Indeed it can be argued that in many ways Bachelard’s approach to these issues is one that confounds the received idea of ‘continental‘ philosophy as deplorably prone to excesses of cultural relativism while ‘analytic‘ philosophy cleaves to the virtues of disciplined truth-seeking rigour.” Norris is going to explain their various points of convergence and divergence, and use the continental perspective to provide a different slant on typically analytic themes and concerns (pretty much stole his words and moved ’em around).

Norris admits the philosophical ‘case’ he is advancing is toward a realist standpoint, and “(more specifically) toward a form of critical realism that rests on the following principal theses. (1) There exists a ‘real-world’, objective, mind-independent physical domain wherein various items on every scale-from electrons, atoms and molecules to chairs, continents and galaxies-exhibit certain likewise objective structures, properties and causal powers which they possess or exert quite apart from our present-best or even our future-best-attainable knowledge of them. This is basically an ontological thesis, that is to say, one having to do with matters that by very definition (as skeptics are always quick to remark) cannot be known in the sense ‘established beyond any possible doubt by our powers of cognitive or epistemic grasp’. Hence (2) the epistemological claim that we can nonetheless acquire increased knowledge of those objects, properties and powers through our various kinds of physical interaction with them, ranging all the way from everyday experience to the most refined and sophisticated methods of applied scientific research. Hence also (3) what critical realists describe as the complexly ‘stratified’ nature of that interaction, some of it transpiring at a level where objectivity is at a premium and where the knower (e.g., the observer or experimental scientist) has least involvement in setting things up with a view to finding things out, while some transpires through a far more active interventionist mode of enquiry. Even so (4), in the latter sorts of case, what is actually discovered through those various investigative methods and techniques is a range of (maybe hitherto latent or physically uninstantiated) properties and powers that are nonetheless real-there to be discovered-by just such newly devised or technologically enhanced means. Thus, for instance, there are certain kinds of entity-such as synthetic DNA proteins or transuranic elements produced in particle supercolliders-which are products of human scientific know-how but whose potential existence is now and always was a matter of real (objectively valid) microstructural attributes, capacities and laws of nature.”

Are synthetic DNA proteins, proteins not normally (naturally) (without the aid/interference of humans) produced by DNA?-or are they proteins normally “synthesized” by DNA? If the former, is this going to be how the case is made for realist ethics, even though it would be voluntarism? If the latter-good observation.

“This approach also has the great advantage of extending to the social-science disciplines where it makes allowance for the highest degree of practical, reflective and self-critical involvement on the part of human agents while explaining how the scope of that agency is both enabled and constrained bythe various physical and social realities with which it has to deal. Not least, it helps to show where cultural relativists and ‘strong’ sociologists go wrong by exaggerating the extent to which scientific knowledge (and the objects of such knowledge) should be thought of as socially or culturally ‘constructed’, while failing to take due account of just those crucial factors. At the same time it offers a useful corrective to the kinds of sharply polarized debate-as described above-in which objectivist (alethic) realists about truth are ranged against anyone who takes the view that truth must be subject to certain forms of epistemic or cognitive constraint. What critical realism chiefly brings out is the frequent confusion here between matters metaphysical and issues epistemological.”

Critical-realist terms: maintain distinction betweenontology – the “intransitive” domain of objects, structures, properties, causal dispositions, etc., and epistemology – “transitive” domain where human agency plays a more-or-less decisive interventionist role. (mostly quoting).

Shifting away from the physicalist reductionism of early logical positivists and logical-empiricist successors, allowing social sciences fair claim, but not to the point of considering all knowledge to be ‘constructed’.

Pretty much the whole section is quoted, lol-not feeling well.

I figured it would be cool to post my starting point, and see how it changes/grows as I study this book (Norris’ “Epistemology”). If you want to post something like that, post it in a new thread in the General Forum and let me know to move it to the Epistemology forum.

1. Certainty requires omniscience. All beliefs are varying degrees of faith, the strongest forms of faith backed by stronger evidence, and blind faith having no evidence and no longer counting as knowledge.

2. Faith: belief in, not just belief that (assurance of promises we hope for, but do not yet see; confidence in the evidence behind the promise, rather than doubting the promise despite the evidence) (or loyalty and trust rather than disloyalty and distrust)

Love is about subjective faith, not objective certainty, as John Nash discovered in the movie “A Beautiful Mind.” However, subjective love without objective demonstration is not love-faith “that” God is love, believing strong evidence of God’s loving us, though it cannot be proved with certainty (certainty being reserved for the omniscient), is a prerequisite to putting faith “in” Him. Blind faith is what leads to drinking the Kool-Aid (36). A genuine leap of faith is a rational one. However, Kierkegaard thought it offensive to require evidence from God of His existence, like requiring proof of love from your lover. But, would you really marry someone, put faith in someone, who never showed you love…someone for whom there is no evidence of their existence? You cannot be certain of the future when you say “I do”-but you have a pretty good idea the person you are marrying exists and (if you’re marrying for love) loves you-faith trusts the promise which is objectively evident. It is a leap, as Kierkegaard said, beyond mere belief “that” into belief “in”-but belief “that” (strong evidence) is still a prerequisite to belief “in” (trusting His promise).

…blind faith…is for those who would drink the Kool-Aid. Unless we know something with absolute certainty, faith is required. Only the omniscient can have absolute certainty. Knowledge for everyone else is varying degrees of faith-ranging from strong to blind (blind faith would no longer be considered knowledge). But, even if we have good evidence for our faith (faith “that”), that doesn’t mean we have the sort of faith the bible talks about (faith “in”)-which is more like “trust”. You wouldn’t trust your wife unless you had knowledge of her existence (“faith that,” for those who are not omniscient) -but even if you have knowledge of her existence (“faith that”) does not mean you have “faith in” (trust) her. See the forum “Reason for God Discussion”.

3. Morality is standards and ends (the ‘how’ and ‘why’), of social character and/or conduct. Morality may be created by the individual or cultural will, or perceived to be discovered in evolving human nature, or in an eternal social essence. While it may be true that a given morality exists in reality, its standards may or may not be “truth“. Truth is that which corresponds to reality (that which is). Moral truth (or true morality) is those standards, ends, of social character and/or behavior which are true (corresponding to reality, which must necessarily include the fulfilled ought, or the ought is just a nice concept). Note that a fact is true regardless if individuals or cultures believe it to be true, and that reality (including nature) does not create facts, but is what facts are about. If the truth about morality is that it evolves (if there is no morality among all moralities which does “not” evolve)-then there is no “moral truth” (truth never changes). If a standard is ‘created’ or is a ‘construct’ it is fiction (there can be true facts about the fiction, but the fiction itself cannot be a true fact). This rules out those standards which are subjective to the individual will, relative to the cultural will, or incorrectly perceived as being justified in evolving, indifferent nature. It can be true that subjective and relative standards exist-but not that they are true, for the same reason it can be true that individual or cultural beliefs can exist without corresponding to objective reality (which explains the wide range of moralities). That there are a wide range of beliefs about reality (including morality) does not rule out the possibility of beliefs which actually correspond (are true).

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I think Kierkegaard thought the objective reality of what Christ did was important, but only a starting point–it must be “personally appropriated” — it must be lived subjectively. When you are faced with the biggest “WHY?” and you know the answer must be love, and that there is no love without demonstration–there is the very real option of just believing that such demonstration (or the promise of it) is real… even if you have no access to evidence of it (to seek relationship with Him, rather than seeking evidence of Him). I think that must be where he is coming from. If you don’t have faith that there is evidence of the answer being “love”–you have settled on something less, or on nothing. And if you accept the answer is love and that there is evidence of it, and then still require evidence, you are still settling, because you are not yet living the answer. I know this to be true. I do not seek evidence and right answers in order to strengthen my faith–my faith is strong (because He made Himself obvious to me, gave me evidence). To me, evidence and right answers are bait for fishing… but I am also challenged to “live”/”be” the evidence/answers. I fall very short, unless you compare me to who I used to be before He brought me back. Grace ain’t for sissies, that’s for sure. I have told Him “this far and no farther” far too many times. :( I know He never gives up on me–I know His opinion of me, His love for me, never changes. It is my fuel. Yet I putter along sometimes… on my own power. He knew I was a ninny when He brought me back. God, change me.

Let’s hear from Kierkegaard…

“The objective reality of Christ’s atonement, independent of its personal appropriation, is most clearly shown in the history of the ten lepers. All of them were healed, though only of the tenth, who thankfully returned to give honor to God, is it said: your faith has made you whole. What was it that cured the others?”

“The Law of Existence: First life, then theory. Then, as a rule, there comes still a third: an attempt to create life with the aid of theory, or the delusion of having the same life by means of the theory. This is the conclusion, the parody, and then the process ends–and then there must be new life again.

Take Christianity, for example. It came in as life, sheer daring that risked everything for the faith. The change began when Christianity came to be regarded as doctrine. This is the theory; it was about that which was lived. But there still existed some vitality, and therefore at times life-and-death disputes were carried on over ‘doctrine’ and doctrinal formulations. Nevertheless doctrine became more and more the distinctive mark of being a Christian. Everything then became objective. This is Christianity’s theory. Then followed a period in which the intention was to produce life by means of the theory; this is the period of the system, the parody. Now this process has ended. Christianity must begin anew as life.”

And see the whole chapter “Existence and the Existential”…

[Edit: Kierkegaard would say to trust our moral sense, that love is the point, that God is love-because to doubt this evidence is to be like the Jews in Jesus’ time who, after seeing miracles, asked for more signs because they did not trust what they were pointing to-like doubting your lover and putting faith in the alternative. Even so, He does not leave us without evidence.]

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Review of Norris’ “Epistemology” — Introduction through chapter 3. My study of this book will slow down now that I have to go back to work Friday and my college semester is starting at the end of the month. Ah, to be paid a grand a month to study all day!!!

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All of this of course perks up my ears because it is relevant to my paper-where I talk about living as if we “know” there is moral truth, when we are offended when others violate our expectations, etcetera. The realist would be the essentialist, the anti-realist would be the voluntarist, and the third category is for those who think we can’t get at the truth–or that there is no truth at which to get (skeptic/nihilist). Those who would deny there are “grand narratives” (Lyotard) would fall in the third category.

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Analytics thought we should stick with the scientific method, which took the “self” out of the picture and required verification. With this attitude, Quine attacked the last two dogmas of empiricism-the analytic/synthetic dichotomy, and the idea that “observation-statements or predictions could be checked one-by-one against discrete items of empirical evidence.” That any statement/theory could be saved by adjusting parts of the ‘web of belief’ was thought to be the end of empiricism, but he “came out firmly in support of the empiricist position…by adopting a thoroughly naturalized (behaviourist) approach to epistemological issues and avoiding all forms of ‘metaphysical’ obfuscation,” for example, “the typically continental idea that epistemology must have to do with intuitions or thoughts ‘in the mind’ of this or that individual knower.” The analytic tradition typically only wants to focus on “structure” (ditching “genesis” when it ditched the self’s involvement in enquiry), whereas the continental tradition also considers “genesis” important (helpful in explaining advances/progress). This is a little confusing for me, because verification requires “knowers” who verify-probably why this ended up as cultural relativism.

Skepticism’s false dilemma: either there can be truths that cannot be known (verified) (leading to “the skeptical impasse-the unbridgeable gulf between truth and knowledge”), or a redefinition of truth putting it in the bounds of knowability. The skeptical/anti-realist false-dilemma is “another version of the fallacy (in) skeptical arguments against the validity of induction, that is to say, the mistake of imposing inappropriate (deductive) standards of truth on modes of reasoning-such as inference to the best explanation-that involved much wider, more practically accountable, sources of knowledge and evidence.”

Realist – values scientific truth and progress, objectivity (“recognition-transcendence”), ‘truth’ is a strident rallying-call. The realist thinks that anti-realists relativize truth, which defaults to skepticism. The realist needs to answer the charge of putting truth (or, perhaps, just “certainty”?) out of reach (perhaps I already answered that in my starting point? we’ll see), defaulting to skepticism.

Statements may: possess alethic (objective) truth (objectivists)-“recognition/verification transcendence” (alethic realism). “…unless the truth-value of statements is specified in alethic (objectivist) terms, and unless knowledge is conceived as a matter of justified true belief, then clearly the way is wide open for skeptics or cultural relativists to press their case for the non-existence of any ‘truths’ beyond those that happen to enjoy credence among this or that community of like-minded believers.” Norris says that was the way Wittgenstein was going when he said that truth-claims are “all bound up with our manifold ‘language-games’, cultural practices, or ‘forms of life’ and are therefore to be judged each by its own sui generes criteria of valid or meaningful utterance.”
Externalist – (semantic: “meanings just ain’t in the head!” “advanced on modal-logical grounds by…Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke” Kripke/Putnam and the causal theory of reference-fixing was mentioned in section II of the Introduction. “Likewise highly promising are the kinds of naturalized epistemology-chiefly that developed by Alvin Goldman-which seek to conjoin a causal account of knowledge-acquisition with an adequately normative, reason-based rather than reductively physicalist (e.g., Quinean) approach.” Know: “correctly and justifiably believe on the best, most reliable or truth-conducive grounds” – “properly applies only to that subset of beliefs which meet the twofold requirement of truth and epistemic or justificatory warrant.” Knowledge about WMDs “has its truth-value fixed by the fact of their existence or non-existence.” Bertrand Russell. “Truth must be conceived (in realist terms) as always potentially transcending the limits of present-best, communally warranted, or socially desirable belief.”

Regarding ‘truth’ of statements in the “disputed class”: they can and do possess objective truth-value “just so long as the sentence in question is well-formed and truth-apt.” Statements can be “truth bearers” (if they “refer”) and the portions of reality to which the statements refer are “truth-makers” (they make the statements true). This means reality is a truth-maker even if no statement is made (truth is knowledge-independent, verification-transcendent, epistemically unconstrained). Reminds me of Russell-I like Russell. “A well-formed statement…will have its truth-value fixed by the way things once stood in reality quite aside from our lack of certainty.”

Critical-realist terms: maintain distinction between ontology – the “intransitive” domain of objects, structures, properties, causal dispositions, etc., and epistemology – “transitive” domain where human agency plays a more-or-less decisive interventionist role (mostly quoting). There is a human role in manifestation but not in reality-the situation is not a dualism, but stratified (ontology/epistemology). Critical realism rests on the following principal theses. (1) There exists a ‘real-world’, objective, mind-independent physical domain wherein various items on every scale-from electrons, atoms and molecules to chairs, continents and galaxies-exhibit certain likewise objective structures, properties and causal powers which they possess or exert quite apart from our present-best or even our future-best-attainable knowledge of them. This is basically an ontological thesis, that is to say, one having to do with matters that by very definition (as skeptics are always quick to remark) cannot be known in the sense ‘established beyond any possible doubt by our powers of cognitive or epistemic grasp’. Hence (2) the epistemological claim that we can nonetheless acquire increased knowledge of those objects, properties and powers through our various kinds of physical interaction with them, ranging all the way from everyday experience to the most refined and sophisticated methods of applied scientific research. “[There is a] wide range of reliably knowledge-conducive procedures which no doubt fall short of absolute, indubitable truth yet which nonetheless offer sufficient grounds for rejecting the kind of anti-realist ‘solution’ currently on offer.” “…it is a necessary presupposition…that there are truths which may or may not be discovered in the course of diligent enquiry and, moreover, that their standing is in no way affected by the extent of our knowledge, ignorance or uncertainty about them. Such is the starting-point or default assumption of any dispute-outside the realms of metaphysics or philosophy of language.”

Habermas conserved the critical/progressive impulses of Enlightenment thought, “deriving those emancipatory values from a theory of ‘communicative action’ based on the idea of free and equal exchange between all parties with access to the relevant (more or less specialized) information sources. In which case philosophy can take on board the whole range of anti-foundationalist arguments brought against more traditional forms of epistemology by proponents of the present-day ‘linguistic turn’ and yet maintain a principled commitment to the standing possibility of truth and progress in the scientific, ethical and socio-political spheres. This approach abandons the old subject-centred epistemological paradigm, but does so-crucially-without yielding ground to the kinds of cultural-relativist thinking that have often been advanced by followers of Wittgenstein or by those who appeal to ‘language games’ or ‘forms of life’ as the furthest we can get in the quest for validating grounds, reasons or principles.”

“[Derridas] reflections on the problematic status of a prior truth-claims are pursued in a way that contrasts sharply with the approach adopted by philosophers who either reject such claim out of hand or arrive-like Putnam-at the pyrrhic conclusion that the sole candidate for a priori status is a trivially self-evident proposition such as ‘not every statement is both true and false’.”

Anti-realist (post-modernist, cultural-relativist, social constructivist)-see realist claims as “the merest of smokescreens designed to conceal and preserve the socio-cultural status quo”… ‘truth’ is a term of abuse… “…deny on principled grounds that truth can possibly be thought to exceed the scope and limits of human knowledge.” The anti-realist thinks that the realists put truth out of our grasp (transcending verification), defaulting to skepticism. The anti-realist needs to answer the charge of relativization.

Statements may: be epistemically constrained (verificationists)-no knowing without a knower…”strong anti-realist line…deny that it could ever make sense to assert of any given statement x that ‘x is either true or false-objectively so-despite our not being epistemically placed to prove, ascertain, or establish its truth-value.” If truth stands apart from “our best methods of proof or ascertainment-then ex hypothesi it lies beyond our utmost scope of knowledge, in which case there can be no defense against radical skepticism.”

Internalist theories of knowledge (confused as to whether this ‘psychological’ aspect conflicts w/ the ‘analytic’ tradition, though it seems to be a consequence of requiring verification) -“first-person oriented modes of epistemological enquiry.” Know: “believe without question to the best of our knowledge or powers of rational comprehension” – “first-person [I: Internalist], ‘psychological’ state of mind (‘I simplyknow this or that to be the case’)” Knowledge about WMDs “has its truth-value fixed…by the strength of conviction (genuine or otherwise) expressed by partisans of either view.” William James. “‘Truth’ can appear only under this or that currently accepted or preferred description.” (descriptivist?) “Truth-values cannot (or should not) be thought of as exceeding the bounds of warranted assertibility.” “Justification is principally a matter of ‘what works’ in the sense of promoting our best psychological, social and ethico-political interests.” “truth just is whatever has gained credence” [Realist objection: “[I: pragmatic justification] ‘works’ only in so far as it encourages an attitude of placid and unthinking acquiescence in taken-for-granted (hence reassuring) habits of thought and belief.” “Wishing cannot make it so.”]

Regarding ‘truth’ of statements in the disputed class: Dummett: “truth” should be replaced with “warranted assertibility” and “restricted to just those statements for which we possess some bona fide means of proof or verification.” The word “truth” keeps being used, though. Again, the anti-realist position is that we shouldn’t be able to say “this is true” (or false) if we cannot also say “this is verified” (or falsified). “Statements [in the disputed class] cannot have a truth-value since it is strictly inconceivable that truth should exceed the limits of assertoric warrant.” Dummett would reject Lewis’ transworld necessary mathematical truths, and stuff like Goldbach’s Conjecture, putting them in the “disputed class” (neither true nor false, as they cannot be verified/falsified)-“as distinct from merely undecidable according to our best, most advanced or sophisticated proof procedures.”

Where this gets really interesting is that Dummett claims that any gaps in knowledge must also be gaps in reality. “…there cannot be a past fact no evidence of which exists to be discovered, because it is the existence of such evidence that would make it a fact, if it were one.” “Equally strange-from any but a hard-line anti-realist viewpoint-is the claim that our evidence (or lack of it) is ‘constitutive’ not only of our state of knowledge with respect to those events at any given time but also of their very reality, i.e., their having actually occurred or not. In which case, quite simply, the historical past must be thought of as a highly selectively backward projection from whatever we are currently able to find out and hence as including lacunae-‘gaps in reality’, as Dummett says-corresponding to our areas of ignorance.”

One example Norris uses of Dummett thinking we can bring about the past by a change in our present knowledge, is retroactively granted prayer request. To Norris, this is Dummett agreeing that “wishing (praying) makes it so”. I used to use this example (not Dummett’s-didn’t know about Dummett) when I would think about time and God’s sovereignty over it. I think differently about it now, because, unlike Dummett, I think everything in the past, present, and future is fixed/complete from God’s perspective (according to Einstein’s relativity, they ‘are’ fixed)-all affirmatively answered prayers were answered (in our past, present, future) before it all began (from His perspective). So the guy’s prayer about what already happened-isn’t “retroactively” granted (nothing changes in the past from God’s perspective-the past, present, and future are fixed/complete)-but “eternally” granted (from beyond time). And this is not a case of the guy changing the past with his knowledge, because nothing changes, and even if it does, it isn’t his “knowing it” that changes it (he does not know how it turns out when he is praying about it), but God Himself that changes it (if that were possible, and it isn’t-it’s all fixed). So “praying makes it so” is not equivalent to “wishing makes it so”.

At any rate, when you’re talking about knowledge that makes the past real, you bring up the time travel paradox of the closed causal loop. Now that I’ve said that, I’m wondering if it has anything to do with causal realism. If you (the reader) don’t know what a closed causal loop is, here’s an example based off the TV series LOST (I won’t get the details exactly correct, so it is only “based off” of it-it isn’t the exact situation). In 2007 Richard gives John a compass and tells John “The next time you see me, give this back.” John goes back in time and meets Richard again sometime in the 1950s, and gives Richard the compass, saying, “The next time you see me, give this back.” Richard gives it back to John in 2007-the event we started with. So–who is the original owner of the compass? Who even manufactured it? Applying that to Dummett’s reverse-causality powers of knowledge: If I make the past real with my knowledge-what made my knowledge happen? Shiver me timbers!!

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So, back to reality, here’s what we end up with:

Incorporating Duhem’s contexts of justification and discovery (ch3.II.1) and Bachelard’s sanctioned/lapsed history categories (ch3.IV.1)–
1. Ontology. “There exists a ‘real-world’, objective, mind-independent physical domain wherein various items on every scale-from electrons, atoms and molecules to chairs, continents and galaxies-exhibit certain likewise objective structures, properties and causal powers which they possess or exert quite apart from our present-best or even our future-best-attainable knowledge of them.” // Mind-independent truth-that to which knowledge refers. Only the omniscient (which, granted, requires mind-but ‘facts’ are not dependent on that mind for their truth–kind of like how God “is” good, rather than “making” good exist) is capable of certainty (does not “come to know” but “knows eternally”)-all else must approach it through reason, but never arrive (all human knowledge is varying degrees of faith, excluding blind faith).
2. Epistemology. “We can nonetheless acquire increased knowledge of those objects, properties and powers through our various kinds of physical interaction with them, ranging all the way from everyday experience to the most refined and sophisticated methods of applied scientific research.” “[There is a] wide range of reliably knowledge-conducive procedures which no doubt fall short of absolute, indubitable truth yet which nonetheless offer sufficient grounds for rejecting the kind of anti-realist ‘solution’ currently on offer.” “…it is a necessary presupposition…that there are truths which may or may not be discovered in the course of diligent enquiry and, moreover, that their standing is in no way affected by the extent of our knowledge, ignorance or uncertainty about them. Such is the starting-point or default assumption of any dispute-outside the realms of metaphysics or philosophy of language.” //
‘context of justification’histoire sanctionée (sanctioned history)-hypotheses which have ‘transcended the metaphor’ –‘absolute ideal objectivity’-the closest we get to certainty/omniscience-a statement is true because it refers/corresponds to ‘1’.
‘context of discovery’ —
–Genesis: “process of reasoning by which such truths [see ‘structure’ directly below] are arrived at”-“the genesis of theories or the history of scientific thought”
—Structure: “distinguishes the truths of mathematics or logic” from others which require a greater degree of faith. ‘1’ and ‘2’ come together when epistemic structure matches up with (refers to, corresponds to) alethic structure, which retains its shape despite conflicting “epistemic shapes” of various observers throughout history [as opposed to the idea that the subject necessarily shapes the structure and is (necessarily) incapable of discovering the structure’s alethic shape by drawing out its alethic shape from its various conflicting epistemic shapes].
histoire perimée (lapsed history) – applies to those theories which don’t pass muster-they don’t just inhabit a different world (contrary to what Kuhn would say).
The naming/descriptivist discussion on Putnam seemed odd to me, and I tentatively concluded that names are short-hand (especially names like “orange” referring to the fruit)-descriptions are the real deal and tell us more about the object-but both names and descriptions are “place-holders” for the object being named/described.

There are a lot of thinkers I left out of this. I didn’t even mention Kant once-’til now. I’m horrible w/ names…I hold on to concepts much better.

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a synthesis of Husserlian transcendental with Heideggerian existentialist phenomenology, and these in turn with an understanding of Hegel mediated by Kojeve’s strong-revisionist reading
–would love to know the ins and outs of that

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If everything we know “about” is always changing, then there’s nothing on which to hang the epistemological hat–unless there is something to know about which never changes. Now that would be something to hang your hat on. That everything (temporal) is changing speaks against Plato’s Forms. But, maybe the eternal is the type of Form Plato referred to. Maybe the only Form. But this world, this temporal existence, “is” real, and has its being from that Form, which, maybe Plato would say (in different words), is “the essence of what it means to be real”. Sounds good to me. The closer to Love, the closer to what it means to be real…the more fully you exist. Every wall we put up to protect ourselves from all the dangers of love–is a wall devolving away from Being. To let Him past the wall and tear it down, to break us back down and (re)form us to His essence, is to let Him help us truly become the only thing that truly exists–Love. And we don’t need to escape this temporal reality to let Him do that. Love is here–love is now.

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Philippians 2:12-“…continue to work out your salvation with fear and trembling,” (NIV). God produces fear and trembling in us because He exposes the most vulnerable in us. It is like when you are terrified to ask a girl out. If asking her out remains a task until you finally ask her-you are always going to be terrified as long as you hesitate (in despair, for you deeply need her-attempting to replace her with innumerable lesser pleasures, or to erect a wall around your heart as if you need nothing, only points out the reality of your despair). But, after the task comes the relationship. And God is like a girl whose love for you never changes, so that when you are unfaithful or doubt her love-she remains constant. A girl like that is terrifying. It is terrifying enough to open your heart to an ordinary girl-but this is no ordinary girl, and she demands your entire, vulnerable heart-complete transparency. You might lose respect for a girl who would remain constant though you are unfaithful, but this is no naïve girl who lacks self-respect. She does not love from a lack. You either choose greatness with her, or the mud-in being unfaithful, you fool only yourself. She always knew which you would choose. That is why some fear death-it reminds them they chose poorly every moment of their life, and that they will no longer have time to ask that terrifying girl out. They used her creations but kept a safe distance all the while, whereas Abraham spared not even his promised son (Genesis 22:2, Hebrews 11:19, Genesis 22:13). After death they will have to spend eternity without her-they must either banish that fear and trembling from their mind and have faith she never existed (eternal spiritlessness), or choose her now, with fear and trembling.

Yes, I’ve been reading Kierkegaard.

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Summary Norris’ Epistemology Ch4, Ch5, Postscript

In preparation for my discussion w/ ‘trop (zoot)… ‘physicalist’ means ‘thoroughly naturalized’.

Response dependence (RD) theory, with roots in Locke’s secondary qualities (better explained by optics and the neurophysiology of visual perception) attempts to bridge the gap between realism and anti-realism by specifying what constitutes an appropriate response, using the quantified, duly provisoed biconditional (“if and only if”). It attempts to move away from subjectivity (and the Kripkensteinian “skeptical solution” of communitarian thinking) by being choosy about its subjects and right response. However, since it is still focused on the subject and response, it still has anti-realist leanings, and does stop short of admitting truth transcends the subject/response.

It might remind one of John Stuart Mill’s consideration that the “higher pleasures” are determined by the “competent judge”—which also is a result of anti-realist thinking. However, it seems Norris’ is some sort of consequentialist—not sure which sort. In my Ethics text, letting the majority of competent judges determine which pleasures are ‘higher’ is referred to as “tyranny of the majority” but really it is the fallacy of reification, as well as the is-ought fallacy. We do not make truth up, and what we actually desire is not necessarily what we ought to desire.

I was hoping to hear how Norris explains a realist account of moral truth without sounding anti-realist, but he never did. All he did was sound consequentialist, without providing a realist justification for it, and suggesting that virtue and deontological theories were anti-realist theories.

The RD reading of the Euthyphro Dilemma says that, rather than “either” determining truth (including moral truth) with best opinion “or” being optimally qualified to recognize truth—it’s both—best opinion (determination) is optimally qualified (recognition). The realist will say “It is because statements are true that they are superassertible” (Socrates) and the superassertibilist (Wright) will say, “It is because statements are superassertible that they are true” (Euthyphro). So, it is still stuck in subjectivity, although an improvement on communitarianism (and skepticism, and nihilism)—at least everyone agrees there is truth to be ‘got at’. However, there is no external norm, only an internal norm set by the standards informing assertions w/in the discourse (according to Wright)—so, little difference from communitarianism.

Mark Johnston says we respond that x is red because x is actually red, Miller replies that our concept of x being red is response-dependent.

McDowell tries to detranscendentalized Kant without thoroughly naturalizing him–to get back the normativity lost when Quine demolished logical empiricism, to overcome the dilemma between discovery and justification, or mind and world. He says that spontaneity (conscious reason–freedom) emerges from receptivity (intuition) and is rationally constrained by it (responsible). So, the real is within our responsibly free grasp—there is nothing outside our grasp. However, when scientific discoveries are made, something that once was not within our grasp, comes within our grasp—before that, it transcended our grasp, and even after that, it transcends our grasp, since grasping it does not make it true, and it will remain true even if we forget it. The RD road leads to and ends, via skepticism, at Dummettian anti-realism…or realism, if you’d rather not settle for less.

Virtue theorists also try to get back some normativity by relying on certain epistemic virtues internal to the subject, rather than external rules which lost normativity with Quine’s demolition of logical empiricism. However, like with RD theory, it makes truth dependent on the subject—instead of the subject being a “competent judge”—the subject is, say, an “honest judge”. But, being internally, intuitionally truthful doesn’t make your facts true externally, though it will increase the probability that you will collect true facts.

Norris says that this does not actually solve the normativity problem, because of the is-ought fallacy. It’s more like the ought-is fallacy… “I’m being truthful, therefore what I’m saying must be true.” A tyranny of one, and the fallacy of reification.

This externalism (rules-based) versus internalism (intuition-based, response-based, virtue-based) thinking makes me wonder … how you be influences what you do, what you do influences how you be. If you follow rules (like the scientific method) you will develop a scientific character, and if you have a scientific character, you will be more likely to follow scientific rules. So, in a sense, it is true that if you “be scientific” you will arrive at true facts, because you will follow the scientific method. But, that is “only” if you acknowledge the external rules/method. Virtue theory does not seem to like the rules thing, and doesn’t like the realist idea that truth may exceed our grasp. That doesn’t seem very honest to me, though. Norris’ criticism that virtue focuses too much on the subject (not enough on the truth being transcendent), doesn’t hold water with me, when you consider that ‘rules’ don’t guarantee certainty, either. But, his criticism does hold water when he mentions that virtue theory usually doesn’t restrict the ‘virtue’ aspect to the context of discovery. Shouldn’t the ‘rules’ be restricted to the context of discovery, too, then? If so…doesn’t that take away normativity? Perhaps both virtue and rules help in the context of discovery, and in the context of justification we can just say that truth is true despite how well or badly we’ve managed to grasp it in the context of discovery?

It is all very weird to me that normativity in epistemology is being linked to ethics. It’s hard for me to wrap my head around it. Not only virtue (internalist) theory—but deontological (external rules) theory—which are just the methods followed by an epistemically virtuous person, if you think about it. But apparently those methods are “ethical” methods? So, to get at the truth is an ethical endeavor? I can see that the ‘privation’ of it would be lying (by giving false information, or withholding information). It almost makes science out to be a duty and scientific character a virtue to develop… Am I getting this right?

So. Virtue and method are in the context of discovery, and discovery is a moral obligation, because it satisfies the hunger in us all for honest, genuine, pure, unadulterated truth. We have confidence that what we know is on the right track, because we virtuously follow the scientific method (context of discovery)—but part of that is realizing that our conclusions must always be open to revision, because no matter how virtuous we are or how meticulous the methods we obey—we can still get things wrong and fail to grasp the complete truth, which is true (context of justification) independent of our grasping.

Where does Norris’ consequentialism fit in here? Sometimes releasing the truth on people hurts them and wreaks havoc and has devastating consequences…but that doesn’t make it false. To me, the “end” of epistemology is to arrive at truth (it is not “the arriving” but “the truth” that is the end). This is not the same end as that of Ethics, which is love. That is why Kant was wrong when he said we should tell the truth to a would-be killer, rather than save a life. But that was more about truthfulness, than it was about truth. There are methods of being truthful, and there are methods of arriving at the truth—truthfulness is the “process of arriving”—it isn’t the truth itself. But, rethinking this–if discovery is a moral obligation, it is because it has the same end as the end in Ethics—love (we all hunger to be loving, to do love—true meaning). If you follow the Golden Rule you will honestly follow the scientific method (tell the truth), unless it would hurt others—then you would abandon the method and save a life (or at least not violate ethical standards governing scientific experiments, for example). Granted, we do not have certainty that the standard for how and why we should be and behave (including ‘discovery’ or ‘truth-finding’ behavior) is “real” (corresponds to the fulfilled standard) rather than reified…subjective or communitarian…but we can make sure that standard at least passes our litmus, and leave ourselves open to future revision in case the complete truth is currently eluding our grasp. This combines internalism (the hunger for truth of any sort; the question) with externalism (the requirement that what fulfills our hunger, the answer, passes the litmus)…it combines intuition with reason, being with doing, without trespassing into justification.

The version of virtue theory which trespasses into justification is at least not communitarian, bowing to the majority. But if it tries to define the virtues as realist virtues (or reliabilist virtues), it contradicts itself out of existence, since truth is no longer justified by the virtuous. It clearly leans toward anti-realism.

Like skepticism, anti-realism, communitarianism, RD-theory, paradigm relativists and paradigm shiftists, yadda yadda, it cannot explain how folks (in this case, virtuous folks) can get things wrong (implying, even while using the argument from error, that something else was right before they knew it was right), and it cannot explain scientific progress (grasping what was previously ungraspable, sometimes in bits and pieces without completely discarding whole theories).

*******
Just sent this question to Professor Norris:

Is how I am using the words “justified” and “true” correct in the following article?

Jonathan’s lightbulb and the science of moralityhttp://www.examiner.com/x…-the-science-of-morality

*******

“Hi again, and thanks for sending the essay. Yes, I think you’re using ‘justified’ and ‘true’ in a perfectly valid sense – not (in the case of ‘justified’) a standard, text-book, philosophical received sense, but no harm in that – you explain what you mean by it quite clearly and you use it consistently. The argument to God’s existence isn’t so strong because he (He? s/he? It?) either has a merely place-filling role in your argument, in which case it might as well drop out, or else needs the relevant (moral) attributes filling in, in which case it is arguable (I think inescapable) that all the definitions/descriptions so far advanced by defenders of the monotheistic religions are morally repulsive or downright contradictory. If you want to see just how repulsive – and what kinds of moral/intellectual contortion they produce in otherwise intelligent apologists – then take a look at Peter Geach’s article ‘On Believing in the Right God’. It seems to me that some kind of naturalistic ethical realism is the only promising (and safe) way for moral philosophy to go, although you won’t agree with that. Still I liked you piece – lively and provocative – and I can see no objection (habitual usage/prejudice apart) to deploying ‘justified’/’justification’ in that non-standard way.  // Best wishes, Chris”

I am disappointed that he thinks I misuse ‘justification’ but…I disagree w/ him. Here is a relevant discussion: http://www.philosophychatforum.com/viewtopic.php?f=51&t=15791&p=156936#p156936

*******

Professor Norris, it crushes me to find out you think I am using the word ‘justified’ incorrectly. I think I’ll just disagree w/ you unless you give good reasons as to why. Here is a relevant discussion which leads me to believe you are mistaken: http://www.philosophychat…791&p=156936#p156936 but I am open to hearing your explanation.

If you think God merely has a place-filling roll in my argument, you have not fully grasped my argument, for if that were his roll, my argument would commit the fallacy of reification. Peter Geach’s argument (or, what I imagine it must be, from your e-mail—I haven’t read it)—that God is immoral (essentially)—is self-defeating, because it assumes the reality of moral truth (in order to deem God immoral) to deny the reality of the only being to which moral truth may correspond (God). Also, perhaps certain conceptions of God are morally repulsive, but it does not follow from that that a morally good God does not exist.

Respectfully,

Maryann Spikes

*******

“Yes, that strikes me as a much better (clearer and more straightforward) statement of the case, and one that gets it exactly right about truth and justification. I’m not sure about the sections on faith & certainty – yes, certainty gets stronger as the evidence firms up but the same doesn’t apply to faith, at least in any normal (psychologically plausible) sense of the word – you might even say the reverse, i.e., that there is less & less need or role for faith as the evidence gets stronger and certainty increases. But that’s just a quibble and beside the main point, which was to get straight about truth and justification. Most likely you were on the right track all along and I was misled by some odd point of phrasing. Anyway thanks for the clarification. // Best wishes, Chris”
*does the dance of joy!*

I agree that less faith is needed as the evidence gets stronger!!!

Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy”

Introduction, section II.

This section deals with the demise of logical positivism, beginning with W.V. Quine’s 1951 essay, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. Quine attacked 1. “the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements (or ‘truths of reason’ and ‘matters of fact’),” and 2. “the idea that scientific claims, predictions, or hypotheses could be tested one-by-one against observational findings or items of empirical evidence.” He replaced those two pillars with the approach that theories are always ‘undetermined’ by the empirical evidence, which is “always in some degree ‘theory-laden’, and the ‘unit of empirical significance’ was not the single observation or statement concerning it but rather the entire ‘web’ or ‘fabric’ of accepted belief at any given time.” So there is no ‘crucial experiment’ which can decide one of rival theories or hypotheses. In short, we can always make excuses for the results… even revise ‘laws’ of logic.

I don’t understand the analytic/synthetic thing.

“Quine maintains a resolutely physicalist or science-led conception of epistemology-one that rejects all its normative claims and treats it as a mere sub-branch of behavioral psychology.” On the one hand he says the physical sciences are not privileged and so numbers, bricks, and unicorns share the same ontological status-on the other hand, he insists the physical sciences are “by far our best guide in philosophic matters and hence that epistemology should forthwith ‘fall into place’ as a thoroughly naturalized study of the processes by which the ‘meagre input’ of sensory stimuli somehow gives rise to the ‘torrential output’ of conjectures, hypotheses, theoretically informed observation statements, and so forth.” This “leaves philosophy wholly bereft of normative standards or values. What then drops out-or would if this programme were carried right through-is any prospect of explaining the growth of knowledge (or our knowledge of the growth of knowledge) in terms that provide a basis for informed and rational theory-choice, as distinct from Quine’s somewhat ad hoc appeal to a process of negotiated trade-off between the interests of economy, conservatism and sheer pragmatic convenience. This normativity-deficit has been noted by various critics, along with the conceptual problems induced by a narrowly empiricist (behaviorist) account of belief-acquisition-albeit shorn of the ‘two dogmas’-which likewise conspicuously fails to explain how and why certain theories are superior to others in point of rational and causal-explanatory power.”

So. Sounds like Norris doesn’t want to reduce normative standards or values to “what works”. I am curious to see how he grounds them.

Directions of post-Quinean epistemology and philosophy of science:

1. Make good on normativity-deficit by rejecting Quine’s physicalist thesis “by offering more detailed accounts of what constitutes a genuine advance in knowledge… (This approach) accepts…theory-laden character of empirical observations-and the ‘undetermination’ of theory by evidence-but sees…that theories can be more or less strongly supported by the best evidence to hand and such evidence more or less convincingly explained by the best available theory.”
2. Something about causal interaction that escapes me. Causal realism. Kripke/Putnam causal theory of reference-fixing.
3. Take anti-realism as somewhat of a default position, aim “not so much to refute that position as to come up with a range of alternative middle-ground proposals whereby truth is conceived in epistemic rather than alethic terms.”
4. Stop fixating on issues between realism/anti-realism, objectivist truth vs. warranted assertibility (insoluble dilemmas… a false-start)-which have more to do with metaphysical or logic/language disputes than with epistemology-and “include some account of theepistemic virtues or the various kinds of knowledge-conducive attitude, mind-set, intellectual character, and so forth, that enable virtuous (well-motivated) enquirers to pursue their task with the best prospect of success. … What is required is an approach that, more in the spirit of Aristotle, allows for a distinctively ethical conception of knowledge, one that gives pride of place to the epistemic virtues.” It would then become a question of why the exercise of some virtue “should have proved especially sound, reliable or apt to maximize the truth-content of those theories and hypotheses arrived at under their guidance.”

Number 4 will be discussed in chapter 5, tracing the problems back to Kant “in the First Critique concerning the role of judgement as a mediating term between sensuous intuitions and concepts of understanding” on to McDowell’s “revisionist (but still deeply problematical) reading of Kant.” “…the virtue-based theory falls into the same kinds of dilemma that afflict those alternative accounts. That is to say, it conspicuously fails to close the gap between a normative conception that relativizes truth to ‘best option’ in the manner of response-dependence theorists and a realist (or objectivist) conception that takes truth to be always in principle verification-transcendent. Moreover this brings it out on the side of an anti-realist approach according to which truth cannot possibly elude or surpass the limits of present-best, virtuously formed belief.” So any theory can describe the sort of mind-set needed for knowledge-conducive enquiry-but this alone cannot provide “a means of reconciling truth (or veridical knowledge) with the deliverance of optimized epistemic warrant or accredited best judgement.”

So in chapter 5 Norris is going to address the problems that surface in virtue-based epistemology. Virtue-oriented, cool. Virtue-based… not so cool.

*****

Explanation of analytic/synthetic: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic-synthetic_distinction#Quine.27s_criticism Basically Quine just said there is no distinction, because there are only synthetic statements, because analytic (a priori) statements are circular. I wonder…was that merely a practical conclusion?

Perhaps this is a dumb question, but … is this “normativity” thing separate from the field of ethics, or … is it saying we have a moral obligation to believe (that? in?)–we ought to believe–when the evidence warrants belief (and that any real moral obligation conflicts with a physicalist worldview)? Is Quine just countering that belief is not a moral duty but a mere matter of practicality or whatever? Like… the ought in “If you want to get there quickly, you ought to take this route?” — is not a “moral” ought.

Or is this talking about … when Norris says “the growth of knowledge”… the “spread” (between minds) of ideas (at first I just thought he meant the growth of knowledge inside an individual mind)? Reminds me of Richard Dawkins’ (“selfish”) meme. We could be dealing with two separate issues here, I think (though related). There is the spread of ideas, and then there is the spread of “true” ideas. They both probably follow the laws of memes (not as “strict” as the laws of truth… prob’ly only requiring “resonance” in the intuition)–but true ideas also correspond to reality.

*****

Reply from Professor Norris, posted with his kind permission:

No, the two kinds of ‘ought’ are quite distinct, and need to be treated as such since otherwise we’ll get into all sorts of muddles. Still I think you can have a much stronger (more strongly normative) sense of ‘ought’ when you’re doing science or any other kind of disciplined activity – drawing conclusions, weighing evidence, testing the soundness of inductive or other inferential reasonings – than anything allowed for by Quine’s ultra-pragmatist approach. This ‘ought’ is a matter of respecting evidence, admitting counter-evidence, not being swayed by foregone beliefs or assumptions, etc., and it does connect – even if not in any straightforward or direct way – with the sorts of ethical imperative that (ought to) govern our dealings with other people.

It’s so nice to get non-combative feedback! I can’t even tell you how nice it is. What a God-send.

*****

Does Quine think norms leading to correspondence do not “physically exist”–does that have anything to do with it (is he saying all truth claims, or methods of arriving at truth, are not about “this is how it is” or “this is how we find out how it is” but are instead about “this is how we should think it is” or “this is how we should find out how-we-should-think-it-is”)?
Physicalism:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism#Argument_from_methodological_naturalism

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Quine snippets from my Intro. to Philo. / Christian Perspective (Geisler/Feinberg) book–

“W.V.O. Quine, a contemporary philosopher, views knowledge in terms of a ‘web of belief.’ He argues that at the center of the web are those beliefs that we hold with greatest certainty, but he claims that even these could be given up. Among the beliefs at the center of the web are beliefs about logic. Quine denies that there are any purely formal or analytic beliefs or statements which are incapable of surrender or modification. He says that we tend to retain our belief in the matters at the center of our web because any change in this area would demand radical revision of our picture of the world, and we tend to resist this as much as possible.”

Summary of section on Coherentism or Contextualism–

Major alternative to foundationalism (realism, right?) is coherentism/contextualism (anti-realism, right?)–the nebula theory of justification (Quine’s “web of belief”). There are no basic propositions, no immediately justified beliefs–beliefs are justified if they don’t conflict with the existing web of belief (which reminds me of every time I have to qualify that only one option among conflicting options “can” correspond–rather than “does” correspond—-the coherentist/contextualist is saying that if it “coheres” it corresponds (and all the other conflicting beliefs necessarily do not correspond). But what if the part of the web to which the belief coheres–does not correspond?

That was a nutshell summary–a LOT left out. Maybe for a later time. Movie time is now.

*****

Some stuff on logical positivism from Intro. to Philo./A Christian Perspective, Geisler/Feinberg:

“A group of philosophers, generally within the analytic school of logical positivism…claims that statements of moral principle are not prescriptive, at least not in any straightforward sense. Rather, they express personal approval or disapproval. So to say, “Killing is wrong,” is merely to express one’s own distaste for murder. It is true that the statement advises a similar policy for others, but they are under no obligation to comply. This form of ethical theory is known as emotivism, and is expounded by A.J. Ayer and C.L. Stevenson.”

So emotivism is a logical positivist theory. Hm.

“In recent times the group of philosophers called logical positivists have argued that a good deal of what had traditionally been a part of metaphysics was pseudoscience. Thus, they talked about the elimination of metaphysics, since they branded it as nonsense or meaningless.”

Doesn’t sound much different from Quine’s physicalism, but maybe that doesn’t rule out the posibility that Quine is a “rationalist metaphysician”–see below. It seems it was Ayer’s verification principle Quine attacked.

Nutshell version of the “Methodology of Philosophy” chapter (covering Socrates’ Interrogation, Zeno’s Reductio ad Absurdum, Aristotle’s Deduction, The Inductive Method, Mill’s Canons of Induction, The Scientific Method, The Existential Method, Phenomenological Method and The Analytic Method), “The Analytic Method” section (covering Verification Method and Clarification Method), “Verification Method” subsection– “The Vienna Circle of the 1920s and the logical positivism movement in general, included men such as A.J. Ayer (1910-1970), Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), and Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970). In Language, Truth and Logic Ayer attempts, as indicated in the title of the first chapter, “The Elimination of Metaphysics.” This alleged elimination is based on his verification principle, that for a statement to be meaningful it must be either purely definitional (analytic) or else verifiable (synthetic) by one or more of the five senses. All other statements (ethical, theological, and metaphysical statements) are non-sense, or meaningless.” The verification principle itself is not verifiable, and if it is just a meta-language rule explaining how how language is to be used, “then it cannot be used in a prescriptive way, say, to eliminate statements about God or ultimate reality.” “There are many objections to this principle. Some have pointed out that it is too restrictive: it eliminates statements that are obviously meaningful even to empiricists (such as empirical generalizations of science, like ‘all swans are white.’ This is not empirically verifiable unless one observesall swans, a practical impossibility). Others have objected that the principle attempts to legislate meaning and not listen to it.” The verification method includes the falsification principle (noted by Flew)–if nothing can count against a statement, then nothing should be allowed to count ‘for’ it, either. This is confusing to me, because if something could count against it–then it would be falsified. I think some examples should have been used.

In the chapter “Can We Know?” Geisler/Feinberg imply Ayer’s dismissal of metaphysics with the requirement of verification/falsifiablility is a skeptical position.

In the chapter “What is Truth?” (covering coherence theory, the pragmatism of Pierce, James and Dewey, performative theory, and the correspondence of Moore and Tarski), it is said that “For a short time it enjoyed some support among logical positivists such as Neurath and Hempel.” Oddly–this reminds me of Quine’s “web of belief”–the nebula theory of truth. But, “The system of coherent statements is different for the rationalist metaphysicians (does that include Quine?) and the logical positivists (like Ayer). For the rationalists the system is a comprehensive account of the universe or reality. The logical positivists, on the other hand, see the system of statements as the scientific picture of the world as described by contemporary sciences.” That’s why it reminds me of Quine’s physicalism. So…Quine’s physicalism doesn’t rule out metaphysics, then? Maybe I’m just confused on the meaning of “metaphysics”. Geisler/Feinberg suggest coherence is a necessary condition of truth–but it is not “enough” because beliefs can cohere which do not correspond. 1) a statement can cohere with one system and conflict with another, 2) a statement can cohere with some system but not correspond to the real world, 3) it is possible to have two coherent systems which are incompatible, so coherence alone cannot decide between the two systems. There’s two more points, but these three clinch it for me.

So it seems logical positivists (like Ayer) were anti-metaphysical realists (even though they required “verification”–like anti-realists, who disagree truth transcends verification), and that anti-realist rational metaphysicians (like Quine) are responsible for the demise of logical positivism. Si o no? Fascinating and weird.

*****

Professor Norris’ reply:

No, not exactly – the logical positivists (and logical empiricists) were much closer to the radical-empiricist & anti-realist (or classical positivist) line of thought descending from Ernst Mach – verification was all (or observation, measurement, etc.). Dummettian anti-realism comes out of that tradition and gives it a logical/metaphysical twist by hooking it up to intuitionism ( = anti-realism) in philosophy of maths. Hopes this clarifies matters (!).

— Professor Norris

They’re BOTH anti-realists. Well, that makes sense, given the requirement for verification. I don’t understand everything you said–math is not my field of expertise (I don’t have such a field, lol)–but–I think I’ve got what I need for now to be able to move on. Thankyou!

Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy”

Introduction, section I.

I want to say at the outset that I wish the index was also a subject index, not just a name index, and all the underlining or other emphasis in the quotes below is purely mine.

The introduction is split into four Roman-numerated (is that right?) sections. Off the top of my head, I don’t know what makes them different from eachother, but I’m betting this little exercise is going to help me find out. To prevent confusion, the “I” that follows is in fact a Roman numeral, not an incomplete sentence or some sort of existential declaration.

I
J

Epistemology-“the theory of knowledge.” … “issues of epistemology-of truth, knowledge and evidential warrant.”

Norris has attempted to: 1. Make his style accessible, 2. Make obvious the complex/technical debates’ importance to real-world topics of dispute, 3. Make obvious how epistemology in general speaks to our most pressing concerns when it comes to having to decide “on the balance of evidence” what/whom to believe. To me it seems 2 and 3 are identical.

I would just like to say that the way Norris actually came out and said the above, and the way the rest of the Introduction reads (I’ve read all five sections, but it’s taking me a while to type stuff up), was just barely accessible to me… but it did capture my interest. By the end of this book, if I can keep up, I feel I may be ready for Epistemology Olympics. I’m just glad it is accessible, even if “just barely”-it will force my brain further than I’ve previously gone-can’t be a bad thing. But my brain needs a sweat-band.

Realist – values scientific truth and progress, objectivity (“recognition-transcendence”), ‘truth’ is a strident rallying-call

Anti-realist (post-modernist, cultural-relativist, social constructivist)-see realist claims as “the merest of smokescreens designed to conceal and preserve the socio-cultural status quo”… ‘truth’ is a term of abuse… “…deny on principled grounds that truth can possibly be thought to exceed the scope and limits of human knowledge.”

Pluralist scale runs between two extremes (concealing bias toward anti-realism, or toward a weak version of realism admitting degrees of epistemic constraint):

1. “objective truth, via truth-aptness ‘in the ideal epistemic limit'” (wha??)

2. “warranted assertibility in keeping with certain communal norms or shared evaluative standards”

One example of this is response-dispositional (or response-dependence) theories, seeking a “third way” middle-ground, picking up on Locke’s “secondary qualities” (not intrinsic to the object, but involving perceptual or cognitive “response”). Covered in chapter 4.

“…there is an inbuilt tendency to privilege epistemic conceptions of truth (or assertoric warrant) even in cases, such as those of mathematics and the physical sciences, where an alethic approach seems better able to accommodate our normal range of working intuitions.”

“…project of meeting the anti-realist‘s challenge on terms that they might be brought to accept while conserving a sufficiently robust conception of truth to satisfy the realist…” “Hence such proposals as those put forward by Crispin Wright for ‘superassertibility’ and ‘cognitive command’ as criteria applying to certain kinds of statement that stop just short of specifying knowledge in full-fledged objectivist, truth-based terms but which should-so he thinks-go a long way toward resolving therealist/anti-realist dispute.”

Statements can:

Realist: possess alethic (objective) truth(objectivists)-“recognition/verification transcendence” (alethic realism). “…unless the truth-value of statements is specified in alethic (objectivist) terms, and unless knowledge is conceived as a matter of justified true belief, then clearly the way is wide open for skeptics or cultural relativists to press their case for the non-existence of any ‘truths’ beyond those that happen to enjoy credence among this or that community of like-minded believers.” Norris says that was the way Wittgenstein was going when he said that truth-claims are “all bound up with our manifold ‘language-games’, cultural practices, or ‘forms of life’ and are therefore to be judged each by its own sui generes criteria of valid or meaningful utterance.”

Anti-realist: be epistemically constrained (verificationists?)-no knowing without a knower…”strong anti-realist line…deny that it could ever make sense to assert of any given statement x that ‘xis either true or false-objectively so-despite our not being epistemically placed to prove, ascertain, or establish its truth-value.” If truth stands apart from “our best methods of proof or ascertainment-then ex hypothesi it lies beyond our utmost scope of knowledge, in which case there can be no defense against radical skepticism.”

Extras:

Anglophone-word makes me feel retarded, got no idea what it means. Sounds like “anglo-saxon” and “homophone” all wrapped in one. Does it mean “arguments that sound good to white folk” or “sounds like something whitey would say”? Maybe I should look it up at some point. Just seems to me that truth would be color-blind. 2 and 2 equal 4 regardless of race or creed, yadda yadda. It should be noted I have no idea what “ex hypothesi” and “sui generes” mean, either.

Norris is going to talk about the boundaries between epistemology, ontology and metaphysics, and how such distinctions are not far removed from “getting straight about issues of wider human concern.” He’s going to “bring epistemology back down to earth.” Hear, hear!

*****

I e-mailed this to Professor Norris and he said (among other nice things) that “Anglophone” just means English-speaking. Good to know. I can tell he is a nice guy, and it will be great to get his feedback throughout this discussion. :)
*****

So… Pluto was a sui generis planet, in that, ex hypothesi it is not a planet. Hm. Sounds dumb when I use them. Strange. Maybe it’s a skill you have to acquire, like ballet. I’m totally ungraceful with these new words.

*****

It is interesting to note that both realists and anti-realists think the other’s position leaves no defense against skepticism.

The realist thinks that anti-realists relativize truth, which defaults to skepticism.

The anti-realist thinks that the realists put truth out of our grasp (transcending verification), defaulting to skepticism.

The realist needs to answer the charge of putting truth (or, perhaps, just “certainty”?) out of reach (perhaps I already answered that in my starting point? we’ll see), and the anti-realist needs to answer the charge of relativization. Of course (when sane) we live against skepticism and behave as if we’ve got a good grasp on reality…so…this reminds me of my Ethics paper. The realist would be the essentialist, the anti-realist would be the voluntarist, and the third category is for those who think we can’t get at the truth–or that there is no truth at which to get (skeptic/nihilist).