Category Archives: Norris’ Epistemology

Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy” Concluding Scientific-Realist Postscript – Section II.After restating some things said in section I, Norris states that he has tried to represent opposing positions fairly, without caricature. The issue has been … Continue reading →

Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy” Concluding Scientific-Realist Postscript – Section I. First-off, I can’t help thinking of Kierkegaard’s “Concluding Unscientific Postscript” when reading the title of this chapter, but Norris never overtly names him.Norris basically … Continue reading →

Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy” Chapter 5: Making for Truth: Some Problems with Virtue-Based Epistemology – Section VI.Grand finale for this chapter. One more chapter after this, with only two sections in it. Marie McGinn … Continue reading →

Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy” Chapter 5: Making for Truth: Some Problems with Virtue-Based Epistemology – Section V.Ok, so, apparently “foundationalist” means coherentist, and “anti-foundationalist” means pragmatist. Sosa claims they are a dead-end dispute to … Continue reading →

Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy” Chapter 5: Making for Truth: Some Problems with Virtue-Based Epistemology – Section IV.Virtue-based epistemology “has partly grown out of, and partly emerged as a reaction against, the kinds of reliabilist … Continue reading →

Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy” Chapter 5: Making for Truth: Some Problems with Virtue-Based Epistemology – Section III.Can a virtue-based epistemology, unlike McDowell’s efforts, “(1) make good the normativity-deficit, and (2) avoid all the usual … Continue reading →

Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy” Chapter 5: Making for Truth: Some Problems with Virtue-Based Epistemology – Section II.Note: physicalist is apparently synonymous with ‘thoroughly naturalized’. This section is going to mainly focus on how McDowell’s … Continue reading →

Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy” Chapter 5: Making for Truth: Some Problems with Virtue-Based Epistemology – Section I.So, basically, virtue epistemology goes beyond the fact that there are certain virtues which people can possess which … Continue reading →

Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy” Chapter 4: Response-Dependence: What’s in it for the Realist? – Sections V-VI.The first two paragraphs are a review of RD’s shortcomings, and then we begin to discuss Crispin Wright’s “superassertibility”, … Continue reading →

Book Discussion of Christopher Norris’ “Epistemology: Key Concepts in Philosophy” Chapter 4: Response-Dependence: What’s in it for the Realist? – Section IV.This section covers Kant’s influence in the RD debate via McDowell’s revision of him.From chapter 3, section III, though … Continue reading →