Debate audio: http://apologetics315.blogspot.com/2011/03/william-lane-craig-vs-lawrence-krauss.html?spref=fb
A brief post-mortem from Craig: http://www.facebook.com/notes/reasonable-faith/a-brief-post-mortem/144625275604375
This just happened last night and I haven’t had a chance to listen as my computer wouldn’t let me. So I’m going to try the audio tonight–just downloaded.
…using Hume’s is-ought distinction’s mirror concept, the ought-is distinction***.
Euthyphro’s dilemma: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious? Or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” This can be reworded to read “Is the good commanded by God because it is good? Or is it good because it is commanded by God?” The first question addresses theistic natural law theory, and the second question addresses divine command theory.
Natural law theory: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious?” God commands whatever is good despite his commanding it. Because this good (which anyone can justify using reason) does not correspond to perfect being, it commits the ought-is fallacy. According to this theory, good is over God.
Divine command theory: “Or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” Good is whatever God commands. Because this good does not correspond to perfect being and God makes it up, it also commits the ought-is fallacy. If you say that “God’s commands are good because God exists” you commit the is-ought fallacy. According to this theory, God is over good.
Synthesis: God commands in accordance with His good nature/essence. Good is good despite God’s command and anyone can reason to it, but it corresponds to perfect being (God). For the sake of argument, if no God exists, all good-concepts correspond to nothing and commit the ought-is fallacy, and using this synthesis to argue for good’s or God’s existence commits the ought-is fallacy. Again, if you say that “Good is good because God exists” you commit the is-ought fallacy. According to this synthesis, God is good.
At the bottom of this relevant link are more relevant links going into more detail without using the words “natural law” or “divine command”.
***Hume’s is-ought (existence-justification) distinction says you cannot use the existence of the status quo (the way things are) to justify (belief in) the status quo—1) just because we have a natural inclination to act a certain way does not mean it is a good thing to do, and 2) just because the sun rises and sets every morning does not mean we have a good theory about sunrises and sunsets (we may believe the sun revolves around the earth!). Flipped around, the ought-is (justification-existence) distinction says you cannot say something (good, God, or anything else) exists just because its existence is justified (iow, just because you have reasons to believe, or to want to believe, it exists)—sometimes we are wrong about something even though we have good reasons to think we are right. This is true about things we do, and about things we ‘think’ we know.
In order to avoid the is-ought/ought-is problem, our belief (about good, God or anything else) must both be justified and correspond to reality.
When people say “God is both love and just” (usually when hell, or predestination vs. free will, is the topic) they make love and forgiveness look unjust, and they make justice look unloving and unforgiving. But true love is just, and true justice is loving—they really are synonymous. This is on my mind as I read White’s “The Potter’s Freedom” (2000) and compare it to Geisler’s “Chosen but Free” (2001). I’m also debating whether or not to add Rob Bell’s “Love Wins” to my long list of to-reads after just seeing him defend himself against the charge of universalism in his interview with Martin Bashir on MSNBC.
Jesus’ sacrifice, foreshadowed by the Old Testament sacrificial system, fully demonstrated that God forgives us and loves us despite our sins. We are not saved by good works or lost by works of sin.
Hell is the just-love consequence of our ultimately rejecting God’s unconditional love (grace), fully revealed in Jesus’ sacrifice. Without the alternative of hell, one is unjustly ‘forced’ to accept a loving relationship with God in Christ, but love (if just) must be a choice, there must be an alternative—hence, the just-love alternative of hell.
Only those who choose hell will know it, by knowingly rejecting God’s unconditional drawing through Christ’s demonstration and all that foreshadowed and foretold it and tells it still. Such rejection no more challenges God’s sovereignty than does any other sin—God knows and sustains the whole thing from beginning to end, including all of our free choices.
Acceptance of his unconditional love no more makes us our own saviors than would our acceptance of the rescuing, active, personal hand held out to save us from drowning. We can save someone without putting any conditions on them before we will save them, but they still have to want to be saved, and so God draws us to a point where we recognize we are drowning and that he can save us, but we must have the choice (he knows we will make, and which he sustains from eternity) to accept or reject his sovereign hand. If the choice is not ours, just-love is not possible.
Rather than randomly picking whom to “love” and whom to reject, we are to love ALL (even our enemies) justly, treating everyone as we would like to be treated, just as Christ did by example for believers while we were yet enemies of him, as well as for nonbelievers who knowingly choose the just-love alternative of hell. If he didn’t do that for them, if he doesn’t give them “equal opportunity” to accept or reject his unconditional love, then there is no alternative other than hell for them, which means they didn’t choose it and that they were (or will be) sent there unjustly, unlovingly, completely randomly (and that believers likewise will go to heaven unjustly, unlovingly, completely randomly)…and such a “God” is not good, is unworthy of the title.
Thank God he unconditionally loves everyone, died for everyone and draws everyone, or else does not hold responsible. [Note that this is not universalism, for he respects and sustains from eternity each individual’s acceptance/rejection.] ‘That’ (besides sustaining) is the example we have to follow. Just love.
Welcome to the 122nd fortnightly edition of Philosophers’ Carnival! Without too much ado [ besides a plug for the Carnival’s new FB page ] I present to you a philosophers’ blog carnival that is (this round) predominantly about mostly Philosophy of Religion and mostly Ethics…with a smidge of mostly epistemology and mostly logic at the end…the fields do tend toward tapestry.
Mostly Philosophy of Religion
Alex Pruss‘ Epistemicism, vagueness and theism posted at Alexander Pruss’s Blog is presented by enigMan. If you’re new to this, epistemicism is the position that there is a sharp line determining when someone has become bald (considered a vague concept), or when grains of sand have become a heap (and only after this line is crossed do such only-apparently vague concepts as “bald” or “heap” correspond/refer)—we just can’t know the line. Related to this is the line-drawing fallacy of saying there is no such thing as baldness or heaps (no objective meaning to them) because there is (it is fallaciously argued) no sharp line between a full head of hair and baldness, or one grain of sand and a heap. Alex fashions an argument for the existence of God that makes this sharp line dependent on God’s sharpening of language (or determining the rules of sharpening), rather than being independent of language. Besides being a God-of-the-gaps argument and other problems, his argument uses the existence of God to argue for the existence of sharp meaning, while also using the existence of sharp meaning to argue for the existence of God. It is parallel to using the existence of objective morality to argue God exists (ought-is fallacy) while using God’s existence to argue there is objective morality (is-ought fallacy), with the twist that it is all language-dependent. Alex writes, “If God, in creating human beings, can create them with a nature that grounds normative facts about them, he can create them with a nature that defines meanings as well.” As human beings are not perfect, though, how is it that any real (natural) ‘ought’ could correspond (refer) to one? It could only always correspond to a being who always wills/commands in accordance with an eternally good nature (good being self=Other), resolving Euthyphro’s Dilemma (more on that below). And why the twist of making it all language-dependent? This is a field I hope I will eventually have more time to explore.
Roman Altshuler presents The Meaninglessness of Life: Camus vs. Nagel posted at The Ends of Thought. There are many misunderstandings (not of Nagel or Camus) packed into this to which I would love to give a reply, but I will only hit a few. On the one hand, it is true that it is absurd to think that God could put meaning into (ought-is fallacy) our lives which we are incapable of finding meaningful (ought implies can). On the other hand, it is argued that if we are capable of understanding (or reasoning to) this meaning, we don’t need God in order to enjoy meaning (however, a real ought, real meaning, must correspond to real being). Also, “What gives meaning to the source of meaning?” makes as much sense as “If God began (temporal) existence, what began (eternal) God’s existence?”. Further, there is a view here of knowledge that it cannot exist without absolute certainty, and a view of faith that it is necessarily blind. Faith (in the epistemological sense) is merely believing the strongest evidence while lacking absolute certainty. Such faith can double as knowledge if it also corresponds. Lastly, how would it be absurd if we justified through reasoning the conclusion that the ultimate end of both being and doing is Golden Rule love (self=Other), a justified conclusion that is true only if corresponding to a being described by it? It would be the only thing that could possibly make real meaningful sense and fulfill the “wild longing for clarity whose call echoes in the human heart” (Camus)—the only thing that would satisfy our hunger for true meaning.
Kenny Pearce presents Two Bad Footnotes posted at blog.kennypearce.net. “Leibniz is not a deist.” The first bad footnote claims Hume is offering the alternative of deism, when Hume was actually referring to Leibniz’ thought, which (Kenny explains) is not deism. The second bad footnote incorrectly refers to the glossary definition of ens per se instead of to one for ens a se as they are not interchangeable, which Kenny shows.
enigMan presents God is Timeless posted at Enigmania. “Concerns what we mean by timelessness.” In this article God’s timelessness does not mean what it usually means to the theist, which is not being limited to the present moment but being in and over every moment. So in what sense can an Open Theist claim God is timeless, if they limit God to the present (and did he begin with the beginning of the physical?)? “The deliberate creation of anything contingent surely requires several real possibilities to choose between, as well as a single actuality amidst counterfactuals, and hence some sort of change (not necessarily one that takes place within spacetime).” What sort of change takes place ‘outside’ spacetime? What would an Open Theist say to Brian Greene’s thought in “The Fabric of the Cosmos” that “special relativistic reality treats all times equally. …Einstein believed that reality embraces past, present, and future equally and that the flow [ of time ] we envision…is illusory,” (p. 132)?
Mostly Ethics
Matt Hoberg presents Traumatic Harm and the Freedom of Speech posted at The Consternation of Philosophy. Matt suggests we modify Mill’s harm principle to be a traumatic harm principle when deciding whether or not to protect speech, so that offensive speech would be protected unless causing traumatic harm.
Richard presents Personal Concern and Chains of Counterparts posted at Philosophy, et cetera. “Discusses Caspar Hare’s ‘morphing argument’ for (a kind of) impartiality.” This reminds me of the original post, in that there is no knowable sharp line between happy (great life) and unhappy (miserable life). But that is not the focus of this submission. Look up impartiality and the Pareto principle if you are unfamiliar with them, before you read this submission. Wouldn’t being impartial actually be a sort of being personal, so that being properly personal would have to involve impartiality, if self=Other? Much of Richard’s article is new to me and I hope to explore this field further in the future.
I present Jonathan Phillips‘ There Is No Such Thing As Art posted at Yeah, OK, But Still (correction: that’s Nicks’ blog; someone must’ve given Jonathan credit for something Nick wrote in a past carnival! arg). Jonathan faithfully submits others’ blogposts behind the scenes and it’s time to see what he has to offer (except, this is Nick’s blog!). This topic is particularly on my mind as my community’s college is suffering from a massive cut to its art program. Nick notes that carpentry survived the death of guilds, and it is interesting that Plato, in his metaphor of the three beds, held carpentry in higher esteem than poetry. One could argue that anything one puts one’s mind to is art, is creative (hence placing this in the “Mostly Ethics” category). If the title “There Is No Such Thing As Art” perked up your ears because it reminds you of Sartre’s “There Is No Human Nature”…
…you might enjoy Human nature and the human condition by Tom, who initially submitted Morality vs Ethics: The Trolley Problem, both posted at The Philosopher’s Beard (but at what point did it become a beard—perhaps there are no beards?). In “Human nature and the human condition” Tom suggests the latter is socially evolved. He puts religion (among other things) on the ‘condition’ (‘nurture’) side of things, but even the self-titled Four Horsemen (our thoughts are with Mr. Hitchens) are not so quick to put religion there. It is too bad he does not cite how he knows some of the things he claims (would be interesting to learn more about them). In “Morality vs Ethics” Tom emphasizes the importance of Ethics using the Trolley Problem.
Matthew Pianalto presents Human/Animal Similarity & Unwarranted Doom posted at The HEP Spot. Matthew critiques Mortimer Adler’s claiming that if other animals are similar to humans, 1) we are doomed to treat them the same as us, and 2) our rights are doomed.
Mike Billy presents
Is Piracy Theft? posted at Voluntary Thought. He is referring to copyright infringement, matey, and his answer to the question is “No.”Skyler Mann presents
The Moral Cause of Arson posted at Metaphysician’s Diagnosis. “Just my take on a part of Francisco Suarez’s treatment of efficient causes.” The difference between a moral (efficient) cause and a physical cause comes out when talking about prevention. This seems to raise intention above the physical. Think of this as pertains to what roll environment plays in evolution as you read the next submission…
David Fryman presents Exercise and Ethics posted at The Bennett Commentary, saying “Regular exercise fosters [ethical] values by . . . demanding that we overcome pain and resistance, conquer laziness, and delay gratification. In this sense, physical courage can cultivate moral courage by enhancing our ability to control our bodies and thus, our behavior.”
Keenan Steel presents The Is-Ought Problem: Hume’s Fallacy posted at Egoist Philosophy Blog. “The argument that a normative or prescriptive statement cannot be derived from a descriptive statement is clearly false if we speak more precisely.” See my submission directly below.
A smidge of mostly epistemology…
My offering to this carnival is Hume’s is-ought, Plato’s true-justified, Euthyphro’s dilemma and Gettier’s problem posted here at Ichthus77. This is what I’ve been thinking for a while in the fewest words possible, relevant to Philosophy of Religion, Ethics, epistemology and perhaps even…
Rico Vitz submits Edgar Aroutiounian‘s
An Interview With Noted Logician, Graham Priest (discussion of dialetheism, Sylvan’s Box, Disjunctive Syllogism and more is in part two) posted at Florida Student Philosophy Blog.Our hearts go out to the survivors of the Japan earthquakes and tsunami. For those motivated to help, please read
this article from The GiveWell Blog.***
Thanks to all who contributed submissions to this carnival. About half of the submissions were rejected on the basis of being “top ten list” types of articles or the advice variety, or written up very hastily merely to promote their site unrelated to philosophy. These are submission no-nos, if you have done this in the past (please don’t do it on the FB page, either). The next carnival will be April 4 at Faith in Philosophy. Philosophy of religion submissions are especially called for. Submit articles for that here, and don’t forget to check out our new FB
page :)Happy blogging!
Many of the photos come from
here.Judges: Of course I am rather partial to this Deborah character, as well as to Jael. Barak…hm…the name reminds me of Barack Obama.
Ruth: Ruth is gleaning in Boaz’ field to help Naomi, and Boaz helps her gleaning be abundantly productive. Good people.
This blog will be the host of the next (March 14) edition of Philosophers’ Carnival. Submit your favorite recent philosophy blog article here by March 12.
Happy blogging :)
Maryann
P.S. Philosophers’ Carnival is now on FB–“like” it :)
Judges: The story of Ehud is one of my favorites. Dude walks right into the king’s domain and the sword goes all the way into the fat. So much bravery, so much disgustingness.
Ruth: I wouldn’t want to leave my mother-in-law either…especially if she had just lost everything and was mourning to the point of changing her name.
Background on Ruth from the book intro link above: “The story is set in the time of the judges, a time characterized in the book of Judges as a period of religious and moral degeneracy, national disunity and frequent foreign oppression. The book of Ruth reflects a time of peace between Israel and Moab (contrast Jdg 3:12-30). Like 1Sa 1-2, it gives a series of intimate glimpses into the private lives of the members of an Israelite family. It also presents a delightful account of the remnant of true faith and piety in the period of the judges, relieving an otherwise wholly dark picture of that era. … As an episode in the ancestry of David, the book of Ruth sheds light on his role in the history of redemption.” Coolness.
Judges: ch. 1 Apparently mutilating p.o.w.s in the ancient Near East was common because it rendered them unfit for military service. They are fighting against Jerusalem again because they do not yet inhabit it until David captures it. Othniel, Caleb’s nephew, wins Caleb’s daughter by capturing Debir (Othniel goes on to be the first judge). She asks her father for a field and springs of water and gets them (those springs are still there in Hebron). There’s all this fighting and they can’t completely drive out the Canaanites (study notes give various reasons). There is an unnamed man who helps them attack Bethel, as did Rahab. The Canaanites who remained became subject to forced labor. ch. 2 Israel is rebuked by the Angel of the Lord for not driving out the Canaanites and for making covenants with them. Joshua’s death is mentioned again, then the cycle of the time of the judges is introduced: rebellion, being plundered, being delivered by a judge God raises up. Ch.3:1-8 is a list of Canaanites left in the land to test Israel, ending in Israel’s first idolatrous rebellion after Joshua’s death. God sells them into the hands of the king of Mesopotamia, who they serve 8 years.
Ruth: Naomi’s husband and sons die, so she wants to return to Judah because she heard God was blessing Judah with food. She urges her daughters-in-law to go back to their families as she is too old to have more male children for them to eventually marry. Setting up the empty-to-full theme.
Ch22: Reuben Gad and Manasseh go back across the Jordan to their agreed-upon land and set up a controversial altar, which they explain is not in place of the main altar, but only a copy of it to remind the rest of Israel that they, too, worship the same God.
ch23: In an earlier chapter, the language “do this thing” stood out to me. In this chapter “going the way of all the earth” stands out. Like Moses, Joshua is giving his last words of exhortation.
ch24: Like Moses before his death, Joshua assembles the tribes at Shechem for covenant renewal. He begins with a review of Israel’s history, starting with Abraham’s father Terah. A well-known verse is “As for me and my house, we will serve the Lord.” It’s a bumper sticker on my fridge door. Then follows the covenant renewal. Something that stands out is that a stone was used all the witness, “for it has heard all the words of the Lord which He spoke to us”. There are six other memorials set up in the Promised Land (4:20, 7:26, 8:29,32, 10:27, 22:27) to which is added the ruins of Jericho. Is this what Jesus meant by the rocks crying out? Perhaps testifying of God’s salvation? This book ends with Joshua’s death and with the bones of Joseph, brought up from Egypt, being buried in Shechem [ 1)the land Jacob bought from Hamor (Gen 33:19), 2) to the center of the tribes of Joseph’s sons Ephraim and Manasseh, 3) fulfilling an oath sworn to Joseph before he died (Gen 50:25; Ex 13:19) ]. Eleazar, the priest who served Joseph as Aaron has served Moses, also dies.
Ch.20: Israel is not the only people to designate cities of refuge. In “Eternity in Their Hearts” Don Richardson tells about the Yali of New Guinea and the Hawaiian “cities of refuge” of which Pu’uhonua-o-honaunau was one. The cities of refuge were not only for Israel, but for the traveller, too.
Ch.21 I tried to google to see if there are still 6 cities of refuge and 48 cities of the Levites, but can’t find any info. … does that mean no?
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