Category Archives: Gettier Problem

Hume’s is-ought, Plato’s true-justified, Euthyphro’s dilemma and Gettier’s problem

Posted on February 23, 2011 by Maryann Spikes

Hume‘s is-ought (fact-value) distinction is the same as Plato‘s true-justified distinction. When is/true/fact and ought/justified/value are not kept distinct, the Euthyphro dilemma as applied to epistemology ensues: Are we justified in believing (ought we believe) merely because our belief is true (can truth justify … Continue reading →

Posted in Apisticism, Divine Essentialism, Euthyphro Dilemma, Gettier Problem, Is-Ought Fallacy, Justified True Belief | Leave a comment

Answering Gettier

Posted on January 9, 2011 by Maryann Spikes

[ work in progress ] [ completed 1/15/11 ] Plato’s justified-true-belief definition of knowledge, maintained by critical realists, besides requiring that a belief be justified by evidence and true by correspondence, says 1) whether or not a belief is true … Continue reading →

Posted in Gettier Problem, Is-Ought Fallacy, Justified True Belief, Norris' Epistemology, Reviews and Interviews | 8 Comments

Norris, Gettier, Euthyphro, Hume and Plato: Is knowledge justified true belief?

Posted on January 5, 2011 by Maryann Spikes

[ Section on Gettier revised 1/7/11 ][ Mention of Euthyphro dilemma as applied to epistemology revised 2/23/11 ] When deciding whether knowledge is justified, true belief (Plato), a question arises: Is the truth of a belief 1) external to the … Continue reading →

Posted in Divine Essentialism, Euthyphro Dilemma, Gettier Problem, Is-Ought Fallacy, Justified True Belief, Norris' Epistemology, Reviews and Interviews | 3 Comments

Replacing Agnosticism with Apisticism

Posted on November 21, 2010 by Maryann Spikes

This article argues we replace the word “agnosticism” (lack of knowing) with the word “apisticism” (lack of believing) on every belief scale. The current debate between Myers and Coyne on the falsifiability of atheism is complicated by a misunderstanding of faith/belief as … Continue reading →