
I just got my Biola Certificate in Apologetics–go here to get yours. Mention “Apologetics 315” to get a discount :)

I just got my Biola Certificate in Apologetics–go here to get yours. Mention “Apologetics 315” to get a discount :)
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| Caravaggio |
All the polls in the past few years show a rapid increase in those who have left their religion, and a rapid decrease in church attendance. Robert Putnam and David Campbell presented research showing “young Americans are dropping out of religion at an alarming rate of five to six times the historic rate (30 to 40 percent have no religion today, versus 5 to 10 percent a generation ago)” (American Grace). This is gleaned from a November 2010 Christianity Today article entitled “The Leavers: Young Doubters Exit the Church” wherein Drew Dyck talks about the results of his interviews with those who leave the church. He writes:
“Almost to a person, the leavers with whom I spoke recalled that, before leaving the faith, they were regularly shut down when they expressed doubts. Some were ridiculed in front of peers for asking “insolent questions.” …
My dad got his questions answered at seminary and my mom got her questions answered by my dad when they were dating, but he could not answer my questions. I eventually became an atheist until God broke through to me starting September 22, 2005. This breaking through caused me to realize that there had to be answers to my questions that would strengthen the faith of those with doubts, and thus began my interest in apologetics. That isn’t to say that I became interested in studying great ways to apologize.
What is apologetics, anyway?
Apologetics is simply the rational defense of the Christian faith, or as William Lane Craig puts it, “that branch of Christian theology which seeks to provide a rational justification for the truth claims of the Christian faith,” (Reasonable Faith, p. 15). It involves making the case for Christianity, like providing historical evidence for the resurrection, and answering objections to Christianity, like the problem of evil. It comes from the Greek word apologia, which means defense, as in a court of law.
Is it biblical?
R.C. Sproul writes that “the apologist echoes the work of the apostles who did not ask people to respond to Christ in blind faith. The apostolic testimony to Christ was buttressed both by rational argument and empirical evidence.” Ratio Christi’s website points out that “Paul is seen reasoning with those he encountered concerning the gospel: ‘So he was reasoning in the synagogue with the Jews and the God fearing Gentiles and in the marketplace every day with those who happened to be present.’ (Acts 17:17) …Paul had done this with such consistency that it became his custom: ‘And according to Paul’s custom, he went to them, and for three Sabbaths reasoned with them from the Scriptures, explaining and giving evidence.’ (Acts 17:2-3)” On page 15 of “On Guard” William Lane Craig notes that Paul “says all men can know that God exists (Rom. 1:20). Paul also appealed to eyewitness testimony of Jesus’ resurrection to show further that Christianity is true (1 Cor. 15:3-8).”
Rather than shutting someone down who asks a question or expresses a doubt about Christianity, Scripture would have us do apologetics. Glenn Miller notes that, “1 Peter 3:15 tells us to always be ready to give every man an answer (apologia), a reason for the hope that is within us. 2 Timothy 2:25 [talks about] correcting those who are in opposition. Jude 3 [says to] earnestly contend for the faith once for all delivered to the saints. Colossians 4:6 [says] you will know how you should answer each one. Phil. 1:16 [says] I am appointed for the defense of the gospel. Titus 1:9 [says] a leader is to be able ‘to exhort and convict those who contradict.’” William Lane Craig signed my copy of “On Guard” with 2 Corinthians 10:5: “We demolish arguments and every pretension that sets itself up against the knowledge of God, and we take captive every thought to make it obedient to Christ.”
Did Jesus ever do apologetics?
Christ himself used apologetics, as pointed out on Ratio Christi’s website, when “Jesus silenced the Sadducees in their attempts to discredit the resurrection by laying out a reasonable argument from the scriptures [Matthew 22:30-32]…reasoned with [the Pharisees] to the only possible conclusion; Jesus is both fully God and fully man [Matthew 22:41-46]…gave evidence of His divine nature to the doubting Pharisees and scribes by supporting the power of His words to forgive a paralytic by healing him with His words, ‘so that you may know that the Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins’ (Luke 5:18-26).” Tim Keller points out in “The Reason for God” that Jesus responded to Thomas’ request for more evidence by supplying it (John 20:25-28), and to another doubting man he responds by blessing him and healing his son (Mark 9:24). Eric Chabot, in his article Do Christians Get Brownie Points For Being Ignorant? Is Anti-Intellectualism Biblical?, notes that when John the Baptist asked Jesus from prison, “Are you the one who was to come, or should we expect someone else?” (Matt. 11:3; Luke 7:20)—Jesus did not reply, “You must have faith; suppress your doubts.” He replied “The blind receive sight, the lame walk, those who have leprosy are cured, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, and the good news is preached to the poor” (Matt. 11:4-6; Luke 7:22). “Jesus’ works of healing and teaching are meant to serve as positive evidence of His messianic identity, because they fulfill the messianic predictions of the Hebrew Scriptures,” (Chabot).
Why don’t we do apologetics?
People are leaving the church because we are disobeying Scripture when we shut people down who have questions. Some of us even misuse Scripture to do this. In The Problem of Anti-Intellectualism in the Church-Problems and Possible Solutions, Eric Chabot writes about some passages that can be misunderstood as speaking against loving God with all our mind. Acts 4:13 is an observation, not a prescription, and refers only to the fact that they had not received rabbinical training. Colossians 2:8 was dealing with proto-Gnostic philosophy, not philosophy in general, and the way to “see to it that no one takes you captive” is through apologetics. I Corinthians 1:19-21 is condemning prideful misuse of reason, not reason itself. Matthew 18:3-5 is talking about moral innocence, not intellectual ignorance (keep in mind Matthew 10:16, where Jesus talks about being as shrewd as serpents, though as innocent as doves).
Shouldn’t we just have faith?
Those who are worried about the relationship between faith and reason need only note that intellectual knowledge that God exists does not equal putting faith in God. James 2:19 states that even the demons believe intellectually. But before we can put real faith in God, we must have reasoned evidence that he exists. So it is inappropriate to answer someone’s questions with, “Just have faith.” A better answer is “I don’t know, but let’s study this.” The Valley Girl Apologist, Sarah Ankenman, alludes in a recent article to the fact that we say things like, “Don’t focus on the why, focus on the Who.” In reality, we can and should focus on both, because if we don’t know why we are focusing on the Who, any old Who will do, which is idolatry. So focusing on the why helps serve the ultimate purpose of being in relationship with the true God. The effect on the brain of Calvin’s sensus divinitatus and witness of the Holy Spirit is scientifically indistinguishable from the effect on the brain of the experience of other religions (see Barbara Bradley Hagerty’s “Fingerprints of God: The Search for the Science of Spirituality”). And so in order to provide a rational justification for Christianity to anyone other than ourselves, and to “doubt our doubts” as Tim Keller puts it in The Reason for God, we must provide reasons outside our own subjective experience.
Going back, to go forward…
In the same article mentioned above, Sarah Ankenman quotes from Nancy Pearcey’s “Saving Leonardo” which reads, “…if [we] aspire to the dynamic impact of the early church, [we] must do as it did, learning to address, critique, adapt, and overcome the dominant ideologies of our day….” (p. 14). Not only must we go back to the roots of the early church, we must focus on our children when they are still growing roots. In another article, this time on the website for the International Society of Women in Apologetics, Sarah writes, “When your kids have questions, they are going to come to you for answers. If you don’t have them, Satan is plenty willing to fill in the gaps. He will do it through public schools, pop culture…he will use whatever means necessary to lead your kids away from Christ. …you shouldn’t even wait for them to ask, you should be instilling the answers in them from when they are very young.” And how will we do that, if we do not have the answers instilled in ourselves?
J.M. Njoroge writes, “In his book Real Christianity, William Wilberforce exhorted parents to incorporate apologetics in the upbringing and training of their children. He wrote, ‘In an age in which infidelity abounds, do we observe [parents] carefully instructing their children in the principles of faith which they profess? Or do they furnish their children with arguments for the defense of that faith? … When religion is handed down among us by heredity succession, it is not surprising to find youth of sense and spirit beginning to question the truth of the system in which they were brought up. And it is not surprising to see them abandon a position which they are unable to defend.’”
Conclusion:
Here are three reasons apologetics is so important, adapted from Eric Chabot’s anti-intellectualism article mentioned above, J.M. Njoroge’s article just mentioned, and William Lane Craig’s On Guard and Reasonable Faith:
1. Pre-evangelism. Apologetics shapes worldviews and cultivates culture to be more receptive to the Gospel message, rather than dismissing it off-hand or attacking it as the New Atheists do. It is part of carrying out the Great Commission (Matt 28:19). “[Apologetics] is necessary for the witness of the church since it helps clear away the obstacles that can keep the non-believer from taking an honest look at his or her true spiritual condition” (J.M. Njoroge) or from considering the gospel “an intellectually viable option” (Craig, On Guard, 18). Apologetics doesn’t save people, just like evangelists don’t save people—but the Holy Spirit can and does use both. “Like a missionary called to reach some obscure people group, the Christian apologist is burdened to reach that minority of persons who will respond to rational argument and evidence,” (Craig, Reasonable Faith, 22).
2. Strengthening believers. Apologetics coaxes the body of Christ out of intellectual idolatry and closer to the true God. If you don’t know why you believe the Who, any old Who will do. It is the responsibility of church leadership to whet the intellectual appetites of those who are idling. Apologetics is used by the Holy Spirit to mold each member of the body of Christ into the image of God, who is a rational being. “…apologetics is necessary for the health of the church because it helps the believer to overcome intellectual obstacles in the course of the believer’s spiritual growth,” (J.M. Njoroge). William Lane Craig points out that knowing why and what you believe, “will make you more confident in sharing your faith with others [and] help you to keep the faith in times of doubt and struggle,” (On Guard, 19).
3. Worship. As mentioned above, focusing on the why helps serve the ultimate purpose of being in relationship with the true God. Apologetics enables us to love God with all our heart, soul, mind and strength (Mark 12:28-30).
| Philosophy |
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| Portal |
Graded absolutism is a theory of moral absolutism which resolves the objection to absolutism that in moral conflicts we are obligated to opposites. Moral absolutism is the ethical view that certain actions are absolutely right or wrong regardless of other contexts such as their consequences or the intentions behind them. Graded absolutism is moral absolutism but adds that a moral absolute, like “Do not kill,” can be greater or lesser than another moral absolute, like “Do not lie”. Graded absolutism, also called contextual absolutism or the greater good view, is an alternative to the third alternative view and the lesser evil view, both discussed below, regarding moral conflict resolution.
According to graded absolutism, in moral conflicts, the dilemma is not that we are obligated to opposites, because greater absolutes are not opposites of lesser absolutes, and evil is not the opposite of good but is instead the privation of good. Since evil is the privation of good, only the privation of the greater good counts as evil, since whenever there is a moral conflict, we are only obligated to the greater good. The real dilemma is that we cannot perform both conflicting absolutes at the same time. ‘Which’ absolutes are in conflict depends on the context, but which conflicting absolute is ‘greater’ does not depend on the context. That is why graded absolutism is also called ‘contextual absolutism’ but is not to be confused with situational ethics. The conflict is resolved in acting according to the greater absolute. That is why graded absolutism is also called the ‘greater good view’, but is not to be confused with utilitarianism.
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This is the view that there are never any real moral conflicts [1] and that there is always a third alternative. However, if there is no real dilemma, what is the need for a third alternative? And surely moral dilemmas exist which have no real third alternative. When asked by a potential murderer the location of a would-be victim, we can either consider it more important to save the potential victim’s life—or we can consider it more important to tell the truth to the victim’s would-be murderer—we cannot do both, and there is no third alternative between them.
The lesser evil view is the view that the only way out of a moral conflict is to violate one of the moral absolutes and choose the lesser evil. For example, if we disagree with Kant‘s thoughts on the categorical imperative and say that lying is a lesser evil than helping a would-be murderer, the lesser evil view would have us lie rather than help a would-be murderer. This violates the ought implies can principle and defeats itself in obligating evil.
Graded absolutism, or the greater good view, is the view that there are real moral conflicts between absolutes, but rather than requiring a third alternative (as in the case of the third alternative view above) or obligating evil (as in the case of the lesser evil view above), this view obligates the greater absolute, or greater good. For example, when one saves a life rather than telling the truth to a would-be murderer, one is committing the greater good of saving life, rather than violating the lesser good of telling the truth or committing the lesser (than aiding a murderer) evil of lying. Since evil is the privation of good, only the privation of the greater good counts as evil, since whenever there is a moral conflict, we are only obligated to the greater good.
“Christian Ethics: Options and Issues” by Norman L. Geisler; Baker Academic; 2nd edition (1989); ISBN 9780801038324.
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The bibliographical test seeks to determine the quantity and quality of documents, as well as how far removed they are from the time of the originals. The quantity of New Testament manuscripts is unparalleled in ancient literature. There are over 5,000 Greek manuscripts, about 8,000 Latin manuscripts, and another 1,000 manuscripts in other languages (Syriac, Coptic, etc.).
Simply, if someone seeks to eliminate the trustworthiness of the New Testament then to be consistent they would also have to dismiss virtually the entire canon of western literature and pull everything from Homer to Plato and Aristotle off of bookstore shelves and out of classroom discussions.
[ The above was taken from Gospel 101 curriculum developed by Redeemer Church, Modesto. ]
Under every billboard of the sort above, should be the following one (click to get it on its own page)…
This is an attempt to give a brief case for the evidence of Jesus’ resurrection, gleaned from Dr. William Lane Craig’s “Reasonable Faith” and “On Guard”. I tinkered w/ it only a bit. One example is that I took from other areas to strengthen the point that the Apparent Death hypothesis is very much contrived, even without the conspiracy twist.
Why focus on the resurrection? The “hope that is within us” stands on the reality of Jesus’ resurrection. His resurrection authenticates his claims to be the royal Messiah, Son of God in a unique sense, the Danielic Son of Man. It authenticates all of his teachings and prophesies. Without the resurrection, there is no Gospel, no good news. The traditional apologetic, used during the Deist controversy, involved showing that the Gospels are authentic (internal, external evidence), the text is pure and the Gospels are reliable (apostles neither deceivers nor deceived). Whereas the traditional apologetic dealt only with the “Lord, liar or lunatic” trilemma, the current apologetic deals with a fourth possibility: “legend”. We will formulate an argument by inference to the best explanation
(which I recognize fondly as a critical realist method, from studying Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology”).
Historical scholars insist that, like other scientists, the historian can only study events occurring in the physical universe. Step 1 directly below does not deal with the miraculous and so counters Bart Ehrman. Step 2 directly below considers the resurrection a bodily event (and so counters Dale Allison) in space and time (and so counters John Meier). [Speaking of the miraculous, the thought might occur to you, whenever it is mentioned that even critical scholars accept the historicity of crucial sayings or events, “Why then do they not believe in the resurrection?” One main answer is the “problem of miracles”. We will not deal with that here, as it is discussed here and elsewhere.] Dr. Craig lays out the two-step process for an historical argument for the resurrection of Jesus:
STEP ONE: “to establish the facts which will serve as historical evidence”
STEP TWO: “to argue that the hypothesis of Jesus’ resurrection is the best or most probable explanation of those facts”
“Step (1) will involve an investigation of the historicity of events such as the discovery of Jesus’ empty tomb; step (2) will assess the comparative merits of rival hypotheses offered as explanations of the facts established in step (1),” (p. 350, Dr. Craig, Reasonable Faith).
CRITERIA FOR STEP ONE:
Some criteria for showing (positively) the authenticity of a particular Biblical saying or event, rather than a whole document:
(these are mentioned in different orders on pages 292, 298 and 395 of Dr. Craig’s Reasonable Faith)
1: Dissimilarity. Dissimilarity to antecedent Jewish or subsequent Christian thought-forms. Dissimilarity to pagan thought-forms. Also referred to as “Context and expectation” on p. 396, RF.
2: Multiple attestation. Multiple/independent attestation (especially if early).
–[ historians think they’ve hit historical pay dirt when they’ve got two independent accounts of the same event ]
3: Semitic traces. Linguistic Semitisms.
4: traces of Palestinian milieu (see 6)
5: Embarrassment. Retention of embarrassing material.
6: Historical congruence. Coherence w/ other authentic, external material. Also see 4.
7: Effect. Effect(s) which point to the saying(s)/event(s) as the cause.
8: Principles of embellishment. No (legend-making) embellishments.
9: Coherence. Coherence with other internal sayings/events (internal congruence).
Look for the titles of these criteria throughout step one and step two.
CRITERIA FOR STEP TWO:
McCullagh’s criteria (p. 371 of Dr. Craig’s Reasonable Faith) for justifying historical hypotheses:
1. The hypothesis, together with other true statements, must imply further statements describing present, observable data (literary evidence of NT).
2. The hypothesis must have greater explanatory ‘scope’ than rival hypotheses. It will explain more of the evidence.
3. The hypothesis must have greater explanatory ‘power’ than rival hypotheses. It will make the evidence more probable.
4. Hypothesis must be more plausible. It will fit better with true background beliefs.
5. Hypothesis must be less ad hoc or contrived (“won’t require adopting as many new beliefs that have no independent evidence” (Dr. Craig, On Guard, p. 244).
6. Hypothesis must be disconfirmed by fewer accepted beliefs. It won’t conflict with as many accepted beliefs.
7. Hypothesis must significantly exceed rivals in fulfilling 2 through 6.
First we will do Step (1) on each of three evidences (directly below), then step (2) on each of the rival hypotheses which attempt to explain those three evidences, concluding with the Bodily Resurrection hypothesis. All of this takes place (a bit differently) on pages 360-399 of Dr. Craig’s “Reasonable Faith” and pages 219-264 of his “On Guard”.
STEP ONE: “to establish the facts which will serve as historical evidence”
–The Empty Tomb
(Rival Hypotheses: Conspiracy, Apparent Death, Wrong Tomb, Displaced Body, Bodily Resurrection)
— Postmortem Appearances
(Rival Hypotheses: Hallucination, Bodily Resurrection)
— Origin of Christian Faith
(Rival Hypotheses: Antecedent Influences, Hallucination, Bodily Resurrection)
Coherence. The above three facts cohere interestingly “with eachother; for example, the coherence between Jesus’ physical resurrection appearances, Paul’s teaching on the nature of the resurrected body, and the empty tomb,” (Dr. Craig, RF, p. 396).
“Don’t be misled by unbelievers who want to quibble about inconsistencies in the circumstantial details of the gospel accounts. Our case for Jesus’ resurrection doesn’t depend on such details. All four gospels agree that: Jesus of Nazareth was crucified in Jerusalem by Roman authority during the Passover Feast, having been arrested and convicted on charges of blasphemy by the Jewish Sanhedrin and then slandered before the governor Pilate on charges of treason. He died within several hours and was buried Friday afternoon by Joseph of Arimethea in a tomb, which was shut with stone. Certain female followers of Jesus, including Mary Magdalene, having observed his interment, visited his tomb early on Sunday morning, only to find it empty. Thereafter, Jesus appeared alive from the dead to the disciples, including Peter, who then became proclaimers of the message of his resurrection. … Historians expect to find inconsistencies even in the most reliable sources. No historian simply throws out a source because it has inconsistencies. Otherwise we’d have to be skeptical about all secular historical narratives that also contain such inconsistencies, which is wholly unreasonable. Moreover, in this case the inconsistencies aren’t even within a single source; they’re between two independent sources. But obviously, it doesn’t follow from an inconsistency between two independent sources that both sources are wrong. At worst, one is wrong if they can’t be harmonized.” (Dr. Craig, On Guard, p. 243).
–The Empty Tomb
1. The historical reliability of the story of Jesus’ burial supports the empty tomb.
a. The burial’s historicity is important because:
i. The disciples would not have preached resurrection if the tomb was occupied
ii. The disciples’ critics would have investigated to make sure the tomb was empty
–wanted to squelch budding Christian movement: hired Saul to persecute
iii. Belief in Jesus’ resurrection flourished in the very city in which he was crucified
iv. The Jewish authorities would have exhumed the body to try to prove Jesus was dead
b. Evidence for the burial:
i. Multiple attestation. Multiply attested in extremely early, independent sources
–Mark, probably via eyewitnesses, within 7 years of resurrection (in a tomb, by Joseph of Arimathea)
–1 Cor 15:3-5, via earliest disciples, within first 5 years of resurrection (buried)
–Compare four-line formula of 1 Cor 15:3-5; Acts 13:28-31; Mark 15:37-16:7
died, buried, raised, appeared
–Jesus’ burial by Joseph also found (with non-editorial differences) in Matthew and Luke
(non-editorial thing discussed pp. 363-364)
–Jesus’ burial by Joseph also found in John and extra-biblical Gospel of Peter
–the early apostolic sermons in Acts (probably not wholly of Luke’s creation)
ii. Not likely to invent Joseph of Arimethea, a Jewish Sanhedrist (Sanhedrin voted to condemn Jesus) as the one who did right by burying Jesus in a proper tomb
—Embarrassment: criterion of embarrassment.
iii. For these reasons, most NT critics concur Jesus was buried by Joseph of Arimethea in a tomb
2. The discovery of Jesus’ empty tomb is multiply attested in very early, independent sources.
a. pre-Markan source probably included and ended at the discovery of the empty tomb
i. incomplete w/o victory at the end
b. third line of four-line formula (mentioned above) is summary of empty tomb narrative
i. “he was buried” followed by “he was raised” implies empty tomb
ii. “on the third day” (since they didn’t ‘see’ the resurrection and couldn’t have known which day it occurred) is when the women found the tomb empty
c. Matthew is independent source, including the story of the guard at the tomb
d. traces of prior-tradition in non-Matthean vocabulary in his narrative
i. also, “This story has been spread among Jews till this day” (Matt. 28:15) suggests Matthew is responding to prior tradition.
—Effect. (See 6 below.)
e. Luke is independent source, including the story (not in Mark) of the two disciples’ verifying the report of the women that the tomb was vacant
f. Luke’s story (e) is independently attested in John
g. apostolic sermons in Acts (2:29-32; 13:36-7)
3. Semitic traces. The phrase “the first day of the week” in Mark reflects ancient tradition.
a. speaks to the fact that the tradition is very old, predating the “on the third day” motif
4. Principles of embellishment: The Markan story is simple and lacks legendary development/embellishment.
a. “The resurrection itself is not witnessed or described, and there is no reflection on Jesus’ triumph over sin and death, no use of Christological titles, no quotation of fulfilled prophecy, no description of the Risen Lord.”
b. no reason to think the tradition ever lacked the angel.
i. If the angel was a literary figure used by Mark to explain the empty tomb, the tradition Mark takes from is even more “stark and unadorned” (cf. John 20:1-2).
c. compare to the account from the extra-biblical Gospel of Peter
“describes Jesus’ triumphant egress from the tomb as a gigantic figure whose head reaches above the clouds, supported by giant angels, followed by a talking cross, heralded by a voice from heaven, and all witnessed by a Roman guard, the Jewish leaders, and a multitude of spectators! This is how real legends look: they are colored by theological and apologetical developments,” (p. 367, Dr. Craig, Reasonable Faith).
5. Embarrassment. The tomb was probably discovered empty by women (discussed further in the book: considered unreliable in court, occupied low rung on Jewish social ladder—disciples wouldn’t have invented this).
a. “Secret Gospel of Mark” tradition was fraud by Morton Smith.
b. If you’re going to “make up” that the women witnessed it, why not make up that the men had ‘not’ fled too far away (a “fiction of the critics”) and were the first witnesses?
c. If you’re going to “make up” that the women witnessed it (and didn’t tell anybody) to explain “why the fact of Jesus’ empty tomb had remained unknown until the writing of his Gospel” why not leave out the part where Jesus commands the women to tell the disciples they will see Jesus?
i. for thirty years nobody asks the women what happened after the women left the cross (btw, this includes that the women saw where he was laid, relevant to Wrong Tomb hypothesis: Mark 15:42-47)?
ii. for thirty years, even after the resurrection appearances, the women just keep silent?
6. Effect. The earliest Jewish polemic (“disciples stole body”) presupposes the empty tomb.
a. Matthew 28:11-15. A stolen body leaves an (undenied) empty tomb.
b. Skeptics regard “the guard” as an apologetic legend.
i. fact: aimed at widespread Jewish allegation that the disciples had stolen Jesus’ body
7. “According to Jacob Kremer, a New Testament critic who has specialized in the study of the resurrection: ‘By far most scholars hold firmly to the reliability of the biblical statements about the empty tomb.’ In fact, in a survey of over 2,200 publications on the resurrection in English, French, and German since 1975, Gary Habermas found that 75 percent of scholars accepted the historicity of the discovery of Jesus’ empty tomb. The evidence is so compelling that even a number of Jewish scholars, such as Pinchas Lapida and Geza Vermes, have declared themselves convinced on the basis of the evidence that Jesus’ tomb was found empty,” (Dr. Craig, On Guard, p. 230).
(Rival Hypotheses: Conspiracy, Apparent Death, Wrong Tomb, Displaced Body, Bodily Resurrection)
–Postmortem Appearances
1. Paul’s list of eyewitnesses to Jesus’ resurrection appearances guarantees that such appearances occurred. I Cor 15:3-8. Old Jerusalem-Christian tradition quoted by Paul.
a. Appearance to Peter. I Cor 15:3-8. Old Jerusalem-Christian tradition quoted by Paul.
i. Paul (Gal 1:18) two weeks with Peter in Jerusalem three years after Paul’s conversion
ii. Multiple attestation: mentioned in another old Christian tradition found in Luke 24:34
iii. As a result, even the most skeptical NT critics agree Peter saw an appearance of Jesus alive after death.
b. Appearance to the Twelve (best attested). I Cor 15:3-8. Old Jerusalem-Christian tradition quoted by Paul.
i. Paul had contact with them (less Judas—“The Twelve” was a formal title).
ii. Multiple attestation: independent stories in Luke 24:36-42 and John 20:19-20
–Jesus shows his wounds and eats to show he was raised physically and is Jesus
c. Appearance to five hundred brethren. I Cor 15:3-8. Old Jerusalem-Christian tradition quoted by Paul.
i. Paul had personal contact with them, since he knew some of them had died.
ii. He mentions most are still alive because their witness adds weight to what he is saying—they can be questioned
iii. Paul couldn’t have gotten away w/ saying these things if they weren’t true
iv. It is probably not mentioned in the Gospels because it took place in Galilee, and the Gospels focus their attention on the appearances in Jerusalem
v. Was this the appearance predicted by the angel in the pre-Markan passion story and described by Matthew (28:16-17)?
d. Appearance to James (Jesus’ younger brother). I Cor 15:3-8. Old Jerusalem-Christian tradition quoted by Paul.
i. Was a skeptic during Jesus’ lifetime (Mark 3:21, 31-35; John 7:1-10).
—Embarrassment: criterion of embarrassment
ii. After resurrection, Jesus’ brothers are among the fellowship in the upper room (Acts 1:14)
iii. In Acts 12 Peter says “Report this to James.”
iv. In Gal 1:19 James is an apostle.
v. In Gal 2:9, James is one of the three ‘pillars’ of the church.
vi. In Acts 21:18, James is the sole head of the church and council of elders.
vii. Historical congruence. Josephus (Antiquities of the Jews, 20.200) says he is stoned to death illegally by the Sanhedrin after A.D. 60 for his faith
viii. His brothers, too, became believers active in the church (1 Cor 9:5)
ix. If crucified, would have confirmed Jesus’ brothers’ doubts, unless they saw the resurrected Jesus
x. Effect. NT critic Hans Grass admits conversion of James one of surest proofs of resurrection
e. Appearance to “all the apostles.” Multiple attestation. Acts 1:21-22; I Cor 15:3-8. Old Jerusalem-Christian tradition quoted by Paul.
i. Paul had personal contact with them.
f. Appearance to Saul of Tarsus. Acts 9:1-9 (later told again twice, referred to in Paul’s letters). I Cor 15:3-8. Multiple attestation.
i. Effect. “This event changed Saul’s whole life. He was a rabbi, a Pharisee, a respected Jewish leader. He hated the Christian heresy and was doing everything in his power to stamp it out. He was even responsible for the execution of Christian believers. Then suddenly he gave up everything. He left his position as a respected Jewish leader and became a Christian missionary: he entered a life of poverty, labor, and suffering. He was whipped, beaten, stoned and left for dead, shipwrecked three times, in constant danger, deprivation, and anxiety. Finally, he made the ultimate sacrifice and was martyred for his faith at Rome. And it was all because on that day outside Damascus, he saw ‘Jesus our Lord’ (I Cor 9:1),” (p. 380, Dr. Craig, Reasonable Faith).
2. Multiple attestation. The Gospel accounts provide multiple, independent attestation of postmortem appearances of Jesus.
a. The appearance to Peter independently attested by Paul and Luke (1 Cor 15:5; Luke 24:34) and universally acknowledged by critics.
b. The appearance to the Twelve is independently attested by Paul, Luke and John (1 Cor 15:5; Luke 24:36-43; John 20:19-20) and is not in dispute (even if many critics are skeptical of the physical demonstrations that attend this appearance).
c. The appearance to the women disciples independently attested by Matthew and John (Matt 28:9-10; John 20:11-17).
i. Embarrassment: also fulfills criterion of embarrassment (see above).
–generally agreed that absence of this appearance from tradition quoted by Paul is a reflection of that embarrassment
d. appearances in Galilee independently attested by Mark, Matthew and John (Mark 16:7; Matt 28:16-17; John 21)
i. “Taken sequentially, the appearances follow the pattern of Jerusalem—Galilee—Jerusalem, matching the festival pilgrimages of the disciples as they returned to Galilee following the Passover/Feast of Unleavened Bread and traveled again to Jerusalem two months later for Pentecost,” (p. 381, Dr. Craig, Reasonable Faith).
e. NT critics Perrin, Ludemann (and others) do not dispute the disciples saw the risen Jesus. “It may be taken as historically certain that Peter and the disciples had experiences after Jesus’ death in which Jesus appeared to them as the risen Christ,” (Dr. Craig quoting Ludemann, On Guard, p. 236).
3. The resurrection appearances were physical, bodily appearances.
a. Paul implies that the appearances were physical. 1 Cor 15:42-44 (‘spiritual’ is used in same sense as it is used in 1 Cor 2:14-15)
i. as opposed to Stephen’s ‘vision’ in Acts which no one else experienced in any way
b. The Gospel accounts show the appearances were physical and bodily.
i. None of them non-physical. No trace of an earlier, non-physical oral tradition, and eye-witnesses are still about.
ii. Non-physical visions do not explain the Gospel accounts of physical resurrection, since Gentiles wanted to be rid of the body and Jews could not conceive of an ‘individual’ resurrection before the end. Dissimilarity.
iii. Not from anti-Docetic motives, since they didn’t think the resurrection was a vision, more would need to be done than Jesus’ showing his wounds, and Docetism came later than the appearance traditions.
iv. Only reason for denying bodily resurrection is philosophical (“problem of miracles”), not historical.
(Rival Hypotheses: Hallucination, Bodily Resurrection)
–Origin of Christian Faith
(Skeptical NT scholars admit earliest disciples ‘believed’ in Jesus’ resurrection.)
(Without resurrection, would not have believed Jesus is Messiah, since had no conception of Messiah who is shamefully executed as criminal. Disimmilarity. Acts 2:32, 36.)
(Meier rejects there was a community of believers devoted to Q document who had no belief in resurrection, because only two Q communities we know of were Matthew and Luke’s churches, who both valued the passion tradition.)
(Discussion of Wright’s critique of Bultmann’s ‘exaltation’ hypothesis on p. 389.)
1. Dissimilarity. Not from Christian Influences.
a. There was no Christianity yet.
2. Dissimilarity. Not from Pagan Influences.
a. That Jesus’ resurrection is a copycat of other resurrection myths is itself a myth.
i. Many of the alleged parallels are actually apotheosis stories, disappearance stories, Emperor worship—none of them parallel to the Jewish idea of the resurrection of the dead.
ii. The ‘dying and rising gods’ did not ‘rise’ but lived in the netherworld, or went through cycles of dying and rising [Jews knew about (Ezek. 37:1-14) and found seasonal deities abhorrent], rather than one single resurrection (Mettinger).
iii. There is no trace of cults of dying and rising gods in first-century Palestine (Kittel).
3. Dissimilarity. Not from Jewish influences.
a. Jewish resurrection: Isaiah 26:19, Ezekiel 37, Daniel 12:2.
i. Occurs after the end of history (John 11:23-24, Mark 9:9-11)
ii. Does not happen to just one individual (I Cor 15:20)
b. no other example of any Jewish group (century before or century after) claiming their executed leader had died and been raised from the dead and really was the Messiah after all
c. If the disciples had merely had hallucinations (which would only have involved visions of Jesus, since they had no concept of individual, mid-history resurrection—Dissimilarity), they would not have concluded he had been raised bodily from the dead. At most, they would have concluded he had been translated or assumed into heaven.
(Discussion of Wright’s critique of Bultmann’s ‘exaltation’ hypothesis on p. 389.)
(Rival Hypotheses: Conspiracy, Apparent Death, Wrong Tomb, Displaced Body, Bodily Resurrection)
STEP TWO: “to argue that the hypothesis of Jesus’ resurrection is the best or most probable explanation of those facts”
Rival Hypotheses:
Conspiracy: Disciples stole Jesus’ body, lied about postmortem appearances.
Apparent Death (a.k.a. Swoon): Jesus didn’t really die but revived in the tomb.
Wrong Tomb: The women didn’t know they went to the wrong tomb.
Displaced Body: The disciples didn’t know Joseph moved Jesus to common grave.
Hallucination: The disciples hallucinated Jesus’ resurrection appearances.
Antecedent Influences: Resurrection part of early pagan, Jewish or Christian beliefs.
–won’t be countered here, because countered above
Bodily Resurrection: Jesus was resurrected physically by God from the dead.
Now to apply McCullagh’s criteria (p. 371 of Dr. Craig’s Reasonable Faith) for justifying historical hypotheses:
1. The hypothesis, together with other true statements, must imply further statements describing present, observable data (literary evidence of NT).
“Virtually any explanation offered for the resurrection will fulfill this first criterion, since such explanations are offered to account for the New Testament witness to Jesus’ resurrection and so will imply that the literary evidence contained in the New Testament will exist as a result of the events described in the proposed hypothesis,” (RF, p. 371).
Conspiracy: See above. Gospel accounts are deliberate fabrications.
Apparent Death: See above.
Wrong Tomb: See above.
Displaced Body: See above.
Hallucination: See above.
Bodily Resurrection: “Dialectical theologians like Barth often spoke of the resurrection as a supra-historical event; but even though the cause of the resurrection is beyond history, that event nonetheless has a historical margin in the empty tomb and resurrection appearances. As J.A.T. Robinson nicely put it, there was not simply nothing to show for it; rather there was ‘nothing’ to show for it (that is, an empty tomb)! Moreover, there is the Christian faith itself to show for it. The present, observable data is chiefly in the form of historical texts which form the basis of the historian’s reconstruction of the events of Easter,” (RF, p.397).
2. The hypothesis must have greater explanatory ‘scope’ than rival hypotheses. It will explain more of the evidence.
Conspiracy: Explains empty tomb, postmortem appearances, disciples’ belief.
Apparent Death: Same as above.
Wrong Tomb: Doesn’t explain resurrection appearances.
Displaced Body: Only explains empty tomb.
Hallucination: Only explains resurrection appearances.
Bodily Resurrection: Explains empty tomb, postmortem appearances, disciples’ belief.
***Surviving hypotheses: Conspiracy, Apparent Death, Bodily Resurrection
3. The hypothesis must have greater explanatory ‘power’ than rival hypotheses. It will make the evidence more probable.
Conspiracy: Why invent the embarrassing detail that women were first witnesses to empty tomb? Principle of embellishment: Why not more theophany-type glorifying embellishments of resurrection experiences? Why isn’t Matthew’s guard there in pre-Markan tradition—and why isn’t the guard there before Saturday morning in Matthew’s story (like they are in the Gospel of Peter)? Why no appearances to Caiaphas or the Sanhedrin as Jesus predicted, branding them liars? What about the fact that the disciples’ lives were transformed and they died for their “supposed” belief? Effect.
Apparent Death: How explain empty tomb, since a man sealed inside cannot move the stone? How did a half-dead man move the stone? Why did the appearance of a half-dead man make the disciples think he had died and then conquered death by rising again? Why did they believe he rose again (contrary to Jewish thought), instead of believing he never died? Dissimilarity. Why couldn’t two women handle the stone (Mark 16), if a half-dead man could handle it?
Wrong Tomb: Has no explanatory power to explain postmortem appearances. It has no power to explain their belief, because they would have investigated the tomb (without getting lost) rather than believing the women (btw, the women saw where he was laid in Mark 15:42-47). Certainly the Jewish opponents would have pointed out Jesus’ body in the correct tomb.
Displaced Body: Has no power to explain the appearances or belief. Has same problems as “Wrong Tomb” hypothesis. Why didn’t Joseph and his servants correct the disciples’ error? Why do the Jews instead claim the disciples stole the body? Why is there no evidence of a dispute over the location/identity of Jesus’ corpse?
Hallucination: Only very weakly explains appearances. The diversity of the appearances and that they happened to groups and unbelievers and even enemies bursts the bounds of the psychological casebooks. A chain-reaction among the disciples does not account for people like James and Saul, who stood outside the chain. Non-physical hallucinations (“visions”) do not explain the Gospel accounts of physical resurrection, since Gentiles wanted to be rid of the body and Jews could not conceive of individual, mid-history resurrection. Dissimilarity. At the very least, they would have assumed the vision was of Jesus “from beyond the grave”. At most, they would have concluded he had been translated or assumed into heaven, like Elijah.
Bodily Resurrection: The Conspiracy and Apparent Death hypotheses, though having good explanatory scope with regard to the empty tomb, the resurrection appearances, and the origin of the Christian faith, have very poor explanatory power (above), whereas the Bodily Resurrection hypothesis makes it very probable that all the data is just as it is.
***Surviving hypothesis: Bodily Resurrection.
4. Hypothesis must be more plausible. It will fit better with true background beliefs.
Conspiracy: Unbelievable complexity of pulling off such a conspiracy, something about the supposed psychological state of the disciples, it wouldn’t have entered the Jewish disciples’ minds to make up (for others to believe) an individual, mid-history resurrection (Dissimilarity). The transformation of the disciples becomes very improbable. Effect.
Apparent Death: Roman executioners were very reliable (spear in the side, piercing heart). Jesus’ tortures ‘before’ that would have prevented him from surviving a crucifixion or entombment. Then Jesus went on to move the stone and appear to his disciples as the Risen Lord throughout Jerusalem and Galilee? Two women couldn’t handle the stone (Mark 16), but a half-dead man could handle it? The transformation of the disciples becomes very improbable. Effect.
Wrong Tomb: Implausible in light of evidence we do have, like that the site was known by both Jew and Christian, the empty tomb story is extremely early and shows no sign of theological development and reflection. Implausible for same reasons as Hallucination hypothesis.
Displaced Body: Criminal’s graveyard not far off, had adequate time for a simple burial, so Joseph would have put it there in the first place (rather than moving it later). Also, Jewish law did not permit moving the body later, except to the family tomb. Historical congruence.
Hallucination: First, Ludemann’s psychoanalysis (Peter and Paul’s guilt) implausible because based on highly disputed theories, insufficient data, evidence that Paul did not struggle from guilt complex [Romans 7 is not to be interpreted in terms of Paul’s pre-Christian experience, and Paul said “As to righteousness under the Law (I was) blameless,” (Phil 3:6)]. Second, in 1 Cor 15 Paul is saying his experience of Jesus was just as objective and real as the other apostles—he was not diluting theirs to a mere vision. Non-physical hallucinations (“visions”) do not explain the Gospel accounts of physical resurrection, since Gentiles wanted to be rid of the body and Jews could not conceive of individual, mid-history resurrection. Dissimilarity. At the very least, they would have assumed the vision was of Jesus “from beyond the grave”. At most, they would have concluded he had been translated or assumed into heaven, like Elijah.
Bodily Resurrection: “plausibility…grows exponentially as we consider it in its religio-historical context of Jesus’ unparalleled life and radical personal claims and in its philosophical context of the arguments of natural theology. Once one abandons the philosophical prejudice against the miraculous, the hypothesis that God should raise Jesus from the dead is no more implausible than its rivals, nor are they more plausible than the resurrection,” (RF, p. 397).
***Still surviving hypothesis: Bodily Resurrection.
5. Hypothesis must be less ad hoc or contrived (“won’t require adopting as many new beliefs that have no independent evidence” (Dr. Craig, On Guard, p. 244).
Conspiracy: What all the evidence points to is mere appearance. The disciples’ conspiratorial motives, ideas, and actions for which there is no shred of evidence. The moral character of the disciples was defective (not implied by already existing knowledge). Can become even more ad hoc when having to answer objections to the hypothesis (like the appearance to the 500 brethren, the women’s role in the empty tomb and appearance stories). The disciples’ lives were transformed because of and they died for their “feigned” belief. Effect.
Apparent Death: The centurion’s lance thrust into Jesus’ side was just a superficial poke or is unhistorical detail (goes beyond existing knowledge). A half-dead man went on to single-handedly move the stone, get past the guard and appear to his disciples as the Risen Lord throughout Jerusalem and Galilee. Rather than making the disciples believe he had ‘not’ died, the appearance of a half-dead man made the disciples think he had died and then conquered death by rising again (contrary to Jewish thought). Gets even more ad hoc in its conspiratorial forms. Secret societies, secret potions, secret alliances between disciples and Sanhedrin, et cetera. It requires a biological miracle (of the gaps), that Jesus survived his tortures, crucifixion and entombment.
Wrong Tomb: Accepts some evidence (the women’s visit to the tomb, most of the angel’s words, that there ‘is’ some person saying those words, that the women react with fear and astonishment) while disregarding other equally-authentic evidence (the women noting where the body was laid, the words “He is risen!”, the person saying those words is an angel, that the women’s reaction is to the angelic confrontation).
Displaced Body: Ascribes motives and actions to Joseph for which there is no evidence. “Becomes even more contrived if we have to start inventing things like Joseph’s sudden death in order to save the hypothesis,” (Dr. Craig, On Guard, p. 254).
Hallucination: “It assumes that the disciples fled back to Galilee after Jesus’ arrest, that Peter was so obsessed with guilt that he projected a hallucination of Jesus, that the other disciples were prone to hallucinations, and that Paul had a struggle with the Jewish law and a secret attraction to Christianity,” (RF, p. 387). It requires a psychological miracle (of the gaps) in the case of the appearances to more than one person at a time, as people do not share hallucinations. It assumes that a physical resurrection was desirable to the Gentile imagination (it was not) and available to the Jewish imagination (it was not). Dissimilarity. At the very least, they would have assumed the vision was of Jesus “from beyond the grave”. At most, they would have concluded he had been translated or assumed into heaven, like Elijah.
Bodily Resurrection: Though McCullagh thought that the Resurrection hypothesis was ad hoc, it seems only to require one new supposition, unless one is already a theist with a background knowledge of the arguments of natural theology: that God exists. “Scientific hypotheses regularly include the supposition of the existence of new entities, such as quarks, strings, gravitons, black holes, and the like, without those theories being characterized as ad hoc,” (RF, p. 398). The biological miracle of Apparent Death, and the psychological miracle of Hallucination, strike one as artificial and contrived (“of the gaps”) compared to Resurrection, within the context of Jesus’ ministry and personal claims.
***Still surviving hypothesis: Bodily Resurrection.
6. Hypothesis must be disconfirmed by fewer accepted beliefs. It won’t conflict with as many accepted beliefs.
Conspiracy: Disconfirmed by knowledge that conspiracies tend to unravel, the disciples’ sincerity (died for faith), the unavailability of individual, mid-history resurrection to the Jewish imagination, et cetera. Dissimilarity.
Apparent Death: Massively disconfirmed by medical facts about the effects of scourging and crucifixion, and unanimous evidence that Jesus did not continue among his disciples after his death.
Wrong Tomb: Disconfirmed by generally accepted beliefs that Joseph buried Jesus and so could point to burial location and empty tomb tradition is very early.
Displaced Body: Disconfirmed by what we know of Jewish burial procedures for criminals. Historical congruence.
Hallucination: Disconfirmed by “the belief that Jesus received an honorable burial by Joseph of Arimethea, that Jesus’ tomb was discovered empty by women, that psychoanalysis of historical figures is not feasible, that Paul was basically content with his life under the Jewish law, and that the New Testament makes a distinction between a vision and a resurrection appearance,” (RF, p. 387). (Joseph and the women add some ‘disconfirming’ embarrassment.) Disconfirmed by the fact that individual, mid-history resurrection was inconceivable to the Jewish imagination, and undesirable to the Gentile imagination. Disconfirmation by dissimilarity.
Bodily Resurrection: “Dead men do not rise” (addressed by addressing “problem of miracles”).
***Still surviving hypothesis: Bodily Resurrection.
7. Hypothesis must significantly exceed rivals in fulfilling 2 through 6.
Conspiracy: Although it has good explanatory scope, “there are better hypotheses, such as the Hallucination Hypothesis, which do not dismiss the disciples’ belief in Jesus’ resurrection as fraudulent,” (RF, p. 373). Poor explanatory power.
Apparent Death: Although it has good explanatory scope, it is hardly a standout. Poor explanatory power.
Wrong Tomb: Nope.
Displaced Body: Nope. If the resurrection is denied, historians are left w/o explanation of the empty tomb, as scarcely any modern historian or biblical critic would hold to these hypotheses.
Hallucination: Although it has very poor explanatory scope (for starters), this is the only hypothesis entertained by skeptical scholars and so exceeds its naturalistic rivals, but not the Resurrection. “Different individuals and groups saw Jesus physically and bodily alive from the dead. Furthermore, there is no good way to explain this away psychologically,” (RF, p. 387) and individual, mid-history resurrection was not available to the Jewish imagination. Dissimilarity
Bodily Resurrection: Given the religio-historical context and vindicating Jesus’ radical personal claims, Jesus’ resurrection explains well the empty tomb, the resurrection appearances, and the origin of the Christian faith. It has “greater explanatory scope than some rival explanations like the hallucination hypothesis or the displaced body hypothesis by explaining all three of the main facts at issue, whereas these rival hypotheses explain only one,” (Dr. Craig, On Guard, p. 259). Its explanatory power is its greatest strength. “The conspiracy hypothesis and the apparent death hypothesis, just do not convincingly account for the empty tomb, resurrection appearances, and origin of the Christian faith; on these theories the evidence (for example, the transformation of the disciples) becomes very improbable. Effect. By contrast, on the hypothesis of Jesus’ resurrection it seems extremely probable that the tomb should be empty, that the disciples should see appearances of Jesus alive, and that they should come to believe in His resurrection,” (ibid). It has been shown that the resurrection hypothesis requires only one new supposition (if one is not already a theist), whereas rival theories require many. It has been shown that the resurrection hypothesis is only disconfirmed if the problem of miracles is a real one (but this is addressed elsewhere), whereas rival theories are disconfirmed by many accepted beliefs. Once one gives up the prejudice against miracles, there is no better rival.
***Sole surviving hypothesis: Bodily Resurrection.
Remember, following where the evidence leads is not the same as trusting the person it leads to. A ‘reasonable’ faith is not mere intellectual assent, but includes a relationship with the God who died to show us that he loves us no matter what.
The Scottish philosopher David Hume (May 7, 1711-August 25, 1776) lays out the is-ought problem, in book III, part I, section I of his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739). Hume says ought-statements are “entirely different” from is-statements and, in his own style, he challenges readers not to pass unthinkingly over the type of argument that switches from is-statements to ought-statements:
“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.”[1]
Hume is essentially asking, “given knowledge of the way the universe is, in what sense can we say it ought to be different?” (2) It is with that in mind that he “notes that many writers make claims about what ought to be on the basis of statements about what is” (ibid).
Some turn Hume’s quote into “Hume’s Law” or “Hume’s Guillotine” (as it completely severs ‘is’ from ‘ought’): “no ethical or indeed evaluative conclusion whatsoever may be validly inferred from any set of purely factual premises” (7) or “you cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’”.
In short, Hume is calling attention to arguments of this form:
Premise: This is (not) so/done.
Conclusion: This ought (not) to be so/done.
Hume says it is “altogether inconceivable” to say any of the following three things:
1) what is good (an ought) is justified by God’s existence (an is),
2) we ought (not) to do something a certain way ‘because’ it is (not) how we have always done it or are currently doing it, or, (though Hume came before Darwin),
3) “natural selection” is how things ought to be ‘because’ it is how things are in nature.
Hume is not so much talking about whether or not those oughts are really ‘justified’. More than that, he is talking about whether or not they are “real” or “true” in order to be known. To put it more basically, “(Can) any moral statement be literally true, and hence potentially knowable?” (6). This is the ultimate concern in Hume’s thinking here.
It should be noted before going any further that, though Hume does acknowledge that the ought-propositions, fallaciously derived from God’s existence, come ‘after’ the writer “has established the being of a God,” Hume would not have granted that God’s existence is part of “how the universe is” (or how reality is). He was an atheist.
Some atheists who agree the is-ought fallacy is a real fallacy will counter theists (who also agree, but use the Guillotine to attack naturalist ethical theories) simply by stating that Hume was an atheist and that the is-ought fallacy does not lead to a theistic conclusion, but actually critiques it. Others will just deny that the is-ought fallacy is a real fallacy in order to neutralize challenges to the validity of their moral judgments which do not “mind the gap” between ‘is so’ and ‘ought to be’.
For example, challenging the fact-value distinction, Ruth Ann Putnam has argued “even the most ‘scientific’ of disciplines are affected by the ‘values’ of the men and women who research and practice the vocation” (9). Granted, but that is something to watch out for when it comes to remaining as objective as possible, rather than an argument against the distinction. And it does not mean they necessarily have reasoned, or that it would be okay for them to reason, from “ought” (or value) to “is” (or fact) (the reverse is-ought fallacy). Pointing out that the distinction has been violated in the past is no argument against maintaining the distinction.
Given that the is-ought problem is fallacious, of what sort of fallacy does it consist?
Those who equate the is-ought fallacy with the fallacy named “appeal to nature” (10) consider it 1) a kind of formal, deductive “fallacy of accident” (also called destroying the exception, because evidence to the contrary is not admitted), 2) a kind of informal “appeal to tradition” which is a type of genetic fallacy, a fallacy of relevance, 3) an example of informally “begging the question” because of an unproved hidden co-premise (as in “He is a person and persons shouldn’t torture other beings” below, and any other “evaluative premise” which could take its place), or of 4) formal “circular reasoning” because the conclusion (what ought to be) is assumed in the premises (what is). “The is-ought fallacy occurs when a conclusion expressing ‘what ought to be so’ is inferred from premises expressing only what ‘is’ so” (4).
While some think the is-ought problem completely severs is from ought and so name it Hume’s Guillotine and Hume’s Law, others interpret him as less strongly suggesting that “one cannot make the initial discovery of moral properties by inference from nonmoral premises using reason alone; rather one requires some input from sentiment” (7). They say this can be done by simply inserting an “evaluative premise” (1). “(Hume) seems to have thought that one can infer the latter (‘ought’ claims) from the former (‘is’ claims) only if, in addition to premises concerning plain matters of fact, one has on hand as well at least one evaluative premise” (1). For example (4):
He is torturing the cat.
[Evaluative premise: He is a person and persons shouldn’t torture other beings.]
So, he shouldn’t do that.
First, it should be easy to see that inserting an evaluative sentence does not mean one can then go ahead and infer an ought from an is. That isn’t what is happening. The ought is not inferred from an is, but from an evaluative statement which is not inferred, but merely inserted or assumed. This leaves unexplained ‘why’ persons shouldn’t torture other beings, instead taking it as a given and going from formally arguing in a circle (without the evaluative premise), to informally begging the question (with the evaluative premise). “The question immediately arises, ‘How might we justify these evaluative premises or principles?’” (1). One might say the question actually ‘remains’ rather than ‘immediately arises’, however, a belief’s being justified (the newly arising question) is different from a belief’s being true (Hume’s question). Both questions are important: the belief (premise/principle) needs to be ‘both’ justified ‘and’ true if it is to also count as moral knowledge (the ultimate concern in Hume’s thinking).
Some say that, given you cannot get an ought from an is, and applying Hume’s Fork (problem of induction), oughts rely on neither “logic and definitions, or…observation” (2) and so can be neither ‘conclusive’ (preferred by Hume’s Fork) or ‘probable’ (this is an area I would love and sorely need to study further).
Mortimer J. Adler considers the is-ought fallacy “an analogue or special form of the modal fallacy. … It is logically invalid in reasoning to infer a necessary conclusion from premises that are contingent in their modality, or to assign contingency to a conclusion that is inferred from premises that are necessary in their modality. It is similarly and just as obviously fallacious to draw an ought-conclusion from premises that consist entirely of is-statements; for the difference in logical type between descriptive and normative propositions is as great as, if not greater than, the difference in modality between two descriptive propositions” (8). Similarly, the difference between descriptive and normative propositions is the difference between correspondence (ontology/metaphysics) and justification (epistemology).
A known belief “is” true (correspondence) and “ought” to be believed (justification). This goes back to Plato’s “justified true belief” requirement for knowledge. Truth is either/or, while belief can vary in degrees depending on the strength of justification. All that is required for knowledge is that a belief be ‘both’ true ‘and’ justified (enough to be believed above 50%) by logic and definitions, observations, direct reason, intellect or intuition—whatever reasons we “ought” to believe the conclusion “is”.
To say that a belief’s being true or false makes it justified 100% or 0% (respectively) commits the is-ought fallacy, and to say that a belief’s feeling justified (say, 86%) makes it (86%) true commits the ought-is fallacy. Although truth is 100%, justification only needs to be above 50%, and we must have them both independently of eachother in order to ‘know’.
Translating from epistemology back over to ethics, there needs to be a real ought in order for there to be moral knowledge, but 1) the real ought is not justified by its correspondence to reality—that would be saying its correspondence justifies its correspondence (begging in a circle) and 2) a particular ought is not made to correspond by its justification—that would be like saying that the act of believing made something real to believe in (also begging in a circle). No, there must be “both” justification “and” correspondence. If one or both is lacking (by depending on the other, or for some other reason), knowledge is lacking.
Some (anti-realists, skeptics) argue that if ‘is’ is completely severed from ‘ought’ then moral ‘truth’ (ontology, metaphysics) is completely severed from ‘justification’ (belief, epistemology) and all we can have is belief and never knowledge, because it puts truth beyond the grasp of even belief, much less knowledge. This is false. Unless we maintain the gap, we argue in a circle, we grasp at grasping and know nothing. For an in-detail analysis, see (11). As long as we mind the gap, knowledge is possible, which is evident in scientific progress.
Still, John Searle tries to derive ought from is by distinguishing between two kinds of descriptive statements: brute facts and institutional facts. Institutional facts are composed of ‘constitutive’ rules which create a form of activity (chess for example) that would not exist without the rules,” (5) as opposed to ‘regulative’ rules which regulate things that would exist even without the regulations (traffic code for example). Searle says combining institutional rules (ought) and brute facts (is) will result in obligation. “As far as institutional obligations go, we can derive them only after we first collectively contrive them. Or, at least, that is all that Searle has shown” (5).
The attempted solutions, first of inserting an evaluative premise, second the discussion of institutional facts, appeal to “values already possessed” (2), rather than evaluating the truthfulness of those values. Truthfulness is about correspondence.
Some (2) say that the truth of an “is” statement is defined by its correspondence to reality, whereas the truth of an “ought” statement is defined by its correspondence to right desire. However, if we are talking about “real oughts” then that (granted) “right desire” should be part of reality, so that the truth of “ought” statements is, like the truth of “is” statements, determined by (though not justified by) its correspondence to reality. In other words, if an ought statement is true, there is some being in reality to which it corresponds, some being which it describes, but which does not justify the ought statement, which is justified using reasons (12).
Sources reviewed in preparation for this article (some of them referenced above):
(1) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaethics/
(8) Comments on the “Naturalistic Fallacy” by Mortimer J. Adler, Ph.D
(9)
(10)
(11) Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology”.
Other relevant articles I have written:
God (is) the Golden Rule (ought) without offending Hume
The Golden Rule (self=Other) and God
Hume’s is-ought, Plato’s true-justified, Euthyphro’s dilemma and Gettier’s problem
Replacing Agnosticism with Apisticism
Is-ought fallacy and knowledge as justified-true-belief http://ichthus77.blogspot.com/2010/11/is-ought-fallacy-and-knowledge-as.html
Norris, Gettier, Euthyphro, Hume and Plato: Is knowledge justified true belief?
Answering Gettier
http://ichthus77.blogspot.com/2011/01/answering-gettier.html
Natural law, divine command and Euthyphro’s dilemma resolved using Hume’s is-ought distinction:
***
This post also appeared on Examiner.com.
I actually have ‘two’ questions (followed by a more important ‘third’ question).
1. Why does Sam Harris’ “Moral Landscape” have the word “moral” in it? and…
2. Why doesn’t its sub-title say “How science can likely determine human values”?
Really, I think the title should read “The Landscape of Well-Being: How science can likely determine human well-being” rather than pretending to be a book about objective moral truth.
Here’s why:
A. Harris: “Notice that I do not mention morality in the preceding paragraph, and perhaps I need not. I began this book by arguing that, despite a century of timidity on the part of scientists and philosophers, morality can be linked directly to facts about the happiness and suffering of conscious creatures. However, it is interesting to consider what would happen if we simply ignored this step and merely spoke about ‘well-being.’” (Landscape, p. 64).
B. Harris: “…if evil turned out to be as reliable a path to happiness as goodness is, my argument about the moral landscape would still stand, as would the likely utility of neuroscience for investigating it. It would no longer be an especially ‘moral’ landscape; rather it would be a continuum of well-being, upon which saints and sinners would occupy equivalent peaks,” (Landscape, p. 190).
And, here’s a third question–the most important of the three:
3. What was the point of including the psychopath’s statement in chapter two (p. 95-96), if Harris is cool with not calling it evil (quotes A and B above)?
He goes on to say that people are not ultimately responsible for their own immoral, evil choices when he denies free will. It is no wonder then that he is so ready to deny morality, to ‘go beyond’ good and evil in quotes A and B. But…what is it people are not responsible for in the first sentence of this paragraph, if there is no morality, no good and evil–why go to the trouble of pointing out they are not responsible for something that doesn’t exist? And what of this quote:
C. Harris: “We can choose to focus on certain facts to the exclusion of others, to emphasize the good rather than the bad, etc. And such choices have consequences for how we view the world. One can, for instance, view Kim Jong-il as an evil dictator; one can also view him as a man who was once the child of a dangerous psychopath. Both statements are, to a first approximation, true. (Obviously, when I speak about ‘freedom’ and ‘choices’ of this sort, I am not endorsing a metaphysical notion of ‘free will,’)” (p. 139).
So…is Kim Jong-il’s dictatorship ‘really’ evil or not? Are we free to focus on ‘really’ morally good thoughts (precursors to behavior), to the exclusion of ‘really’ morally bad thoughts, or not? What is the ‘correct’ approximation (as Harris calls it)–if the ‘first‘ one (by calling it ‘first’ and an ‘approximation’) needs improvement? One that is more in line with quotes A and B–right, Harris?
I’ve said most of this previously, but it came up again here. Figured I’d blog about it.
Other related blog posts:
Why Sam Harris’ “objective moral truth” hovers over an abyss…
Craig v Harris debate post mortem, audio, video and transcript
Open letter to William Lane Craig regarding April 7 debate with Sam Harris
At Coffee with the Euthyphro Dilemma
Related Examiner.com articles:
Review: Sam Harris’ “The Moral Landscape”
Harris versus Dawkins, modern day Euthyphro dilemma
Dawkins changes mind for Harris’ objective moral truth
Sam Harris’ forthcoming Moral Landscape ‘decides’ objective morality
Sam Harris claims we are not free to choose objective moral truth.
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This post also appeared on Examiner.com.
Philosopher Christopher Norris, whose book Epistemology is discussed here on Ichthus77, has granted me permission to post the following as a guest post and enter it into the most recent Philosophers’ Carnival. It was written a couple weeks back and is under consideration for a regular print journal, so until then I am honored to display it here. Thankyou, Professor Norris :)
Outside the Box: on the ‘extended mind’ hypothesis
Christopher Norris
Abstract
In this essay I examine various aspects of the ‘extended mind’ (EM) thesis proposed by David Chalmers and Andy Clark. Their claim is that various items of extra-cranial equipment (ranging from notebooks to iPhones) are so closely bound up with the mental processes of those who use them that they must – on a ‘parity principle’ – count as parts or integral components of the users’ minds. Opponents of the thesis typically object that minds don’t have parts, that the devices in question are themselves products of human ingenuity, and that intentionality – the mark of the mental – cannot be attributed to notebooks or iPhones without falling into gross confusion. In response the advocates of ‘strong’ EM run a range of arguments, mostly of the slippery-slope kind, in order to press their point that there is no way to draw a firm or principled line between ‘internal’ and ‘extraneous’ modes of mental extension or cognitive enhancement.
Keywords: brain, cognitive science, epistemology, extended mind, externalism, mind, phenomenology, psychology
In which case, Fodor continues, ‘it looks as though the notebook that’s part of Otto’s mind is also part of Inga’s’, with the consequence that ‘if Otto loses his notebook, Inga loses part of her mind’.[11] This sounds logical enough and would seem to knock a hole in the EM case were it not for the temporal aspect of the story which allows both circuits (Otto’s with his notebook; Otto’s mind with Inga’s) to be broken once Otto has mislaid that precious item. After all, it is quite explicitly a question in Fodor’s narrative of who knows what and when, that is to say, of knowledge acquired by both parties at a certain stage in the proceedings and then lost by one of them (due to his memory deficit) but presumably not by the other (due to her suffering under no such disadvantage). However Clark ignores this point and focuses instead on what he takes to be Fodor’s most substantive objection, namely his above-mentioned argument concerning the ‘underived’ (self-sufficient or autonomous) nature of mental content as opposed to the ‘derived’ (dependent or second-order) status of physical prostheses such as Otto’s notebook. His rejoinders regularly take the form of turning Fodor’s objections around so as to argue that any sense in which Otto’s knowledge or cognitive state can rightfully be called ‘derivative’, ‘secondary’, ‘dependent’, ‘unreliable’, ‘indirect’, ‘error-prone’, ‘fallible’, or whatever, is also – at no great stretch of counterfactual reasoning – a sense that applies equally in Inga’s case.
IV